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ABSTRACT
Normative decision theory describes the judgment and decision-making 
process as a cost/benefit analysis based upon maximum utility. One assumption of the 
theory is full rationality for choices made throughout the process. Due to bounded 
rationality, however, mental shortcuts become necessary. Use of these shortcuts does 
not necessarily diminish the quality of the decision. However, a suboptimal use of a 
heuristic results in a biased decision.
Kahneman and Tversky (1979) identify three basic heuristics: availability, 
representativeness, and anchoring and adjusting. One suboptimal use of the anchoring 
and adjusting heuristic, confirmation bias, is the unconscious search for and evaluation 
of information that confirms one’s desired decision outcome while ignoring 
disconfirming information. In an adversarial legal contest, relying on biased research 
diminishes the probability of prevailing (Johnson 1993).
The intent of this research inquiry is to use archival data to test for the presence 
of confirmation bias in the defenses presented by the litigants in Tax Court 
Memorandum Opinions. The data sample consists of the briefs presented to the Court 
by both litigants, taxpayer and Internal Revenue Service, in 106 of the 288 rendered 
Memorandum Decisions in 2004.
Summary statistics from the data show that 51.85% of taxpayers represent 
themselves (i.e., pro se) in the contentious proceedings. The remaining taxpayers
iii
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employ tax professionals to provide the defense. The IRS has a contingent of legal 
counsel to present their position. Non-parametric statistical testing provides evidence 
that defenses presented by pro se taxpayers show more bias than defenses provided by 
tax professionals. In turn, taxpayers’ professional representatives present more biased 
defenses than do the IRS professional representatives.
This research inquiry adds external validity to the extant literature on biased 
research recommendations resulting from the tax research task. That is, numerous 
identified incentives promote susceptibility to the use of confirmatory decision­
making strategies. As shown in this study, incentives impact practitioners differently 
than government employees. Remedial measures, including education, task-specific 
experience, and accountability can reduce this proclivity. Pro se taxpayers, with no 
legal education, experience, or accountability, show a greater degree of bias in their 
defenses than do tax professionals.
iv
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
A code of professional ethics governs tax professionals, whether they are 
certified public accountants or attorneys. For certified public accountants, regulation 
is provided by the state legislatures. Regulatory power is delegated to state boards of 
accountancy by Uniform Accountancy Act Section 4(h)(4). As such, the American 
Institute of Certified Public Accountants (hereinafter referred to as AICPA) has 
adopted the Code o f Professional Conduct1 as a general standard. Additionally, the 
AICPA has adopted Standards o f Responsibility in Tax Practice to delineate 
guidelines for tax practice. These guidelines set parameters for aggressive tax 
positions. Alternatively, the American Bar Association's Model Rules o f Professional 
Conduct governs attorneys with regulation provided by states' supreme courts. For 
federal tax practice, tax professionals are also subject to the rules of the Internal 
Revenue Service (hereinafter referred to as IRS or Service) and the rules of the court 
where a matter is pending. In all instances, guidance is provided for the quality of 
services to be rendered to clients. Both professional codes mandate "unbiased" 
research as the foundation of the services provided by these professionals.
1 The Code o f Professional Conduct o f  the American Institute o f Certified Public Accountants, adopted 
by the membership to provide guidelines that govern the performance o f professional responsibilities, 
consists o f two parts: Principles and Rules. Interpretations o f these Principles and Rules are adopted 
after an exposure period. Noncompliance with the standards ultimately leads to disciplinary actions 
where necessary.
1
R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
In a simplistic definition, Webster (1997) defines "unbiased' research as a 
studious inquiry or examination aimed at the discovery and interpretation of new 
knowledge without prejudice. This process necessarily requires alternative choices. 
Normative economic theory stipulates that choice is based upon maximizing utility 
under a natural cost/benefit analysis. That is, under the same facts and circumstances, 
there is a rational and optimal choice. Early studies, however, have found that 
optimization in a cost/benefit context is representative of instinctive lower animal 
behavior; the human condition is characterized by violations of this normative model 
(Killeen 1978; Rachlin and Burkhard 1978; Staddon and Motheral 1978). Causes of 
this suboptimal behavior have led to identification of a plethora of human judgment 
biases, cognitive illusions, and deficiencies, resulting in biased judgment processes. 
Thus, "unbiased" research, as mandated by regulating authorities, is the ideal 
condition.
Biased decisions by tax professionals, as with all professionals, lead to 
refutable positions. Refutable positions, as the foundation of recommendations to 
clients or actions taken in another's behalf, as an employee, may result in undesirable 
consequences. Undesirable consequences run the gamut from challenges by taxing 
authorities to collapse of a business (e.g., Enron). Thus, unbiased decision-making, as 
the mandated foundation for professional judgment and decisions, is elemental to the 
effectiveness of professions and individual professionals. Education, experience, and 
accountability, in theory, mitigate the effect of biases. Thus, awareness of the 
presence of bias is necessary before causes can be isolated. At that point, steps 
necessary to mitigate susceptibility to cognitive illusions can be implemented. The
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
increasing incidence of legal claims against accountants in recent times mandated that
\
the knowledge necessary to elicit unbiased professional decision-making be enhanced. 
The focus of this research inquiry is to examine the support presented by litigants in 
challenges by taxing authorities, under a set of stipulated facts, to ascertain if 
confirmation bias exists. By isolating the presence of this bias, a step toward 
enhancing unbiased tax research may be taken.
Background
Judgment and Decision-Making
Judgment is the process of estimating outcomes and related consequences 
(Libby 1981). Decision-making refers to the process of identifying and evaluation of 
consequences for alternative choices and actions. Preferences and judgments are the 
inputs into decision-making. The term "decision" denotes the choice made (Shields et 
al. 1995). Thus, judgment and decision-making (hereinafter referred to as JDM) 
processes involve the acquisition of knowledge. Knowledge is dynamic and 
continually evolving. This epistemic process (Heaton and Kruglanski 1991) involves 
two stages. The stages, hypothesis generation (information gathering) and hypothesis 
validation (information evaluation), are continually repeated until a decision is 
determined. Under the normative model, JDM is free of bias.
However, the same fact pattern using the same available information, which 
under normative theory has one outcome, can result in diametrically opposite and, 
seemingly, defensible positions. This is the result of different individuals making 
different choices during the epistemic process.
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4Among other assumptions, the normative economic theory of rational choice 
implies full rationality. In Herbert Simon's seminal work (1983), Simon contends that 
full rationality is an unrealistic standard. A more realistic standard, a bounded (e.g., 
limited) rationality, inhibits the acquisition of full knowledge. That is, the scarcity of 
resources (i.e., conscious attention and time) limits ability. Kahneman and Tversky 
(1979) developed an additional perspective on bounded rationality. Human beings 
rely on heuristics, or mental shortcuts, to enhance the information processing abilities. 
In complex decision-making, the use of heuristics routinely facilitates good JDM. 
Even though the use of heuristics is efficient in the use of time and effort, it may 
produce systematically biased JDM. Kahneman and Tversky (1979) identify three 
heuristics: availability, representativeness, and anchoring and adjusting. Uses of 
these shortcuts are identifiable by the types of biases (e.g., departures from the 
normative models) that evolve from such usage.
Of the three heuristics identified by Kahneman and Tversky (1979), two of the 
shortcuts, availability and representativeness, are indicative of processes people use 
while making a particular type judgment. The availability heuristic is useful when 
making frequency and probability judgments. The representativeness heuristic is 
beneficial when categorical logic is necessary. The anchoring and adjustment 
shortcut, however, is "generic" in that it involves the inferential thought processes of 
the mind. As such, anchoring and adjusting is useful in all JDM. A fundamental tenet 
of psychology is that the human mind initially performs an unconscious process on 
information before passing a thought to the consciousness. Anchoring and adjustment 
is a model of this process.
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5During the epistemic process, people will anchor on one belief and adjust from 
that belief for new information. For example, in a comparison of skill levels, one may 
anchor on their own skill level and adjust for the skill of others (Kruger 1999). 
Additionally, in a confidence probability situation, people will anchor on the 
extremeness of information, then adjust in accordance with the credibility of other 
information (Griffin and Tversky 1992).
During the anchoring and adjusting process, among other strategies, a decision 
maker may reach a judgment by attending to information consistent (e.g., confirming) 
with the initial anchor. Biased JDM may result because inconsistent (e.g., 
nonconfirming) information is not used or is undervalued (Snyder and Swann 1978). 
Research shows that this confirmatory decision-making strategy is engaged in during 
both the information gathering (Snyder and Swann 1978) and information evaluation 
stages (Lord et al. 1979) of the epistemic process.
This bias, referred to as confirmation bias, is such that while the adjustment 
away from the anchor for new information may be appropriate in direction, it is 
generally not of sufficient magnitude to alleviate the bias (Slovic and Lichtenstein 
1971; Tversky and Kahneman 1974). Experimentally provided anchors have been 
shown to affect the initial anchor in the decision-making process.
Individuals cannot avert biases unless they are aware of those biases (Petty and 
Wegener 1993; Wilson and Brekke 1994). Without awareness, incentives can be 
instrumental in the anchoring process. Tversky and Kahneman (1974) demonstrated 
that incentives did not reduce anchoring. However, Wright and Anderson (1989)
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
6found a minimal reduction in anchoring when the tested incentives were the monetary 
payment for accuracy of judgment and public awareness of accuracy rates.
Tax Professionals
By signing an income tax return before filing it, every taxpayer is stating that, 
under the penalty of perjury, the return has been examined and, to the best of his/her 
knowledge and belief, the return is true, correct, and complete. The Internal Revenue 
Code of 1986 (hereinafter referred to as the Code) cannot and does not purport to 
address every conceivable factual taxing situation. In the alternative, statutory 
guidelines are presented, and consequently, uncertainty exists. Under these 
conditions, signing one's tax return that includes an ambiguous transaction infers that 
the position taken on the tax treatment of such event represents substantial authority.
Among other functions, tax professionals are charged with the responsibility of 
defending vague positions challenged by the Service. For the alternative tax 
treatments of the ambiguous transactions, the role of the professional is to research 
and present authoritative support.2 Likelihood that the position recommended, based 
upon the client's facts and circumstances, will prevail on its merits upon challenge 
reduces the risk of uncertainty faced by the taxpayer. An assessment of alternative tax 
treatments may be the result of an open-fact (planning) task for the professional. In 
this instance, the professional is involved in structuring the transactions before
2 In this context, authoritative support is defined by an enumerated listing o f authoritative sources in 
IRC Section 6662(d)(2)(B)(i). This listing, however, is not presented in a ranking context. Sources of 
primary authority have the force and effect o f law. Statutes, legislative interpretations, and case law 
exemplify primary authority. Secondary authority, without the force and effect o f low, provides 
guidelines and are accorded substantial weight. Interpretive regulations, IRS Rulings, and technical 
advice memoranda are examples o f secondary authority. Lacking an explicit guideline, tax 
professionals must rely on judgment to weight authoritative sources. Reg. § 1,6662-4(d)(3) also 
provides an enumerated listing. The Secretary o f the Treasury is mandated by Code Section 
6662(d)(2)(D) to provide an annual listing in the Federal Register o f positions for which there is not 
substantial authority.
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7occurrence. Upon completion of the transactions, the position taken is reported on an 
income tax return prepared by the tax professional for the taxpayer as a client. In 
other instances, closed- fact (compliance) tasks, a tax professional becomes involved 
in the challenge towards the end of the process rather than from the beginning. That 
is, the position has been taken by the taxpayer upon filing a return either self-prepared 
or prepared by another paid professional. Professional standards mandate that 
unbiased assessments of alternative tax treatments of clients' facts and circumstances 
be made (AICPA 1994, 18,055-18,059). Professional tax service models assume 
unbiased assessments (Phillips and Sansing 1998; Beck et al 1996).
Prior psychological research gives evidence that incentives impede the 
detachment necessary to generate unbiased research assessments (Koehler 1991). In 
both planning and compliance scenarios, several multi-directional incentives are 
present. While not all inclusive, incentives present in the tax professional-client 
relationship include compliance, professional enhancement/damage, and client 
advocacy. As the preparer, a position taken on a tax return concerning an issue that 
lacks a realistic probability o f success will result in IRS sanctioned preparer 
penalties. This compliance incentive will be present when the tax professional, or 
firm, is the preparer. Professional reputation is acquired by provision of quality 
services. Quality services are a matter of judgment. Prevailing in the challenge to a 
client’s desired outcome is an enhancing measure of professional quality while not 
prevailing in an action is detrimental. Professional reputation enhancement/damage 
has been shown to be a stronger incentive than the monetary compliance incentives
3 IRC Section 6694 defines a realistic probability o f success as a one in three probability. The 
monetary amount o f this sanction, $250, is symbolic. Invoking this penalty against a tax practitioner 
results in reporting o f the infraction to professional regulatory agencies for disciplinary actions.
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8(Wright and Anderson 1989). Client advocacy is both a "right and responsibility" in 
tax practice (AICPA 1994). Primary loyalty lies with the client (Ayres et al. 1989; 
IRS 1987).
With incentives, decision-makers may place more emphasis on information 
confirming the desired outcome during an information search and evaluation. Over 
emphasis on confirming information, "confirmation" bias, may result in overly 
aggressive assessments and recommendations by tax professionals to support the 
client-preferred treatment. While all incentives may not be present in every tax 
litigation scenario (e.g., compliance incentives are present only as preparers), the 
dichotomous nature of the incentives performs checks and balances to insure, in 
theory, that disputed positions proceeding to litigation have strong support.
Tax research is performed in a hierarchical manner. Working under a 
supervisor, staff accountants and staff lawyers begin research initiated by a superior. 
Substantial support for the position recommended is the outcome of this task. 
Research has shown evidence of the presence of systemic bias in this decision-making 
process. One such systematic bias, confirmation bias, purports that in the decision­
making process one searches more for information confirming one's desired outcome 
than for information disputing one's desired outcome. Since experience, education, 
and accountability should mitigate the presence of biases, bias should disperse as 
hierarchical research levels increase. Because of the filtering properties of 
dichotomous incentives and hierarchical levels, unbiased defenses for litigated cases 
should evolve. Empirical results on the mitigating effects of education (Cloyd and
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9Spilker 2000), experience (Biggs and Mock 1983; Kida 1984; Kaplan and Reckers 
1989), and accountability (Hatfield 2000) on confirmation bias, however, are mixed.
Tax litigation involves adversarial stances on an alternative tax treatment 
situation. With the same research sources available, it is possible for adversarial 
parties to strongly defend positions both for and against the same facts and 
circumstances. Confirmation bias could be one explanation for this anomaly.
Tax Administration
The IRS, a subsidiary agency of the Department of the Treasury, is charged 
with the administration of the tax laws. Among other duties, the IRS is charged with 
identifying delinquent tax payments for assessment and collection. In discharging this 
duty, the Service selects returns to audit. This selection, based on mathematical 
formulas, is engineered to derive those returns most likely to be erroneous and yield 
substantial additional taxes upon review.
The audit of a selected tax return can be in the form of an office audit (i.e., 
correspondence examination) or a field audit (i.e., interview examination). An office 
audit is performed through correspondence with the taxpayer and is generally limited 
to simple matters. A field audit entails analytical and judgment issues. This audit is 
accomplished on the premises of the taxpayer. This initial procedure can culminate in 
acceptance of the return as filed. In the alternative, the IRS auditor will propose 
certain adjustments in the Revenue Agent's Report (RAR). This report will undergo 
an internal review.
At this juncture, the taxpayer and IRS may agree to a settlement of the issues 
(Reg. Sec. 601.105(c)(l)(ii)). The Service, however, cannot settle based upon the
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probability of winning the case in litigation, the "hazards of litigation." The taxpayer, 
with the tax professional as a representative, may consider all relevant issues. If an 
agreement is reached, the taxpayer signs Form 870. By signing this form, interest on 
any deficiency is limited to 30 days following this signing. Additionally, the taxpayer 
is agreeing to waive the right to petition the Tax Court.
If an agreement is not reached, the taxpayer receives a copy of the RAR and a 
30- day letter. This letter states that the taxpayer has 30 days to request an appeal to 
the IRS Appeals Division (Reg. Sec. 601.105(c)(l)(ii). This division has the authority 
to settle the matter with consideration of the probability of prevailing under litigation 
(Internal Revenue Manual, Sec. 8711(2)). Thus, negotiation and trading off issues is 
available in this appeals process. Costs of litigation would be an instrumental 
consideration for both the Service and the taxpayer. If the taxpayer does not request 
this hearing, a 90-day letter (Notice of Deficiency) is issued (Reg. Sec. 
601.105(c)(l)(iv). At this point, all parties are aware of the bases for the arguments 
supporting the position being advocated.
After the issuance of a Notice of Deficiency, the taxpayer may pay the 
stipulated amount and sue for refund.4 Alternatively, the taxpayer may choose to 
forgo payment and petition for litigation. That is, the taxpayer controls the choice of 
litigation venue. However, in all venues other than the Tax Court, the Notice of 
Deficiency must be paid.
4 After receipt o f the Notice o f Deficiency, the taxpayer has to petition the Tax Court within 90 days. 
In the alternative, after expiration o f 90 days, the taxpayer must pay the assessment and institute a suit 
for refund in either the U.S. District Court or the U. S. Court o f Federal Claims. O f these courts of 
original jurisdiction, the Tax Court is the only court limited to hearing tax matters. As such, it is 
considered the court o f technical expertise in tax litigation.
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If the Tax Court judge decides that proceedings are frivolous, groundless, 
primarily for delay, or the taxpayer failed to pursue the available administrative 
remedies, Sec. 6673 allows the Court to invoke a penalty not in excess of $25,000. 
This sanction can be applied to either the taxpayer or the Service. Similar to the 
district courts, attorneys or other persons, having “multiplied the proceedings in any 
case unreasonably or vexatiously”, can be required to pay the excess costs associated 
with such conduct (Sec. 6673(a)(2).
Research Questions
Tax litigation provides a natural anchor. The Notice of Deficiency sets a 
monetary amount for the litigation. The review and appeals process within the IRS 
has been completed. The taxpayer and their tax professional representative then 
choose either to pay a certain settlement to the Service and/or to litigate. In choosing 
to litigate, they are hoping that litigation will result in either no deficiency or a smaller 
deficiency. The IRS, by contrast, cannot choose to litigate. However, the hazards of 
litigation are incorporated in the settlement negotiation process. As such, a failure to 
further negotiate indicates the Service's realization that there exists a realistic 
probability of their success in litigation. In addition, both parties are aware of the 
substantial authority supporting the adversarial position. Thus, the tax professional 
and the IRS legal representative, having the set of facts and the basis of support for 
both positions, each conclude that the position they support has the strength to litigate. 
Normative economic theory of rational choice, however, does not support this 
outcome.
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Although education, experience, and accountability should mitigate 
confirmation bias through the hierarchical process of research in both the tax 
professional's and the IRS legal representative's stances, the failure of normative 
theory (i.e., the same outcome) indicates an anomaly. Research indicates that the 
presence of incentives in the decision-making process of knowledge acquisition may 
result in confirmation bias in the anchoring and adjusting heuristic used. That is, each 
professional has weighted materials confirming the desired outcome inappropriately or 
has failed to weight nonconfirming materials adequately.
Fischloff (2002), a noted psychological researcher in heuristics and biases, 
states that these anomalies of the normative model are in the public domain. Applied 
fields with high stakes are subject to erroneous beliefs (Bunker et al., 1977; Byrne, 
1986; and Gilovich, 1991). Expert judgment provides a central role in public policy. 
Practitioners, however, seldom read research literature. The research into heuristics 
and biases provides evidence that experts, like the laity, oftentimes must rely upon 
judgment. Rachlinski (1994, 1998) provides support for biased judgments in legal 
decision-making. In a context similar to this research inquiry, Rachlinski investigated 
actual tort suits for hindsight bias. The generalizibility of lab studies is supported by 
such findings. By demonstrating bias in the lab and, of immense importance, in the 
public domain, debiasing opportunities can be pinpointed.
This study addresses the following research questions:
Is there confirmation bias exhibited in the substantial authority presented in 
support of the stance taken on an ambiguous tax issue by tax professionals in litigation 
before the Tax Court?
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If confirmation bias is present, which litigants exhibit a propensity to use 
confirmatory strategies in their JDM processes?
If confirmation bias is present, is there a correlation between instance of bias, 
litigants, and the monetary amount of the Notice of Deficiency and related penalties?
Prior studies that have found evidence of confirmation biases in the tax 
research task used experimental conditions. This study attempts to use actual court 
cases from the 2004 session of the Tax Court. While the stipulated facts may be more 
complex than those presented under experimental conditions, actual litigants have 
more time, more materials, and more resources to determine their recommended 
positions. Additionally, incentives are present rather than conjectured. Decisions are 
actually made rather than purported to be made.
With "unbiased" research being the mandate, awareness of the presence of bias 
is a necessary first step in mitigating the effects of using confirmatory strategies while 
conducting tax research. Mitigating those effects approaches the ethical standard.
Organization of this Dissertation
This dissertation is organized into five chapters. Chapter 1 introduces the topic 
of confirmation bias inherent in decision-making processes and relates this bias to 
parties in the tax litigation forum. The purpose of this study is presented. Chapter 2 
reviews the relevant psychology and accounting literature. A survey of the stream of 
accounting literature on the effect of incentives on professionals' recommendations in 
the tax research task is followed by a survey of the studies investigating the presence 
of confirmation bias in the JDM of tax professionals. Chapter 3 presents the research 
hypothesis to be explored along with discussions of the data, test instruments, and
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analytical methodologies to be employed in the research. Chapter 4 presents the 
empirical results of the study. Chapter 5 provides a summary and conclusions drawn 
from the research findings. Also, a discussion of the limitations of the study is 
presented and opportunities for further research are identified.
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CHAPTER 2
LITERATURE REVIEW
A sequence of choices governs the dynamics of judgment and decision-making 
processes. While normative JDM theory views these choices as a cost/benefit analysis 
for maximized utility, psychological research provides evidence that choices are 
individualized and, as such, are based upon individualized criteria. Theoretical 
psychology studies by Beach and Mitchell (1978) and Payne and Johnson (1993) 
enumerate numerous characteristics that drive JDM strategy choices. These factors 
may impact and subordinate the outcome of the JDM process. These characteristics 
include accountability, ambiguity, complexity, familiarity, information display, 
instability, irreversibility of response, response mode, significance of outcomes, and 
time constraints.
In a suppletory manner, Roberts (1998) introduces an economic psychology- 
processing model (EPP) for use by JDM researchers investigating the tax research 
process. This EPP model, depicted in Table 2.1, categorizes previously tested factors 
that may skew the outcome of the tax research process by impacting choices. These 
relevant factors5 are categorized into five groupings that are based on a theoretical 
framework of the sequential processes involved in decision-making.
5 Studies in Roberts’ EPP model are limited to those inquiries investigating the behavior o f tax 
accountants. As such, the model is not all-inclusive o f the influences driving suboptimal JDM.
15
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TABLE 2.1
Factors Tested for Association with Tax Accountants’ Judgment/Decision-Making
(Roberts 1998)
Individual Psychological Factors 
Cognitive
■ Years o f experience
■ Task experience
■ Knowledge
■ Knowledge o f transactions
■ Formal education
■ Job title/position in firm
■ Age
■ Problem-solving ability 
Affective
■ Advocacy
■ Tax accountant’s risk preference
■ Ethical attitude
■ Attitudes related to professional status
■ Attitudes related to firm size
■ Attitudes associated with gender
Environmental Factors: Risks and Rewards 
IRS Position
■ Audit probability
■ Audit success prediction
■ Penalties
■ IRS position on the issue
■ Probability o f issue being examined on 
audit
■ Applicable regulatory standard for 
reporting
■ Tax rate structure 
Client Characteristics
■ Dollar amount o f tax savings at stake
■ Client payment status
■ Client risk preference
■ Client importance
■ Client tenure
■ Client preference for tax-reporting 
position
■ Client sophistication
■ Amount o f  income/operating 
performance
■ Client dependability
■ Client records
■ Conformity o f item with client’s financial 
report
Firm Expectations
■ Economic benefit to firm
Task Factors: Inputs
■ Ambiguity
■ Structural similarity o f authoritative 
sources
■ Surface similarity o f authoritative sources
■ Outcome o f authoritative sources
■ Amount o f legal authority
■ Complexity o f law
■ Staff recommendation
Task Factors: Outputs
■ Planning vs. compliance context
Processing Factors
■ Information order
■ Structured problem-solving approach
■ Decision aid availability
■ Framing o f  issue as gain/loss
■ Certainty o f outcome
■ Confirmation bias
■ Hindsight bias
■ Accountability
■ Time pressure
■ Group discussion
The purpose of this chapter is to review the extant empirical literature of 
decision-making in the hierarchical tax research process. The first section generally 
follows the factors as depicted in Roberts’ EPP model. The selected studies provide 
evidence of the effect of numerous incentives present in this JDM process on the
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recommendations of tax professionals. The second section of the chapter details the 
research focusing on the presence of confirmation bias in the JDM processes of tax 
researchers. Understanding this literature is critical in designing and accomplishing 
the objective of this research inquiry.
Incentives Research
Individual Psychological Factors
Tax professionals develop an expertise in taxation with time and experience. 
Early psychological studies state that a decade or more of intense preparation is 
necessary to achieve expert knowledge in a chosen area (Ericsson and Crutcher 1990; 
Bloom 1985; Hayes 1981; Simon and Chase 1973). Intense preparation in the quest of 
knowledge necessitates the use of heuristic JDM strategies. Using heuristics increases 
the susceptibility of JDM processes to illusions. Individual psychological factors that 
lead to misimpressions are both cognitive (internal) and affective (external) influences. 
The impact of these illusional factors may result in suboptimal decisions by tax 
professionals.
Cognitive Factors
Internal (cognitive) influences can affect individuals involved in JDM 
processes. For this reason, numerous studies focus on cognitive attributes. Individual 
characteristics of experience, task-specific experience, task-relevant knowledge, 
education, problem solving ability, and gender are investigated.
Experience. It is intuitive that experience enhances one’s decision-making 
capabilities. Numerous early studies incorporate EXPERIENCE as a variable in 
researching the impact of individual cognitive attributes on tax professionals’
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recommendations to clients (Chang and McCarty 1998; Kaplan et al. 1988; LaRue and 
Reckers 1989). Nevertheless, measuring an EXPERIENCE variable proves to be 
problematic. One measure of EXPERIENCE is the passage of time (e.g., years). 
However, the researcher must take care in linking the JDM process under scrutiny 
with this measure because YEARS OF EXPERIENCE can proxy for many between- 
subject differences. As a result, studies generally define EXPERIENCE explicitly by 
such measures as the amount of time spent in tax research, the number of encounters 
with the tax issue, or the number of IRS encounters. Additionally, other variables that 
can proxy for EXPERIENCE must be controlled by the use of separate variables. 
Client advocacy and risk preferences are examples of variables needing separate 
measures (Roberts 1998). This review presents studies that recognize and incorporate 
these distinctions.
EXPERIENCE as a variable is statistically significant in identifying relevant 
tax issues (Bonner et al. 1992; Spilker and Prawitt 1997; Roberts and Klersey 2004). 
Other studies show a significant relationship between EXPERIENCE and the ability to 
correctly determine proper tax treatment (Chang and McCarty 1988; Kaplan et al. 
1988; LaRue and Reckers 1989; Helleloid 1989; Hite and McGill 1992; Newberry et 
al. 1993; Roberts and Klersey 2004). Additionally, EXPERIENCE is a significant 
variable when subjects are locating substantial authority for an ambiguous tax 
situation (Cloyd 1995b; Spilker and Prawitt 1997).
Differences in EXPERIENCE are found to be not statistically significant in 
studies that rank authoritative tax sources (Chow et al. 1989; Bain and Kilpatrick 
1990) and in stock valuation tasks (Roberts 1990). In addition, Duncan et al. (1989),
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Schisler (1994) and Carnes et al. (1996) report no significant differences for 
EXPERIENCE when asking subjects to evaluate itemized deductions. Madeo et al. 
(1987) has similar results when study subjects are asked to predict the percentage of 
income reported by individuals.
Marchant et al. (1989) present a model, depicted in Figure 2.1, of tax research 
that describes the cognitive processes of legal reasoning. Analogical reasoning6 is the 
foundation for this model. Ostensibly, the model is a diagram used to research 
ambiguous tax issues. In their 1991 study, Marchant and his co-researchers test 
analogical reasoning in the problem solving processes of “novice” and “expert” tax 
professionals. The manipulation results in a reduction of knowledge transfer for the 
‘experts” and an increase in knowledge transfer for the “novices.” Thus, results of the 
Marchant et al. (1991) study are counter-intuitive. The authors theorize that the 
highly proceduralized rule used in their study interferes with the knowledge transfer of 
the experts. That is, proceduralizing a principle of a solved problem may result in 
inflexibility when dealing with a new problem.
Marchant et al. (1992) refine their experiment. Using a complete analog7, the 
results are also counter-intuitive. With the manipulations between complete analog, 
incomplete analog, and no source analog, this study observes a greater effect on the 
student subjects than on the professionals. Additionally, professionals are misled by
6 Holland et al. (1986) define analogy as a reasoning mechanism dependent upon recognizing, after 
selective abstracting, seemingly unrelated situations as related. With the use o f analogy, existing 
knowledge o f a previously solved problem extends into the reasoning process o f a current problem. 
Specific determined court cases set the precedent in tax research to which all following cases with the 
same issues are to be compared.
7 An analog consists o f a source analog (solved problem) and a target problem. In a complete analog, 
all the necessary logical parts between the source analog and the target problem match up. In contrast, 
an incomplete analog will have parts between the source analog and the target problem that do not 
match up.
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
2 0
Process 
Begins with 
Facts 
Presented 
by Client
Reach
Conclusions
Request More 
Facts?
Communicate
Conclusions
Reexamine
Issuers
Define Goals 
And 
Identify Issues AnalyzeAuthorities
FIGURE 2.1 
Cognitive Model of Tax Research 
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the incomplete analog condition; that is, they cannot successfully protect against the 
misuse of incomplete analogs. The authors offer the use of an easy target problem as 
a possible explanation for the results. Also, taxpayer advocacy could be instrumental 
in the complete analog because the ruling included in the testing instrument is contrary 
to the taxpayer’s preferred tax treatment.
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In light of these earlier findings, Marchant et al. (1993) manipulate the 
direction of the source analog. That is, both rulings that support the taxpayer’s 
preference and rulings that refute the taxpayer’s preference are incorporated. An 
additional manipulation takes place with regard to the nature (complete versus 
incomplete) of the source analogs. With these refinements, the authors report that the 
knowledge transfer both in complete and incomplete analog manipulations is 
influenced by the outcome of the source analog.
Task-Specific Experience. Bonner and Walker (1994) and Davis and Solomon 
(1989) theorize that performance in JDM improves with task-specific experience 
assuming the existence of the ability to perform, motivation to perform, and feedback. 
This theory leads to an additional technical refinement of the definition of 
EXPERIENCE as a construct. The findings of empirical research which explore this 
refined EXPERIENCE variable produce mixed results.
Numerous variables develop to measure TASK-SPECIFIC EXPERIENCE. 
Duncan et al. (1989) find that the percentage of clients involved in tax shelters is 
statistically significant for tax professionals’ recommendations with regard to tax 
shelter deductions. The professional’s familiarity with like-kind exchanges, as a 
measure of TASK-SPECIFIC EXPERIENCE, is significant in tax managers' 
recommended reporting decisions (Reckers et al. 1991). Newberry et al. (1993) report 
that recommendations regarding deductibility of asbestos abatement costs are 
significantly related to a percentage of fees derived from real estate activities.
Alternatively, Karlinsky and Koch (1987) note that self-reported time spent 
with the Code is not statistically significant in answering a brief quiz. Subjects in this
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study, however, self-report low task-specific experience. Roberts (1990) reduces the 
task to a highly structured context by relying on problem-solving heuristics. His study 
reports that task-specific knowledge is not statistically significant in observed 
differences for business valuation judgments.
Knowledge. In contrast, empirical research testing TASK-SPECIFIC 
KNOWLEDGE supports a more stable relationship with JDM performance 
differences. The majority of studies find this relationship statistically significant. 
Using multiple-choice questions from textbook testbanks or the Uniform CPA exam, 
Cloyd (1995b), Spilker (1995), and Bonner et al. (1992) each show the significance of 
task-relevant knowledge on JDM performance. Memory recall of relevant information 
provides the basis for the relationship demonstrated by Roberts and Klersey (2004), 
Davis and Mason (2003), and Bonner et al. (1992). When subjects identify tax issues 
in a given set of client facts (Bonner et al. 1992) or select authority using electronic 
resources (Cloyd 1995b, 1997; Spilker 1995), the results produce statistically 
significant relationships. Using highly technical partnership tax issues as the measure 
for TASK-SPECIFIC EXPERIENCE, Cloyd (1995b) and Roberts and Klersey (2004) 
each report a significant relationship. Additionally, Davis and Mason (2003) find a 
significant relationship when subjects identify unique features in tax cases. However, 
one measure of KNOWLEDGE in Davis and Mason (2003) is not significant. In this 
memory recall study, the KNOWLEDGE variable is significant in detailing how 
distinguishing tax features are identified, but is not significant in explaining similar tax 
features.
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Cloyd’s (1995b) study providing evidence of the effect of prior knowledge on 
the information search and evaluation behavior of tax professionals is of particular 
interest in this research inquiry. Using subjects from a national accounting firm, 
Cloyd (1995b) establishes a prior knowledge distribution by administering a multiple- 
choice questionnaire on the chosen tax issue. By structuring experimental scenarios to 
mirror examples illustrated in the IRS regulations, the researcher controls ambiguity8. 
From the results of the prior knowledge questionnaire, subjects are divided into two 
TASK-SPECIFIC KNOWLEDGE categories. Results of the experiment indicate that 
prior knowledge is negatively correlated with overall use of the topical index of the 
provided source materials and with the number of topics selected. Alternatively, 
TASK-SPECIFIC KNOWLEDGE is positively correlated with the accuracy of topics 
selected. Additionally, a significant positive relationship exists between prior 
knowledge and the number of accurate topics selected in the first loop of the iterative 
information search process. Thus, the authors conclude that prior knowledge affects 
the information strategy used, the amount of information located, the speed of 
retrieval, the attention (measured by time) paid to relevant information, and the ability 
to distinguish the relevance of information.
Education. Education is one method of acquiring knowledge. Oftentimes, 
KNOWLEDGE/EDUCATION is measured by the degree earned and teaching 
methodologies. In testing reading comprehension, Karlinsky and Koch (1987) note 
that the degree earned affects JDM performance. Among other theories, Bonner et al.
8 Scholes and W olfson (1992) and Pratt (1994) note that “precise” tax rules delineate requirements for a 
specific particular tax outcomes. By providing “roadmaps,” precise rules control uncertainty. Ever 
mindful o f this distinction between tax issues, the majority o f empirical JDM research inquiries 
incorporate ambiguous issues with the desire o f expeditiously eliciting behavioral characteristics from 
the subjects.
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(1992) investigate the relationship between knowledge, type of pedagogy, and practice 
experiences. Formal education is statistically significant in explaining different scores 
on a knowledge test. That is, participants’ exposure to case studies pedagogy 
enhances the integration of tax transaction knowledge and tax rules. Cloyd and 
Spilker (2000) hypothesize that the type of academic training tax professionals receive 
impacts the extent of observable bias. They theorize that law students, as opposed to 
accounting students, should attend to both positive and negative research in an 
information search because law school education provides extensive exposure to cases 
and legal arguments. With this training, law students should exhibit less bias in JDM 
than accounting students. The Cloyd and Spilker (2000) hypothesis is supported. 
Carnes et al. (1996) find a positive relationship between aggressiveness and formal 
education. In their study, EDUCATION is correlated with FIRM SIZE (r = .2403, p = 
.0001) and PROFESSIONAL STATUS (r = .2403, p = .0353). Therefore, additional 
models are investigated incorporating only one of the correlated variables. 
PROFESSIONAL STATUS and EDUCATION are significantly related to the 
aggressiveness of the tax positions taken by subjects in high-ambiguity scenarios, but 
not in low ambiguity scenarios.
Problem-Solving Ability. The presence of cognitive faculties that enhance 
problem-solving abilities varies among individuals. Thus, individualized problem­
solving abilities could impact JDM choices. One aspect of Bonner el al. (1992) 
studies tax professionals’ general problem-solving abilities and JDM. Problem­
solving abilities are tested using a cued recall test instrument. This ability is 
statistically significant for the difficulty of issues identified, but is not significantly
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associated with the number of tax issues identified. Additionally, study results 
indicate that problem-solving ability relates to better performance in subjects with low 
levels of tax knowledge.
Davis and Mason (2003) formulate a feature-mapping model that describes 
how tax professionals evaluate precedent. While Treasury Regulation 1.6661-3(b)(3) 
mandates the weighing of conflicting authorities in determining "substantial authority" 
and the AICPA Code o f Professional Conduct requires unbiased research (i.e., 
research defined as looking at both confirming and disconfirming information in 
formulating a position), these researchers find that only common features are used to 
make similarity judgments. Thus, while the evaluation of precedent proves 
instrumental to tax research, the evaluation is generally flawed in that only common 
(and not distinctive) features impact perceived similarity.
In summary, experience, knowledge, and education should enhance one’s 
ability to perform the technical requirements of tax research. Empirical results, 
however, produce mixed results with regard to experience, including task-specific 
experience. Task-relevant knowledge, however, provides a significant cognitive 
measure to link with the requirements of tax research tasks. Education and experience 
are each shown to have mitigating effects on aggressiveness of tax professionals' 
recommendations.
Affective Factors
In addition to internal (cognitive) influences, external (affective) factors affect 
individuals, especially in the areas of motivation and effort. Kennedy (1995) observes 
a positive impact from affective influences in that a more thorough analysis or a wider
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solution set results during tax research tasks. Johnson (1993), however, shows a 
negative effect from external factors through the presence of confirmation bias. 
Roberts’ (1998) EPP model lists advocacy, risk preference, ethics, professional status, 
firm size, and gender attitudes as affective factors in tax research studies.
Advocacy. Although the AICPA Code o f Professional Conduct mandates 
“unbiased” research, the Standards o f Responsibility in Tax Practice recognizes that 
tax professionals have the “right and responsibility” to act as client advocates in tax- 
related tasks. While the statutes require “substantial authority” to support an 
ambiguous tax position taken on a tax return, the IRS penalizes preparers when a 
position taken does not have a “reasonable possibility” of prevailing in a litigious 
arena. “Reasonable possibility” is defined as a one in three (33.3%) probability of 
prevailing. Thus, vague guidelines emanate from both the professional regulators and 
the governmental regulators. As a result, a plethora of studies investigating client 
advocacy have evolved. Major studies that investigate the effect of advocacy on JDM 
are reviewed.
Recognizing that the degree of client advocacy is a personally interpreted 
guideline (i.e., a cognitive trait), Johnson (1993) dichotomizes the professional 
subjects of her study into strong client advocates and less strong client advocates. 
This categorization is accomplished through an analysis of the residuals from a 
regression of NETSCORE9 on RECOMMENDATION. From this differentiation, the 
inquiry investigates the evaluation of evidence strategies used in analyzing and
9 NETSCORE represents a measure derived from analysis o f authority chosen in support o f  client 
preferences; therefore, a confirmation bias measure is determined.
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making recommendations.10 The anchoring and adjusting heuristic and the resulting 
confirmation bias comprise the focus of the inquiry. Johnson's results indicate that 
professionals use confirmatory decision strategies when evaluating judicial cases for 
their clients’ ambiguous issues. This bias inhibits the ability to properly assess the 
likelihood of prevailing in a judicial challenge. Improperly high assessments lead to 
stronger recommendations. Degree of advocacy contributes to use of confirmation 
strategies. Consequently, degree of advocacy directly impacts the strength of 
recommendations. Davis and Mason (2003) demonstrate that, as degree of advocacy 
increases, professionals assign more weight to common features if the outcome is 
favorable to client preference and less weight if the outcome is unfavorable. Cuccia 
(1995) links advocacy attitudes to increased effort in identifying support for 
deductions in response to increases in penalty threats.
Risk Perceptions. In a theoretical work, Milliron (1988) reports that one result 
of interviews with tax practitioners suggests that professionals believe their own risk 
propensities do not influence the aggressiveness of their recommendations. Carnes et 
al. (1996) provide evidence disputing this belief. Their study identifies professional- 
specific factors that influence decision-making among tax professionals. Possible 
determinants incorporated into the study include experience, firm type, gender, 
education level, and risk propensity. Their third hypothesis states in the alternative 
form:
Tax professionals who are more inclined to accept risk will be more 
likely to recommend aggressive tax positions than will professionals 
who are less inclined to accept risk.
10 As previously noted, the use o f ambiguous tax issues is instrumental in observing strategy. As such, 
the majority o f studies, including this study, incorporate ambiguous issues for clarity.
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Results indicate a higher propensity for risk leads to more aggressive 
recommendations.
In a belief-revisioning study, Pei et al. (1990) explore several tax preparer 
attitudes as determinants of professional behavior. An 11-point Likert-type scale 
measures a preparer’s perception of income tax reporting. One extreme of the scale, 
business risks (i.e., cost/benefit analysis), contrasts with a purely moral assessment as 
the other extreme. The derived variable acts as a covariate in the study. Movement 
along the scale toward business risk analysis correlates with stronger support of the 
client-preferred position. While client preference does influence recommendations of 
professionals with little moral obligation, scores of professionals who exhibit greater 
moral obligation are not effected by preferred outcome. LaRue and Reckers (1989) 
note that aggressive reporting recommendations become statistically linked to those 
practitioners that consider risk-propensity and perceive the tax system as unfair.
Ethics. The accounting profession embarked on an assessment focusing on 
professional standards following the enactment of preparer penalties and several 
adverse court cases in the 1980s. With this impetus, Bums and Kiecker (1995) test 
and report that ethical orientation is significant in explaining tax professionals’ ethical 
judgments of encouraging clients to overstate deductions. Ethical orientation is 
determined by analyzing management facilitators (encouragements) and management 
inhibitors (reprimands) using the Hunt-Vitell model11. Thus, results indicate that 
managers would facilitate ethical decisions and inhibit unethical decisions. However,
11 The Hunt-Vitell (1986) model is one o f three early ethical decision-making models designed for use 
by business scholars in business environments. This model is used primarily in marketing research 
before the subject study. The model is intended to determine why an individual chooses between 
ethical and unethical behavior. An additional determination concerns why individual perceptions differ 
in an ethical/unethical context.
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the degree of behavior encouragements or behavior reprimands depends on possible 
economic benefits to the firm. As a consequence, unethical behavior with greater 
economic benefits to the firm is viewed as less serious than unethical behavior with 
negligible benefits to the firm.
Professional Status and Firm Size. Unlike accounting practitioners who offer 
auditing services and expertise, tax professionals are not required to maintain 
professional certification to perform as a tax preparer. Designation as a certified 
public accountant (hereinafter referred to as CPA) is achieved through successful 
completion of a comprehensive examination and stipulated experience requirements. 
As such, professional status, CPA or non-CPA, is hypothesized as one factor effecting 
attitudinal differences among tax preparers. Prior empirical studies consistently 
provide evidence of the existence of attitudinal differences between CPAs and non- 
CPAs. Cuccia (1995), Jackson et al. (1988), and the IRS (1987) each support that 
CPAs exhibit more loyalty to clients than do non-CPAs. Ayres et al. (1989) and 
Cuccia (1995) find that CPAs more aggressively report clients’ ambiguous tax issues 
than non-CPAs. In a study that maximizes systematic variation in professional 
position, Roberts and Klersey (2004) report PROFESSIONAL STATUS significantly 
associates with evaluations of client-favored treatment. In support of these results, 
CPA firms are noted as that group “least compatible” with the IRS mission in a 1987 
report prepared by Westat, Inc. Conversely, Karlinsky and Koch (1989) find no 
statistically significant difference between CPAs and non-CPAs on a reading 
comprehension test. Collins et al. (1990) also reports no significant differences 
between professional statuses when identifying appropriate preparer penalties.
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Firm size can represent different firm cultures and client characteristics. For 
example, firm size may dictate the ability to pursue specialization within the 
profession. Different type preparers serve different clientele.12 As such, large v. small 
firm differences are significant in studies that investigate mileage deductions 
(Helleloid 1989) and capital gains treatment for sales of real estate (Chang and 
McCarty 1988). These results are supported when testing income and deductions 
(Carnes et al. 1996), prizes, capital gains, education expenses, and travel expenses 
(Sanders and Wyndelts 1989).
No FIRM SIZE differences are found in studies investigating reading 
comprehension (Karlinsky and Koch 1989), ranking of tax authorities (Chow et al. 
1989), determining appropriate preparer penalties (Collins et al. 1990), and 
formulating closely-held business valuations (Roberts 1990).
In light of these mixed results, later studies that investigate FIRM SIZE refine 
the attitudinal constructs measured by this factor.
Gender. McGill (1988), Sanders and Wyndelts (1989), and Roberts (2004) all 
support the cognitive psychologists who report that males have a greater propensity 
for risk than females (Levin et al. 1988). These studies report males as more
aggressive in their recommendations than females in a compliance context. While
1 ^testing for framing effects in tax practitioners’ decisions under uncertainty, only one 
of five tests conducted by Sanders and Wyndelts (1989) does not reveal statistical 
significance. Responses from female subjects showing a risk neutral preference are
12 Larger accounting firms typically serve wealthier clients than do smaller firms (Helleloid 1989). 
Those serving lower-income clients express greater government loyalty (Helleloid 1989). Therefore, 
large firms see themselves as client advocates to a greater degree than do smaller firms.
13 Framing effects, defined as the variations in the framing o f available choice options in terms o f  gains 
and losses, yield systematically different preferences in JDM (Tversky and Kahneman 1974).
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not significant. Earlier empirical works fail to find a relationship between 
aggressiveness and gender (Ayres et al. 1989; Cuccia 1994).
In summary, researchers present evidence that both cognitive and affective 
influences provide sources of bias in the JDM processes of tax professionals when 
used to search for and provide recommendations to clients in tax research contexts. 
Table 2.2 summarizes the results of the reviewed extant literature on the impact of 
individual psychological factors on JDM processes of tax professionals while 
searching and evaluation information in support of tax issues.
TABLE 2.2
Summary of Literature on the Impact of Individual Psychological Factors on 
Judgment/Decision-Making in Tax Research
Author(s) Factor Results*
Ayres, Jackson & Hite, 1989 Gender Not Significant
Professional Status Significant
Bain & Kilpartick, 1990 Experience Not Significant
Bandy, Betancourt & Kelliher, 1994 Client status Not Significant
Bonner, Davis & Jackson, 1992 Experience Significant
Knowledge Significant
Education Significant
Problem-solving Mixed
Bonner & Walker, 1994 Experience Significant
Burns and Kiecker 1995 Ethical Judgment Significant
Carnes, Harwood & Sawyer, 1996 Experience, Not Significant
Education, Not Significant
Gender Significant
Risk perceptions Significant
Firm size Significant
Chang and McCarthy 1988 Experience Significant
Firm size Significant
Chow, Shields &Whittenburg 1989 Experience Not Significant
Firm size Not Significant
Cloyd 1995a Experience Significant
Knowledge Significant
Cloyd 1995b Knowledge Significant
Cloyd 1997 Knowledge Significant
Cloyd & Spilker 2000 Education Significant
Collins, Milliron & Toy, 1990 Firm size Not Significant
Connor, 1994 Gender Significant
Cuccia, 1994 Experience Significant
Gender Not Significant
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TABLE 2.2 (Continued)
Cuccia, 1995 Advocacy Significant
Firm size Significant
Davis & Mason, 2003 Knowledge Mixed
Problem-solving Significant
Advocacy Significant
Davis & Solomon, 1989 Experience Significant
Duncan, LaRue & Reckers, 1989 Experience Mixed
Helleloid, 1989 Experience Significant
Firm size Significant
Hite & McGill, 1992 Experience Significant
Internal Revenue Service, 1987 Professional status Significant
Jackson, Milliron & Toy, 1988 Professional status Significant
Johnson, 1993 Advocacy Significant
Kaplan & Reckers, 1989 Experience Significant
Kaplan, Reckers & West 1988 Experience Significant
Karlinsky & Koch 1987 Experience Not Significant
Education Significant
Professional status Not Significant
Firm size Not Significant
LaRue & Reckers, 1989 Experience Significant
Risk perceptions Significant
Madeo, Schepanski & Ueker, 1987 Experience Not Significant
Marchant, Robinson, Anderson & Model N/A
Schadewald, 1989
Marchant, Robinson, Anderson & Experience Not Significant
Schadewald, 1991
Marchant, Robinson, Anderson & Experience Not Significant
Schadewald, 1992
Marchant, Robinson, Anderson & Experience Not Significant
Schadewald, 1993
McGill, 1988 Gender Significant
Milliron, 1988 Risk perceptions Not Significant
Newberry, Reckers & Wyndelts, 1993 Experience Significant
Pei, Reckers & Wyndelts, 1990 Risk perceptions Significant
Reckers, Sanders & Wyndelts, 1991 Experience Significant
Roberts, 1990 Experience Not Significant
Firm size Not Significant
Roberts, 2004 Gender Significant
Roberts & Klersey, 2004 Experience Significant
Knowledge Significant
Professional status Significant
Sanders & Wyndelts, 1989 Gender Mixed
Firm size Significant
Schisler, 1994 Experience Not Significant
Spilker, 1995 Knowledge Significant
Spilker & Prawitt, 1997 Experience Significant
Westat, Inc. Professional status Significant
*Significant/Not Significant designation is, generally, based upon p-value, with an a of .05. However, in survey 
and interview studies, the designation may be the result o f self-reports.
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Environmental Factors
Roberts’ EPP model identifies three sources of environmental factors that may 
influence tax professionals’ JDM. These sources include IRS position, client 
characteristics, and firm expectations. As the regulatory agency monitoring tax 
compliance, actions by the IRS influence JDM behavior. Client characteristics, such 
as preference for a reporting position, status/tenure as a client, dependability and 
sophistication, may influence professionals in their information search and evaluation. 
Additionally, firm expectations provide influences in decision-making. Firm 
expectations, however, are interrelated with several client characteristics; therefore, 
this review aggregates studies related to firm expectations and client characteristics. 
Internal Revenue Service
The IRS, as the primary government regulatory agency, attempts to enhance 
compliance with the voluntary tax reporting system through their ability to perform 
audits and penalize noncompliance.
Audit. Normative decision-making strategies assume a cost/benefit analysis. 
As such, a rational tax professional faced with the probability of an audit would weigh 
the benefits of an aggressive reporting position with the inherent costs. Aggressive tax 
recommendations should negatively correlate with high audit probability because of 
the associated costs. Nonetheless, interactions of audit probability with other 
attitudinal characteristics result in mixed findings. Roberts (2004), Newberry et al.
(1993), Hite and McGill (1992), and Kaplan el al. (1988) provide evidence of the 
significant negative relationship between audit probability and tax professionals’ 
aggressive recommendations. Audit probability interacts significantly with amount of
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tax savings (Hite and McGill 1992; Kaplan et al. 1988) and likelihood of client 
defection (Roberts 2004). Kaplan et al. (1988) reports that audit probability 
considerations only affect less experienced subjects.
Audit probability as a construct is operationalized using numerous measures. 
While high/low probability is defined differently, studies which assign numerical 
values to probability generally report the relationship not statistically significant. 
However, numerical measures have not closely correlated with realistic audit 
probabilities. Alternately, studies verbalizing audit probability14 generally find the 
relationship as significant.
In a refinement of audit probability, Hite and McGill (1992) dichotomizes 
audit the variable into the probability of the return being selected for audit and the 
probability of the position being examined in the event of an audit, finding each 
component significant. Conner (1994) praises this dichotomy because audit selection 
is based upon mathematical formulas while position examination is based upon 
technical expertise of IRS agents.
Duncan et al. (1989) and Kaplan et al. (1988) hypothesize and support the 
theory that recent successful audit experiences would lead to more aggressive client 
recommendations. Perception of ability to prevail in litigation, used as a covariate, is 
significantly associated with willingness to recommend an aggressive reporting 
position (Newberry et al. 1993). Interestingly, the mean of the covariate is 61 percent, 
which signifies that the mean of the likelihood of prevailing upon challenge is 61
14 Verbalizations include “ high v. low” audit probability (McGill 1990) and “reasonably possible v. 
remote” (Roberts and Cargile 1994).
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percent, as reported by practitioners. Hite et al. (1992) report a threshold of 70 percent 
as the taxpayer’s (i.e., the client) desired likelihood of prevailing upon challenge.
Penalties. Results of surveys (Cuccia 1995; McGill 1988; Milliron 1988; IRS 
1987), predictions of taxpayer behavior (Madeo et al 1987), and experiments of tax 
professionals' recommendations (Cuccia 1994; Reckers et al 1991; Hite and McGill 
1992) all support the negative relationship between penalties and aggressive reporting 
recommendations. Furthermore, Cuccia (1994) reports that an increase in penalties 
has a positive correlation with CPAs search efforts but a negative correlation with 
non-CPAs search efforts.
Schisler (1994, 1995) reports that penalties do not significantly affect JDM. 
Roberts (1998) points out a weakness in the Schisler’s PENALTY measurement. By 
definition, the low penalty condition in Schisler’s (1994, 1995) studies contains only a 
taxpayer penalty, while the high penalty condition contains both taxpayer and 
professional penalties. With this definition, other attitudinal characteristics are 
inadvertently incorporated (e.g., client importance).
As previously noted, normative decision-making strategy assumes an implicit 
cost/benefit analysis. As a result, the Service attempted to lessen the advocacy 
position of tax professionals by statutorily strengthening preparer penalties in 1986. 
Still, Cuccia (1994) notes that psychological rewards accrue for professionals who 
view the relationship as a competitive exercise.
Client Characteristics
Since client characteristics vary, they may have significant differential affects 
on tax professionals' JDM strategies. Tax professionals’ interviews suggest that tax
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law ambiguity is interpreted in accordance with client preferences (Milliron 1988). In 
an attempt to explain this behavior, Milliron (1988) devises a model of variables 
which effect aggressive behavior in a tax compliance context. The model incorporates 
both client and tax professional attributes. Milliron (1988) reports that professional 
attributes are more important in the model. Subsequent studies establish the impact of 
numerous client characteristics Investigated characteristics include tax payment 
status, client risk preference, and client status.
Tax Payment. The objective of a tax return is to determine the tax liability on 
the transactions contained therein. Prepayments of the tax liability require either 
estimates or withholdings.15 Therefore, at the time of filing, calculations may 
determine either an overpayment (refund) or underpayment (balance due). If the 
prepayment requirements under IRC Chapter 68 have not been met, penalties will 
accrue. This cash flow characteristic (payment status) may influence the approach 
taken in preparation of the return. Milliron (1988) suggests that the amount of tax 
savings positively influences aggressiveness. Faced with a balance due, it is 
hypothesized that taxpayers and professionals will exhibit risk-seeking behavior to 
minimize this additional, possibly unexpected cash outflow. Conversely, a desire to 
increase the amount of refund can
Kaplan et al. (1988) find a significant relationship between professional 
aggressiveness and the dollar amount of tax liability. LaRue and Reckers (1989) 
support these results. Their study notes an interaction effect involving three variables: 
payment status, professional experience level, and tax savings.
15 Prepayment requirements are set forth in IRC Chapter 68.
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Several studies examine the impact of overwithholding and underwithholding 
with mixed results. Weak main effects are found by Duncan et al. (1989) when testing 
the theory that professionals are more aggressive when the taxpayer is in a balance due 
rather than a refund status. However, payment status most often results as significant 
in terms of an interaction. Client preference (Schisler 1994, 1995), experience, and 
amount of tax savings (LaRue and Reckers 1989) show statistically significant 
interactions with payment status. Recommendations to clients with underpayments 
are aggressive only when the client’s description includes an aggressive mien. 
However, holding these interactive characteristics constant results in non-significance 
of payment status (Sanders and Wyndelts 1989).
Risk Preference. Most empirical work in the area of client risk preference 
chooses “aggressive v. conservative” to represent the taxpayer’s preference. Four of 
the following five studies find client risk preferences statistically significant relative to 
professional recommendations.
Cuccia et al. (1995) incorporate a defamation settlement in their study. In order 
to manipulate client risk preference, clients are described as aggressive/conservative or 
risk-averse/risk taking. Risk preference operationalizes as the independent variable 
PREPARER INCENTIVE. The variable is significant (p < .001) which suggests 
preparers recommend aggressively to aggressive clients and more conservatively to 
conservative clients. Cloyd (1995a) replicates these results when using start up costs 
and a purchase price allocation as the ambiguous tax issue. His study asserts that 
professionals are likely to consider their vulnerability to certain risks (reputation, 
litigation, loss of client) if they make aggressive recommendations. Duncan et al.
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(1989) report the same findings for recommendations when one incorporates client 
risk preferences as conservative, fearful of audit, and avoids gray areas as opposed to 
aggressive, not fearful of audit, and aggressive in gray areas.
While the previously examined between-subject studies find client preference 
as significant, some explanation is provided by Schisler’s (1994) within-subject 
experiment. Initial recommendations are elicited from the professional with no 
knowledge of client preference. A second recommendation is recorded after injecting 
client preference into the available information. With this manipulation, client 
preferences become significant in the recommendation of the professional.
In contrast, Helleloid (1989) elicits opposite results in a study of aggressive 
recommendations and client preference when investigating client documentation 
efforts regarding business auto expenses. No significant relationship is determined. 
Roberts (1998) suggests that the tax issue is the pivotal factor in Helleloid's study. 
While most studies involve an ambiguous tax issue, Helleloid's study considers a tax 
deduction with statutorily required detailed recordkeeping as a prerequisite, which has 
the effect of incorporating “precise” elements into the tax issue. This distinction could 
be causal to the atypical findings.
In one of the few studies on tax research from the taxpayer perspective,16 Hite 
and McGill (1992) examine taxpayers’ preference for aggressive reporting. That is, 
taxpayers report their tolerable risk levels as opposed to professionals using perceived
16 Many prior studies, including Duncan et al. (1989), report taxpayer attitudes and risk preferences. 
These attitudes and preferences, however, are from practitioner self-reports rather than taxpayer 
responses.
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taxpayer risk levels in JDM processes. Using a very conservative null hypothesis17, 
results indicate taxpayers prefer a conservative position under uncertainty. This study 
provides no evidence supporting a taxpayer demand for aggressive tax reporting. 
These results follow findings by Hite et al. (1992) that reported 70 percent certainty as 
a threshold by small business owners for probability preferences on ambiguous issues.
Client Status. Client status refers to those characteristics that could influence 
the tax professional’s valuation of the taxpayer. Firms intuitively take more risk for a 
highly valued client than a less valued client. That is, economic dependence elicits a 
cost/benefit analysis in the JDM process as a recommendation evolves. Both vaguely 
measurable (e.g., importance) or specifically measurable (e.g., tenure, payment status) 
constructs proxy the value of a client to the professional.
Empirical research inquiries operationalize CLIENT IMPORTANCE in terms 
of taxpayer gross income interacting with referrals (Reckers et al. 1991) and out-of- 
state residence (i.e., influential proximity) with past referrals (Bandy el al. 1994). 
Reckers et al. (1991) efforts provide evidence of a significant relationship, while the 
Bandy study finds no significance between the CLIENT IMPORTANCE construct 
and reporting recommendations. Roberts (1998) notes that the tax reporting issue used 
by Bandy is less ambiguous than Reckers et al. Criticisms of these works include the 
inability to precisely define “importance”.18 Without an explicit definition, studies 
using CLIENT IMPORTANCE as a variable are confounded and, consequently, weak
17 Preference for conservative advice would reject the null. Preference for aggressive advice or a 
neutral stance by the taxpayer would not reject the null.
18 Bandy et al. (1994) criticizes Reckers et al. (1991) on this aspect. It is noted that, in the context used, 
importance could be measuring client sophistication, tenure, or gross income.
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Operationalizing CLIENT STATUS as tenure provides stable results of a 
significant relationship with aggressive reporting recommendations. Milliron (1988) 
uses self-reports of tenure. Roberts (2004) and Newberry et al. (1993) define client 
status as the risk of losing the client if the professional recommendation runs counter 
to client preferences. Each study provides support for a significant relationship 
between client tenure and aggressive recommendations.
In empirical works that incorporate CLIENT INCOME as a construct, this 
variable proxies for several characteristics. Madeo et al. (1987) use income to 
represent the opportunity to evade taxes. With the reasoning that greater incomes 
provide more opportunities for tax evasion, Madeo and co-researchers find a 
significant association between the interaction of income amount and income source 
with professionals’ predictions of taxpayer compliance. Reckers et al. (1991) also 
measure client importance with client income for a significant relationship.
Business settings provide the context for empirical work on client 
characteristics in Roberts (2004). In this work, financial condition becomes a 
significant variable for aggressive tax reporting by professionals. Cloyd (1995a) 
hypothesizes that consistency of tax/financial reporting, perceived as lowering audit 
risk, will effect professional recommendations. His study supports the assertion that 
tax professionals' recommendations are significantly influenced by financial 
accounting treatment of a tax transaction.
To summarize, researchers present evidence that environmental factors provide 
motivations for bias in the JDM processes of tax professionals when used to search for 
and provide recommendations to clients in tax research contexts. Table 2.3
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
41
summarizes the results of the reviewed extant literature on the impact of 
environmental factors on the JDM strategies of tax professionals.
Ambiguity
Whether reporting for income tax or excise tax purposes, signing and filing the 
appropriate return is paramount to establishing the taxpayer’s position on all tax issues 
included on that return. Oftentimes, well-defined rules govern tax treatment of an 
event. For example, IRC Section 163 allows for the deduction of primary home 
mortgage interest from adjusted gross income. Thus, these “precise” rules provide 
guidance about what is a primary home and what comprises home mortgage interest. 
The taxpayer is allowed this deduction if the particular facts and circumstances meet 
the enumerated criteria. On the other hand, some tax rules are ambiguous. Little 
guidance is given with regard to the interpretation of the terminology used in the 
Code. For instance, the proper characterization of the gain/loss on the disposal of real 
estate is governed by IRC Sections 1221 and 1231. Meeting the guidelines determines 
the characterization of the transaction (e.g., ordinary gain/loss or capital gain/loss). 
However, the guidelines are vague, resulting in characterizations of real estate gains 
and losses that have become a source of constant litigation. Case law develops a test 
of factors used by the judiciary to aid in a resolution for this question (Englebrecht and 
Bundy 2004). Judgment is instrumental in determining the proper application of these 
ambiguous rules and the evolved judicial factors to the taxpayer’s particular set of 
facts and circumstances. As previously noted, studies investigating JDM processes 
employed during tax research must incorporate an ambiguous issue because the 
application of precise rules does not necessitate choices. As such, the following
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TABLE 2.3
Summary of Literature on the Impact of Environmental Factors on 
Judgment/Decision-Making in Tax Research
Author(s) Factor Results*
Bandy, Betancourt & Kelliher, 1994 Client status Not Significant
Cloyd 1995a Risk preference Significant
Client status Significant
Cuccia, 1994 Penalties Significant
Cuccia, 1995 Penalties Significant
Cuccia, Hackenbrack & Nelson, 1995 Risk preference Significant
Duncan, LaRue & Reckers, 1989 Audits Significant
Tax payment Significant (Interaction)
Risk preference Significant
Helleloid, 1989 Risk preference Not Significant
Hite, Cloyd & Stock, 1992 Audits Significant
Risk preference Significant
Hite & McGill, 1992 Audits Significant
Penalties Significant
Risk preference Significant
Internal Revenue Service, 1987 Penalties Significant
Kaplan, Reckers & West 1988 Audits Significant
Tax Payment Significant
LaRue & Reckers, 1989 Tax Payment Significant (Interaction)
Madeo, Schepanski & Ueker, 1987 Penalties Significant
Client status Significant
McGill, 1988 Penalties Significant
Milliron, 1988 Penalties Significant
Tax Payment Significant
Risk preference Significant
Client status Significant
Newberry, Reckers & Wyndelts, 1993 Audits Significant
Client status Significant
Reckers, Sanders & Wyndelts, 1991 Penalties Significant
Client status Significant
Roberts, 2004 Audits Significant
Client status Significant
Sanders & Wyndelts, 1989 Tax payment Not Significant
Schisler, 1994 Penalties Not Significant
Tax payment Mixed
Risk preference Significant
Schisler, 1995 Penalties Not significant
Tax payment Significant (Interaction)
Scotchmer, 1989 Risk preference Significant
*Significant/Not Significant designation is, generally, based upon p-value, with an a o f .05. However, in survey 
and interview studies, the designation may be the result of self-reports.
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studies are included elsewhere in this literature review based on other variables in the 
research.
Taxpayers are interested in filing an accurate tax return. Numerous studies 
investigate the motivation behind the use of tax professionals for the preparation of tax 
returns. The Code has become increasingly complex over time. Time management, 
audit risk, and liability minimization are among the motivations that evolve from early 
studies (Yankelovich, Skelly, and White, Inc. 1984; Hite 1987; Collins et al. 1990; 
Hite et al. 1992). Scotchmer (1989) determines that taxpayers who use professional 
preparers view the primary function of the professionals to be the resolution of 
uncertainty. Additional findings of this study indicate that tax law ambiguity is 
usually resolved according to client preferences. Scotchmer’s (1989) findings support 
Hogarth and Einhorn’s (1990) assertion that, when faced with ambiguity and 
uncertainty, individuals exhibit cautious behavior. The inquiry concludes that the 
more risk averse the taxpayer, the more highly they value their tax professional.
Interestingly, findings on the compliance of professionally prepared returns are 
mixed.19 Higher dollar audit adjustments are found on audited returns prepared by 
CPAs and attorneys than those returns prepared by other preparers (Smith and Kinsey 
1986). In a later study in the same context, Smith and Kinsey (1987) control for 
income, tax shelters, over age 65, number of forms, joint returns, and self-employed 
status. By controlling for the enumerated items, degree of uncertainty is limited. The 
controlled items, particularly tax shelters and self-employment status, are areas of 
considerable ambiguity and uncertainty. With this control, the result for CPA and
19 Data for the following studies were derived from the IRS’s Taxpayer Compliance Measurement 
Program (TCMP). As such, a compliance distinction between legal tax avoidance and illegal tax 
evasion was not made.
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attorney prepared returns is not significantly different than other return preparers. 
Erard (1990) analyzes the decision to employ a paid preparer with compliance while 
controlling for tax return characteristics. Non-compliance is greater for paid 
preparers. However, controlling for return characteristics limits the ability to 
generalize results of both studies to ambiguous tax issues.
Klepper and Nagin (1989) differentiate these mixed results. Analyzing the 
audited returns line-by-line, they posit that tax professionals play dichotomous 
compliance roles. For tax issues with precise rules, professionals become “enforcers”; 
for tax issues with ambiguous rules, professionals become “exploiters.” That is, tax 
professionals are aggressive when faced with ambiguous tax issues, exploiting that 
vagueness. Precise areas are not exploited. Spilker et al. (1999) comments that the 
Klepper and Nagin (1989) study, because of the use of TCMP data and IRS audited 
amounts, could be confounded by the IRS agents resolving ambiguity in favor of the 
Service.
Consistent with these findings, when audit and penalty risks are low, CPAs’ 
recommendations to clients are more aggressive (McGill 1988). Playing the “audit 
lottery” can play a role in tax professional decision-making (Kaplan et al. 1988). 
Testing the effects of a recent IRS audit experience, Kaplan et al. (1988) find that a 
recent audit experience leads to aggressive recommendations only when the 
interpretation of the law contains ambiguities.
CPAs provide more aggressive tax reporting recommendation decisions than 
non-CPAs (Ayres et al. 1989). Additionally, client preferences weigh more heavily in 
the position taken by CPAs than in the position taken by non-CPAs when the issue
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contains ambiguous elements. As noted earlier, CPA firms are reported to be that 
group “least compatible” with the IRS mission in Westat, Inc.’s 1987 report.
Krawczyk (1994) studies the influence of tax law and the organization of 
clients' facts on professional judgment. She determines that only the form of law,
90objective (i.e., precise) or subjective (i.e., ambiguous) , affects the selection and 
weighting of cues. Form of law and organization of client facts are significant in the 
number of cues selected. Experience enhances the selection ability. Even though all 
subjects in her study work at the same firm, the participants represent different levels 
of experience. This study gives indirect support to the findings that professionals 
interpret ambiguity in the direction of client preferences. Additionally, these results 
justify Dawes’ (1979) findings that people, generally, are better at selecting cues than 
in weighting them.
Spilker et al. (1999) manipulate ambiguity to test concerns that tax 
professionals exploit the vagueness of the tax law to minimize taxes for their clients. 
Manipulating ambiguity is achieved by comparing recommendations when the tax law 
requires trust distributions by a certain date (precise rule) vs. by a “reasonable time” 
after year-end (ambiguous rule). Their results provide evidence that in compliance 
decision contexts professionals are more likely to recommend an aggressive position 
to the client for an ambiguous issue than a precise one. However, recommendations 
in planning contexts appear more conservative than in compliance contexts.
20 In her study, objective form is defined as structured lists o f specific relevant cues while subjective 
form considers all facts and circumstances.
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Substantial Authority
Treasury Regulation 1.6662-4(d)(3) states:
There is substantial authority for the tax treatment of an item only if the 
weight of the authorities supporting the treatment is substantial in relation to 
the weight of authorities supporting contrary treatment...The weight of 
those authorities is determined in light of the pertinent facts and 
circumstances...The weight accorded an authority depends on its relevance 
and persuasiveness and the type of document providing the authority.
These regulations do not provide explicit guidance. What the regulations do 
provide is a methodology. An ordinal comparison of supporting and non-supporting 
authority is statutorily mandated. Authoritative support is defined by an enumerated 
listing of authoritative sources in IRC Section 6662(d)(2)(B)(i).21 This listing, 
however, is not presented in an ordinal context. Sources of primary authority have the 
force and effect of law. Statutes, legislative interpretations, and case law exemplify 
primary authority. Secondary authority, without the force and effect of law, provides 
guidelines and is accorded substantial weight. Some examples of secondary authority 
include interpretive regulations, IRS rulings, and technical advice memoranda. 
Because they lack an explicit guideline, tax professionals must rely on judgment in 
ordering and weighting authoritative sources.
Chang and McCarty (1988) provide tax professionals and tax accounting 
students with relevant authoritative sources and 32 variations of a case with the 
purpose of comparing and contrasting the resultant rankings. Subjects rank the 
support for the different variations of case facts. One observation reveals a high 
degree of consensus among the judgments of the professionals. This consensus and
21 Reg. § 1.6662-4(d)(3) also provides an unordered enumerated listing. The Secretary o f the Treasury 
is mandated by Code Section 6662(d)(2)(D) to provide an annual listing in the Federal Register o f  
positions for which there is not substantial authority.
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the determined weights are consistent with previous research. However, the use of 
students is problematic and provides support that students are not appropriate subjects 
for tests of expert knowledge.
In contrast, Chow et al. (1989) ask fifty-three experienced tax practitioners to 
rank fifty-six authoritative sources in relation to the substantial authority standard. 
They report that preparers are highly consistent in their priority rankings of 
authoritative support, reporting a mean correlation of .79. However, with a mean 
correlation of .45, the study reports a low degree of consensus among preparers when 
asked to explain actually what constitutes substantial authority.
In summary, researchers present evidence that task input factors provide 
sources of bias in the JDM processes of tax professionals when used to search for and 
provide recommendations to clients in tax research contexts. Ambiguous issues 
provide the context while the vague regulatory guidelines provide the ability for 
motivational characteristic to infiltrate judgment and decision-making processes. 
Table 2.4 summarizes the results of the reviewed extant literature of the impact of task 
input factors on the JDM strategies of tax professionals.
Compliance v. Planning
When making aggressive recommendations to clients, professionals consider 
their exposure to risks. These risks include damage to reputation, litigation, and loss 
of the client (Cloyd 1995b; Milliron 1988). Risks are present in both the planning and 
compliance context. In planning contexts, additional risk exists because the 
professional gives advice before the event has taken place. The necessary fact pattern 
can be structured to comply with the relevant authority with the intention of reducing
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uncertainty. Compliance recommendations are rendered after the transaction has 
occurred. As such, the facts are pre-determined and the professional must work within 
the transaction as structured. The incremental risk in planning results because the 
practitioner may provide advice that proves ineffective; therefore, justifying their 
recommendations becomes instrumental to the engagement (Margo 1999). Tax 
professionals cannot shift all risk of aggressive-reporting recommendations to clients, 
but they can shift more of the risk in compliance engagements than in planning 
engagements on the pretext that the client should have sought advice earlier (Cloyd 
1995b).
After providing evidence of confirmation bias, Johnson (1993) extends her 
research to planning versus compliance situations. Planning tasks afford more 
flexibility than compliance tasks. For this reason, Johnson (1993) hypothesizes that 
planning research would show greater use of confirmation bias than compliance 
research. Results support this hypothesis.
Spilker et al. (1999) base their hypotheses on the theory that risks for the 
professional remain higher in a planning context than a compliance context. Because 
risk exposure is reduced when the tax rule is precise, the study manipulates the 
ambiguity of the tax issue. The sixty-three tax professional participants in the study 
have little knowledge of the tax issue involved. This allows the manipulation of 
ambiguity without consequences of prior knowledge. That is, the professional 
planning the structure of the tax transaction will be more conservative, even though 
they have the flexibility not present in a compliance context. Spilker et al. 
(1999)report that professionals interpret ambiguity more conservatively in planning
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TABLE 2.4
Summary of Literature on the Impact of Task Input Factors 
Judgment/Decision-Making in Tax Research
on
Author(s) Factor Results*
Ayres, Jackson & Hite, 1989 Ambiguity Significant
Barrick, Cloyd & Spilker, 2004 Substantial authority Significant
Chang and McCarthy 1988 Substantial authority Significant
Chow, Shields &Whittenburg 1989 Substantial authority Mixed
Cloyd & Spilker, 1999 Substantial authority Significant
Kaplan, Reckers & West 1988 Ambiguity Significant
Klepper & Nagin, 1989 Ambiguity Significant
Krawczyk, 1994 Ambiguity Significant
McGill, 1988 Ambiguity Significant
Scotchmer, 1989 Ambiguity Significant
Smith & Kinsey, 1986 Ambiguity Significant
Smith & Kinsey, 1987 Ambiguity Mixed
Spilker, Worsham & Prawitt, 1999 Ambiguity Significant
*Significant/Not Significant designation is, generally, based upon p-value, with an a of .05. However, in survey 
and interview studies, the designation may be the result o f self-reports.
engagements. While seemingly in contrast to the results in Johnson (1993), the authors 
note that the level of risk in her study is minimized by incorporating an allowable 
deduction with the exposure being only the extent of the deduction. In the present 
study, the risk incorporates the possibility of overturning the entire transaction. This 
results in a taxable transaction rather than a nontaxable return of equity. The authors 
infer that planning situations mitigate bias relative to compliance situations. To 
provide evidence to the extent of this mitigation, the researchers compared the 
planning/precise subject's recommendations to those of the planning/ambiguous 
subjects. In planning decision contexts professionals exploit precise tax rules by 
recommending aggressive, client preferred positions. These results replicate the 
Hackenback and Nelson (1996) findings that making a more conservative 
recommendation is a way professionals use to mitigate the incremental risk associated 
with a planning context.
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In summary, researchers present evidence that task output factors, the 
engagement contexts, provide sources of bias in the JDM processes of tax 
professionals when used to search for and provide recommendations to clients in tax 
research contexts. Table 2.5 summarizes the results of the reviewed extant literature 
of the impact of task output factors on the JDM of tax professionals.
TABLE 2.5
Summary of Literature on the Impact of Task Output Factors on
Making in Tax Research
Judgment/Decision-
Author(s) Factor Results*
Cloyd 1995b Compliance v. planning Significant
Hackenbrack & Nelson, 1996 Compliance v. planning Significant
Johnson, 1993 Compliance v. planning Significant
Margo, 1999 Compliance v. planning Significant
Spilker, Worsham & Prawitt, 1999 Compliance v. planning Significant
*Significant/Not Significant designation is, generally, based upon p-value, with an a of .05. However, in survey 
and interview studies, the designation may be the result o f self-reports.
Confirmation Bias Research 
While ambiguous information can hamper an unbiased search, the anchoring 
and adjusting heuristic may result in the decision maker’s use of a confirmatory 
decision strategy. The subsequent bias, confirmation bias, can result in less than 
optimal decisions, even though information asymmetry is not a condition. This 
research inquiry presents a review of the studies related to the presence of 
confirmation bias in tax research.
Confirmation bias results when individuals evaluate information based upon 
their initial belief. That is, the process of assessing relevance, reliability, and validity 
of information becomes distorted. People fail to consider the possibility of irrelevance 
in information confirming their initial belief. Likewise, disconfirming information is
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challenged (Ross 1977). Consequently, individuals remember the weakness of 
disconfirming information and underweight this source. On the other hand, the 
perceived strength of confirming information is weighted at face value (Lord et al. 
1979) or overweighted. Distorted weights in JDM result in suboptimal judgments. 
Anderson et al. (1980) demonstrate the strength of this distortion. Their study 
provides evidence that people fail to revise their beliefs even after evidence has been 
discredited.
Johnson (1993) tests 107 tax preparers to assess how professionals evaluate 
authoritative evidence for an ambiguous tax issue. Subjects review the authority, 
assess the probability that the position favorable to their client would prevail upon 
challenge, and recommend a position for the client’s tax return. Test administrators 
provide participants with the appropriate Code Sections, applicable Regulations, and 
four court cases. The outcomes of the judicial decisions are manipulated as the 
treatment in the experiment. Weights that participants assign the relevance of the 
court cases support the presence of the confirmation process. Those decisions 
believed to be adjudicated in favor of the taxpayer rate higher than those cases where 
the IRS is believed to prevail. The variable NETSCORE is derived by the subjects’ 
relevance ratings for supporting and opposing decisions. A net positive rating 
indicates that supporting cases are more highly rated than opposing decisions; a 
positive NETSCORE suggests confirmation bias. The variable POSTPROB is derived 
from participants’ assessments of the probability of success for the recommended 
position upon challenge. The significant (p < .003) direct relationship between 
NETSCORE and POSTPROB supports the hypothesis that use of the confirmatory
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process results in higher assessed probabilities of judicial success. Further testing 
provides evidence that higher assessed probabilities result in stronger client 
recommendations. Thus, client advocacy results in the use of a confirmation 
mechanism in judgment processes. The researchers also find a direct relationship 
between the strength of pro-client recommendations and the degree of client advocacy.
Cloyd and Spilker (1999) extend the research into the causes and effects of 
confirmation bias. Psychological studies indicate that, by overweighting information 
in confirming one’s belief, professionals will likely increase their assessment that the 
belief is true (Koehler 1991). Cloyd and Spilker (1999) postulate that advocacy, by 
affecting information search, has an indirect effect on likelihood assessments that the 
client-preferred tax position will prevail under challenge. The seventy-two tax 
professionals participating in their study have diverse educational backgrounds. 
Thirty-five percent earned bachelor’s degrees in accounting, fifty-eight percent 
possess master’s degrees in accounting, and seven percent of the participants have law 
degrees. Utilizing twenty-four actual court cases on dealer vs. investor status, 
manipulations are performed on the client’s preferred tax treatment. Evidence of 
confirmation bias is presented. Roberts (1998) notes that the results of this study show 
that confirmation bias can cause professionals to recommend a clearly incorrect 
aggressive position, thus exposing both the client and the professional to unanticipated 
risk.
To test the mitigating effect of education on confirmation bias, Cloyd and 
Spilker (2000) focus on the pedagogical differences between an academic accounting 
education and a legal education. Because of the increased exposure to court cases and
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legal arguments, the authors hypothesize that law students will show significantly less 
confirmatory strategies in their tax research than do accounting students. Thirty-six 
law students in the second or third year of law school and 43 Masters of Accounting 
students are asked to assess court cases to support a client's set of facts. The desired 
client outcome is manipulated within groups. While both groups exhibit confirmation 
bias in their search strategies, law students' average usage was significantly less than 
that of accounting students. Without the ability to randomize, the authors address the 
possibility of differences being attributable to conditions other than academic training. 
Demographics and self-reports of knowledge are assessed to alleviate these arguments.
Placing the tax research task in a social context, Hatfield (2000) hypothesizes 
that accountability to a supervisor will moderate the extent of confirmation bias 
evident in information search by staff accountants. Hatfield (2000) bases his research 
on prior psychological research of accountability predicaments. Schlenker and 
Weigold (1989) state that an accountability predicament occurs when the decision 
maker’s actions may not match those expected by the evaluating audience. Relating 
this to the tax research task, Hatfield (2000) designs his study so that the staff 
accountant’s initial belief differs from the supervisor. The tax research analysis 
requires justification to the supervisor. Three JDM strategies are available in an 
accountability predicament: multiple advocacy, belief shifting, and defensive
bolstering (Tetlock 1985). Hatfield's (2000) study focuses on belief shifting (i.e., the 
staff changes the initial belief (client preferred) to support the supervisor) and 
defensive bolstering (i.e., the staff justifies the initial belief). He coins the term 
secondary confirmation bias to denote an information search strategy that will confirm
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a supervisor’s belief. Fifty-six tax accountants are placed in an accountable or non- 
accountable position for the study. The subjects’ choices of JDM strategies are then 
evaluated. Main effect of ACCOUNTABILITY is not significant. However, an 
interaction between ACCOUNTABILITY and STAFF OPINION is significant. 
Further research indicates that the accountable subjects with conservative initial 
beliefs who used the belief shifting strategy are less likely to confirm their initial 
belief than those with aggressive initial beliefs (p = .06). More importantly, those 
accountable subjects who used defensive bolstering strategies support a confirmation 
bias (p = .0025). The presence of bias affects final recommendations (p = .03), as 
hypothesized.
Hatfield (2001) extends his prior research to evaluate the objectivity of the 
supervisor during a tax research task. Experience mitigates confirmation bias by 
reducing the likelihood of use of the strategy (Kaplan and Reckers 1989; Kida 1984). 
Therefore, this study investigates whether supervisors recognize the potential lack of 
unbiased research from lower-level staff accountants. Results indicate that supervisors 
recognize that staff accountants’ perceived objectivity diminishes when the research 
confirms the staffs’ initial belief. As such, more weight is accorded to a report that 
disconfirms an initial belief than is given to a confirming report. Therefore, 
supervisors are aware of the potential for confirmation bias in tax research tasks 
performed by staff accountants. The review process mitigates some of the bias.
Barrick et al. (2004) define accuracy and advocacy as the two primary 
objectives when researching tax issues. A third objective inherent in the hierarchical 
research process requires experienced supervisors to provide corrective feedback
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necessary to enhance staff learning. With experience mitigating confirmation bias, 
supervisors can correct this bias in subordinate's research tasks and elicit an accurate 
recommendation. If this recommendation is synchronized with the client preferred 
position, all objectives are met. If this recommendation is not synchronized, there is a 
resulting tension. Designing their study to mirror this tension situation, the 
researchers investigate the extent to which supervisors' judgments are affected by 
confirmation bias in staff research reports. This study finds evidence that supervisors 
rate accurate tax reports as more persuasive than biased reports when the advocacy 
objective is not met. Additionally, supervisors find that biased reports which advocate 
client preference, even though incorrect, appear more persuasive than correct reports 
that do not advocate the preferred position. Commenting on this finding, the authors 
note this result suggests that supervisors find research reports that provide 
encouragement in tension situations more persuasive than those that do not. 
Additional work for biased reports (i.e., when accuracy and advocacy objectives are 
not the same) is requested more than when tension does not exist when evaluating the 
tax issues.
To summarize, researchers present evidence that processing factors provide 
sources of bias in the JDM processes of tax professionals when used to search for and 
provide recommendations to clients in tax research contexts. The use of confirming 
strategies in JDM, with awareness, can be mitigated by feedback (accountability) and 
experience. Table 2.6 summarizes the results of the reviewed extant literature on 
confirmation bias’ presence in the JDM process of tax professionals.
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TABLE 2.6
Summary of Literature on Confirmation Bias' Presence in 
Judgment/Decision-Making in Tax Research
Author(s) Factor Results*
Barrick, Cloyd & Spilker, 2004 Confirmation bias Significant
Cloyd & Spilker 2000 Confirmation bias Significant
Hatfield 2000 Confirmation bias Significant
Hatfield, 2001 Confirmation bias Significant
Cloyd & Spilker 1999 Confirmation bias Significant
Johnson, 1993 Confirmation bias Significant
Kaplan & Reckers, 1989 Confirmation bias Significant
*Significant/Not Significant designation is, generally, based upon p-value, with an a of .05. However, in survey 
and interview studies, the designation may be the result o f self-reports.
Summary
Taxpayers use tax professionals primarily to resolve uncertainty. However, 
improper tax advice, as opposed to improper tax return preparation, is the most 
prevalent error resulting in litigation liabilities to the tax professional (Katch 1992). 
Although regulatory agencies mandate unbiased research, illusions inherent in 
heuristic decision-making strategies may result in systematic biases in tax 
professionals' recommendations. Prior research in JDM among tax researchers 
supports the presence of incentives and heuristics that inhibit unbiased research.
The more salient individual motivational cognitive incentives providing biases 
include task-relevant knowledge and gender. Advocacy and professional status 
consistently suggest a significant relationship between recommendations proffered and 
client preferred positions. Results suggest a misunderstanding concerning acceptable 
risk between tax professionals and their clients. Environmental factors, including 
penalties and payment status, lead to aggressive recommendations. Ambiguity and the 
lack of guidance in the application of “substantial authority” allow professionals to 
confirm desired results. Although planning contexts inherently have more
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professional risk, the results are mixed concerning professional JDM dependent upon 
context. Once systemic bias is identified, the reduction of systemic bias in JDM 
necessitates attention to JDM processing influences. Experience and education are 
shown to be effective in mitigating systemic biases.
This research inquiry incorporates various constructs from the extant literature 
in investigating the defense presented by litigants in tax court cases. Specifically, 
professional status, payment amount, client penalty, and professional penalty will be 
tested. Incorporating litigants at the apex of the tax administration process will 
implicitly assay the mitigating effects of experience, education, and accountability. 
Existing research views JDM in an experimental context. By using actual court 
transcripts, results will be based upon reality rather than conjecture. Additionally, this 
inquiry extends the research of confirmation bias in the JDM processes of tax 
professionals by providing external validity to prior findings where generalizations are 
confounded by internal validity needs.
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CHAPTER 3
METHODOLOGY
The purpose of this research inquiry is to examine defenses utilized by the 
litigants in tax cases for evidence of the use of confirmatory processes in the search 
and evaluation of authoritative support. Use of confirmatory processes can inhibit 
one's ability to produce an unbiased defense. As previously noted, education, 
experience, and accountability have been identified in the tax research task literature 
as mitigating this suboptimal processing strategy. Nonetheless, studies of the 
cognitive sequences employed during tax research tasks consistently identify 
confirmation bias. Judgment biases and dependencies cannot be addressed unless the 
susceptible individuals are aware of them (Petty and Wegener 1993; Wilson and 
Brekke 1994). The intent of this study is to provide evidence of a dependency, if such 
exists, in order that tax professionals may become aware of and reduce behaviors 
which inhibit the ability to produce the unbiased decisions mandated by professional 
standards.
This chapter details how the research is conducted by establishing the 
hypotheses, describing the data, explaining the testing instruments, and presenting the 
statistical tools to be used for evaluation of the data.
58
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Hypothesis Development
The outcome of a compliance tax research task should be the presentation of 
substantial authority affirming or disaffirming the position taken by the taxpayer on an 
ambiguous tax issue. The previous chapter presents numerous incentives which 
impact the JDM processes of tax practitioners, resulting in recommendations which 
affirm the desired client outcome rather than an unbiased research conclusion. 
Although these incentives may impact the original position recommended, movement 
through the hierarchical review levels inherent in the research process should filter 
such bias out in that each step provides a review by personnel with more experience. 
In theory, an unbiased recommendation should evolve.
When a return establishing a position on an ambiguous tax issue is selected for 
audit by the appropriate regulatory agency, the position presented by the professional 
is challenged by disconfirming substantial authority resulting from the information 
search and evaluation performed by IRS tax professionals. Therefore, information 
asymmetry between opposing parties is disseminated with this encounter. Each 
litigant is made aware of seemingly disconfirming information for their position. 
Thus, the opportunity to attend to disconfirming information is now afforded to each 
party.
If the contested issues are unresolved through the audit process, the taxpayer 
has the right to present the case in a legal forum with legal representation. As 
previously noted, lawyers are less susceptible to confirmatory processing strategies 
than other tax professionals. Additionally, professional standards for both the 
accounting and legal professions mandate unbiased research. To have a reasonable
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probability of prevailing in this challenge, the substantial authority outcome presented 
must be unbiased. If this authority is fraught with bias, the probability of prevailing is 
sabotaged.
In summary, the presence of incentives could inhibit unbiased 
recommendations. However, the hierarchical review process and the audit experience 
provide opportunities for resolving biases. Lawyers, because of their education and 
professional standards, should present unbiased defenses when representing a case in 
court. Therefore, the following research hypotheses are presented for empirical 
investigation:
H0 i: Confirmation bias is not present in the substantial authority presented
by litigants in tax issues litigation before the Tax Court.
Hai: Confirmation bias is present in the substantial authority presented by
litigants in tax issues litigation before the Tax Court.
H„2 : Confirmation bias, if present, is not more prevalent in the substantial
authority presented by pro se2 2  representatives than professional 
representatives.
Ha2: Confirmation bias, if present, is more prevalent in the substantial
authority presented by pro se representatives than professional 
representatives.
H0 3 : Confirmation bias, if present, is not more prevalent in the substantial
authority presented by taxpayers' professional representatives than 
professional representatives.
Ha3 : Confirmation bias, if present, is more prevalent in the substantial
authority presented by taxpayers' professional representatives than IRS 
professional representatives.
H0 4 : Confirmation bias, if present, is not more prevalent in the substantial
authority presented by Martindale-Hubbell rated professionals than 
Martindale-Hubbell non-rated professionals.
22 As in most judicial forums, taxpayers litigating before the Tax Court may represent themselves.
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Ha4: Confirmation bias, if present, is more prevalent in the substantial
authority presented by Martindale-Hubbell rated professionals than 
Martindale-Hubbell non-rated professionals.
H0 5 : Confirmation bias, if present, is not more prevalent in the substantial
authority presented by Martindale-Hubbell “A” rated professionals than 
Martindale-Hubbell “B” rated professionals.
Ha5: Confirmation bias, if present, is more prevalent in the substantial
authority presented by Martindale-Hubbell “A” rated professionals than 
Martindale-Hubbell “B” rated professionals.
H0 6 : Confirmation bias is not more prevalent in the substantial authority
presented by Martindale-Hubbell non-rated taxpayer professionals than 
Martindale-Hubbell non-rated IRS professionals.
Ha6: Confirmation bias is more prevalent in the substantial authority
presented by Martindale-Hubbell non-rated taxpayer professionals 
Martindale-Hubbell non-rated IRS professionals.
H0 7 : The amount of the Notice of Deficiency and related penalties does not
correlate to the presence of confirmatory processing strategies for pro 
se representatives, taxpayer professional representatives, or IRS 
professional representatives.
Ha7: The amount of the Notice of Deficiency and related penalties does
correlate to the presence of confirmatory processing strategies for pro 
se representatives, taxpayer professional representatives, or IRS 
professional representatives.
Data
Subjects
In deciding to litigate an IRS challenge, taxpayers are presented with a choice 
of forums. Three tribunals are available to adjudicate tax cases. One may petition for 
a hearing before the U. S. Tax Court (hereinafter referred to as Tax Court). By 
petitioning the Tax Court, abeyance of the tax deficiency is automatic until a final 
decision is rendered. In the alternative, taxpayers may pay the deficiency and sue for a 
refund in either the U. S. District Court for their jurisdiction or the U.S. Court of
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Federal Claims. U.S. District Courts are empowered to decide all areas of litigation, 
including tax matters. The U.S. Court of Federal Claims is charged with the 
responsibility of deciding any claim made against the United States. The Tax Court, 
however, is a tribunal for tax matters only. As such, it is considered the court of 
technical expertise. Thus, the Tax Court is the forum chosen for investigation by this 
research inquiry.
Decisions rendered by the Tax Court which require an interpretation of law are 
"Regular" opinions. Decisions that require an interpretation of facts are 
"Memorandum" opinions. Therefore, those Memorandum Decisions rendered by the 
Tax Court during 2004 comprise the census of data for this study.
The population of Memorandum Decisions issued during 2004 is identified 
from tax case databases provided by Research Institute of America, Commerce 
Clearing House, and West Law. Two hundred and eighty-eight cases emerge as viable 
subjects for investigation. Each case presents two defenses of the facts and 
circumstances, that of the taxpayer representative and the IRS representative. Thus, 
the cases provide 576 defenses available for analysis.
Sample Size
The equation for calculating the required sample size is
With this finite population of Memorandum Decisions, using the finite population 
correction factor in conjunction with the required sample size formula produces the
Po - Pi
where Po - Pi
I Z0 | +  | Z0
G
amount of acceptable error 
degree of confidence required 
variability
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appropriate sample size for the study. The finite population correction factor is 
calculated as
finite population correction = ((N - n) / (N - l ) ) l/2
Selecting a  as .05 chance of the estimated population parameter being incorrect, the 
degree of confidence of this inquiry is set at 1.96. Instances of confirmation bias for 
the study are counted using a scale of zero through ten. As such, the amount of 
acceptable error is set as .5, or one-half of a point. The standard deviation for use in 
the formula, determined by a preliminary statistical analysis of thirty observations, is 
2.589. From a population of 288 cases, the sample size generated in accordance with 
these formulas is 83 cases.
Random Sampling
There are two broad categories of traditional sampling methods: probability 
and non-probability. Probability methods incorporate the premise that each element of 
the population has a known probability of being selected. When properly executed, 
probability sampling methods ensure that the sample is representative of the census 
under investigation. By assigning each element in the population with an equal 
probability of selection, thus minimizing selection bias, simple random sampling is 
used to generate the subjects to be analyzed. Using the random number generator in 
the software package SPSS, eighty-three numbers are generated from a population of 
288. These numbers are then matched to the sequential numbers assigned by the Tax 
Court to Memorandum Decisions based upon the date of release. A listing of cases 
selected is presented in Appendix A.
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Study Instruments
In the extant literature of confirmatory processing strategies used by 
professionals during the tax research process, the experimental instrument used to 
assess bias is a collection of adjudicated court cases. Manipulations are incorporated 
into the judicial decisions by controlling the outcome (i.e., who prevailed, the taxpayer 
or the IRS). Unaware of this manipulation, subjects are asked to choose and/or weight 
which cases they would recommend as support for a particular set of client facts and 
circumstances. Subjects are aware of the desired client outcome (Johnson 1993; 
Cloyd and Spilker 1999, 2000; Hatfield 2000, 2001).
For this research inquiry, the briefs each party submits to the court in litigation 
and the resulting decision issued by the judge are a replication of this schemata in an 
actual decision context.
Court Briefs. Adversarial defendants in tax litigations file briefs23 with the 
Court. The Clerk of the Court then serves each party with the briefs filed by the 
opposition. In general, these briefs are organized as follows: Preliminary Statement, 
Questions Presented, Request fo r  Finding o f Fact, Ultimate Finding o f Fact, Points 
Relied Upon, Arguments, and Conclusion. The section entitled Points Relied Upon 
lists, according to rank, the citations the taxpayer is presenting as support for the 
position taken on the relevant tax situations being litigated. As an alternative, some 
briefs cite the relevant authorities in a section entitled Listing o f Citations. Cited court 
cases are the strongest primary authority and are listed alphabetically. In the
23 Briefs are written statements delineating one's arguments used in the litigation. Rule 151 o f the 
United States Tax Court Rules permits an opening brief, an answering brief, and a reply brief by each 
party at stipulated times. If a party fails to file a timely opening brief, answering or reply briefs are not 
permitted for that party unless permission is granted by the Court.
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following section, Arguments, the defendant details the reasoning used for each article 
of support in the listing. This discussion presents confirming information and, for 
unbiased research, differentiates disconfirming information relative to the facts and 
circumstances of the case at issue. If initially ignored in their opening brief, 
answering and reply briefs afford an opportunity for a defendant to differentiate the 
disconfirming information presented by the adversary. Note that information filed as 
confirming one position is disconfirming information for the opposing position.
Relative to the experimental context, a composite listing of court cases 
presented by both parties in Points Relied Upon provides the cases available to choose 
from. The decisions used by each party in their own briefs provide the cases chosen 
from the available cases. A reading of the Arguments section of the brief delineates 
the reasoning behind the inclusion of each case (i.e., as confirming information or as 
disconfirming information).
All briefs filed for a sample case are provided in Appendix B.
Court Opinion. The Tax Court judge renders a finding by issuing a Tax Court 
Memorandum Decision. In general, the document consists of two parts: 
Memorandum Finding of Facts and Opinion. In the Opinion section, the judge 
delineates the cited cases from the filed briefs that are used in resolving the tax issues 
at bar.
Analogous to the lab experiment, the judge's Opinion provides the expert 
judgment of those cases submitted by the opposing parties that actually defend the 
particular facts and circumstances without the anchor of desired client outcome.
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The judge’s opinion relative to the sample briefs is also provided in Appendix 
B. For the random sample of cases included in this study, twenty-eight judges 
rendered opinions. With nineteen presidentially appointed regular judges, this sample 
includes opinions from all the regular judges, 5 of the senior judges (i.e., retired 
and recalled as needed), and four special judges (i.e., specially appointed by the chief 
judge).
Dependant Variable
Instances of Confirmation Bias. Confirmation bias (CB) is symptomatic of 
attending to/overweighing confirming and ignoring/underweighing disconfirming 
information when using the anchoring and adjusting heuristic. By receiving briefs 
from the adversary, each defendant is given the opportunity to distinguish one's 
position from disconfirming information. If this opportunity is never taken, this 
inquiry counts the lapsed opportunity as an instance of confirmation bias. That is, the 
disconfirming information has been ignored by the professional.
One either does or does not use a confirmatory strategy in decision-making. 
As such, confirmation bias is a dichotomous variable (i.e., either present or not 
present). An element of conservation is incorporated into this inquiry by the use of 
relative measurement methods.
Two methodologies are employed in determining instances of confirmation 
bias. In accordance with a literal interpretation of the definition of this bias, the first 
method of determining a measurement of the dependent variable CB is that all cases 
presented by each party in the litigation will be compared. That is, all cases presented 
by the adversary should be addressed in the opposing party’s briefs. If a case
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presented by the adversary is either not distinguished or favorably compared with the 
facts of the case, an instance of bias will be recorded. One may argue that presenting a 
case as confirming/disconfirming information does not guarantee that interpretation. 
Therefore, the opposing party may determine that the adversary’s interpretation of the 
cited case is erroneous and, consequently, chose to not mention the citation. Failing to 
address this inconsistency, however, presumes the correctness of one’s own 
interpretation. This measurement is dependent variable CB(L).
In a more conservative measurement, cases presented by each party are 
compared with those cited by the judge in the published opinion. This method allows 
for a judgment that irrelevant cases can be ignored. To be included as an instance of 
bias, any citation by the judge must be included in a brief from either party. This 
condition insures that each party is made aware of the particular case. When the 
opposing party does not address that citation, an instance of bias is recorded. This 
measure of the dependent variable is CB(J).
The final count under each measurement method of instances of CB will be 
standardized relative to 10. As such, cases with less than or more than 10 suits cited 
will be placed on a comparable basis. The Data Collection Instrument is found in 
Appendix C . 24
Other subjective areas in recording bias include litigants who do not cite cases 
in their briefs or fail to file any briefs. These cases will be coded as 10 Instances of 
Bias. Cases filed pursuant to a Motion for Summary Judgment generally do not
24 An additional methodology may also be appropriate. Combining the two chosen methodologies, a 
third measurement would compare cited cases between lawyers for instances o f bias. Additionally, bias 
would be recorded for cases presented by litigants but not mentioned by the judge. This method is not 
used in this study because subjectivity could be problematic with this count.
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involve the filing of brief. This Motion purports, by the Internal Revenue, that no 
issue is in contention as to interpretation of fact. The taxpayer may rebut this position 
by presenting cases, either through the brief process or during the trial, that present 
contentious interpretation of situational facts. As such, the IRS will receive a measure 
of 0 in Motion for Summary Judgment cases, while the taxpayer bias will be based 
upon filed briefs.
Independent Variables
The focus of this inquiry is the presence of confirmation bias in the defenses 
presented. As such, a t-test on the dependent variable will suffice. However, if the 
use of confirmatory decision strategies is identified, additional investigation into the 
types of litigants and types of cases susceptible to the use of this strategy will follow. 
The following variables are collected in order to enhance this investigation of relevant 
characteristics.
Litigants. Four diverse groups may provide representation in tax matters before 
the Tax Court. The initial group is composed of taxpayers who chose to represent 
themselves (i.e., pro se).. However, representation before judicial forums is generally 
provided by lawyers. As such, these parties have been exposed to the pedagogy 
provided by law schools. Consequently, they are less susceptible to confirmatory 
strategies (Cloyd and Spilker 2000). Without a legal education, taxpayer 
representatives practicing before the Tax Court must qualify. Successful completion 
of extensive testing of legal knowledge is required. A second group of litigants, 
therefore, are taxpayer representing themselves who are professionally qualified. The
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third group of litigants is tax professionals in private practice engaged to defend a 
taxpayer.
Legal counsel for the government in tax litigations are employees of the IRS. 
As a government employee, it is intuitive that the experience one receives differs from 
that of a private employee/owner. Many of the incentives introduced in the EPP 
model of Chapter 2 are not elemental to a government employee. Namely, 
environmental factors are of minimal consideration. IRS tax professionals, therefore, 
consist of the fourth group of litigants.
Professional Status. With the subjects of this study generally members of the 
legal profession, legal ability ratings are included in this study for dimensionality. 
Martindale-Hubbell Law Digest provides a peer reviewed rating for this characteristic. 
In order to be rated, an attorney must have been endorsed as adhering to professional 
standards of ethics. Legal ability is categorized as A (very high to prominent), B (high 
to very high), and C (good to high). This rating considers one's ability in the area of 
practice. These ratings are expected to improve over time. As such, they proxy for 
experience and expertise. The ability variable is operationalized as MHR and consists 
of four levels: A, B, C, or Not Rated.
Monetary Incentives. The crux of tax litigation is the Notice of Deficiency and 
the related penalties and interest. This monetary component of each legal exercise can 
be framed in the context of opposing gains and losses. A gain for the IRS is a loss for 
the taxpayer while a loss for the government is a gain to the taxpayer. The magnitude 
of the assessment could drive a perceived need to confirm a desired outcome. In 
addition to the amount of tax deficiency, several penalties are probable when a Notice
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of Deficiency is issued. IRC Section 6651 invokes a penalty for the failure to pay 
taxes when they are due. IRC Section 6662 provides an accuracy-related penalty. 
This sanction is imposed when the tax amount due is defined as a "substantial 
understatement." As such, not all taxpayers will be subject to this penalty. IRC 
Section 6694 imposes a sanction on the return preparer if a position taken on a return 
is deemed to be "unrealistic." Interest on the alleged tax deficiency is imposed under 
Section 6601. The cumulative amount of these monetary assessments constitutes the 
continuous variable MONEY.
The monetary assessment variable ranges from $128 to $37,709,602. To 
facilitate comparisons, the MONEY variable is scaled on a range of one to five. The 
ranges applied are depicted in Table 3.1.
TABLE 3.1 
Monetary Assessment Rankings
Range
Rank 1 Below $24,999
Rank 2 $25,000 - $99,999
Rank 3 $100,000 - $499,999
Rank 4 $500,000 - $999,999
Rank 5 Above $1,000,000
25 A “substantial understatement” is defined in IRC Section 6662(d)(1)(A) as a situation in which the 
amount o f understatement o f income tax (the Notice o f Deficiency amount) exceeds the greater o f 10% 
o f the tax required to be shown on the return for the year or $5,000.
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Outcome. Most often, one party prevails in the subject cases. However, the 
opinion may result in a “split” decision. Neither party prevails in the entirety. For 
example, the IRS may prevail as to the issue of inclusion of an omitted asset on an 
estate tax return, while the taxpayer may prevail as to the value of an omitted asset. 
The decision for each case will be recorded in accordance with the prevailing party as 
listed by Research Institute of America’s database record of the official opinion. Split 
decisions will be recorded as a win for each party.
A summary list of the variables examined by this study is found in Table 3.2.
TABLE 3.2 
List of Variables
CB(L) — Instances of Confirmation Bias -  
Comparison to Adversary
CB(J) = Instances of Confirmation Bias -  
Comparison to Judge
LITIGANTS Four levels:
Pro Se
Pro Se Lawyer
Taxpayer Representative Lawyer 
IRS Representative Lawyer
MHR Four levels: 
Not Rated 
“A” Rating 
“B” Rating 
“C” Rating
MONEY = Cumulative Monetary Assessment
MONEYRANK = Monetary Assessment Rank from Table 
3.1
OUTCOME : Win = 1 
Lose = 0
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With the use of actual information (i.e., the briefs filed with the Court) this 
archival study will have a greater degree of external validity than other research 
methods (i.e., experiments and simulations). With this real-life assessment, external 
validity threats of assumptions being at odds with reality are not inherent (Wallace 
1991).
Statistical Methodology
Analysis of variance (ANOVA) and Analysis of covariance (ANCOVA) 
models are used in this study. As a statistical tool, ANOVA assesses the difference in 
group means by testing if the group means of the independent variables are different 
enough to have happened not by chance. If the group means are not significantly 
different, they have no effect on the dependent variable. This relationship is tested for 
each independent variable separately and as an interaction with all other pertinent 
independent variables. Linear relationships are not assumed. ANCOVA identifies 
those variables that influence the dependent variable through assessing the error 
variance. After being identified as influential, the variable enters into the analysis as a 
covariate.
Hypothesis 1
Hypothesis 1 investigates the presence of confirmatory strategies in defenses 
submitted by taxpayer representatives in Tax Court litigations. The overall test for HI 
is to determine if Instances of Confirmation Bias (CB(L) and CB(J)) is significantly 
greater than zero for all litigants. One-variable ANOVA on the response variable CB 
with a test statistic of zero will elicit a statistically significant presence of this bias.
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Hypotheses 2 through 6
With significant results from Hypothesis 1, an ANOVA model will be utilized 
in analyzing Hypotheses 2 through 6 . Hypotheses 2 and 3 are tested using a one-way 
ANOVA model with CB as the dependant variable and specific factor levels of the 
variable LITIGANT for the independent variable. A one-way ANOVA model with 
CB as the dependent variable and specific factor levels of the variable MHR as the 
independent variable will be employed to investigate Hypotheses 4 through 6 .
If the data violates the assumptions of ANOVA, the non-parametric Mann- 
Whitney U Test will test the differences between the factor levels of each hypothesis. 
As a non-parametric test, the Mann-Whitney U ranks the values of the tested variables 
before assessing the appropriate population parameters.
Hypothesis 7
The Pearson’s Correlation Coefficient will be the statistical methodology 
utilized to assess any relationship between CB, the factor levels of LITIGANT, and 
MONEYRANK variables. In the event that the parametric assumptions are violated, 
Spearman’s Rank Correlation Coefficient will be substituted for Pearson’s to 
investigate any correlative relationship. Spearman’s Rank Correlation Coefficient, a 
non-parametric method, operates identically to Pearson’s Correlation Coefficient on 
the ranks assigned to the original data values.
Model Assumptions
ANOVA and ANCOVA models are generally robust against violations of a 
normal distribution of error terms (Neter et al. 1996). However, goodness of fit of the 
models must be tested for serious departures from the three basic assumptions of the
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
7 4
models. These assumptions are: errors are independent, errors appear to have constant 
variances (homogeneity of variance), and errors seem to be a random sample from a 
normal distribution (normalcy).
Independence of the error terms is ensured by randomization. This study will 
randomly sample the population of cases. Consequently, the independence 
assumption should be satisfied
Because the factor levels of the variable LITIGANT are not equal, it is likely 
that the homogeneity of variances assumption is violated. Levine's Test of 
Homogeneity of Variances will be utilized to test for violations of this assumption.
The normality assumption can be tested by plotting error terms for the 
dependent variable in the form of a normal probability plot, or Q-Q plot. This plot 
shows the observed values against the expected values if the sample data are drawn 
from a normal distribution. Clustering around the expected value (i.e., the straight 
line) denotes meeting the assumption. Shapiro-Wilk’s and Kolmogorov-Smirnov 
testing will assess the distributions evidenced by the study data.
Serious violations of one or more of the assumptions will confound the results 
of parametric testing. In the face of such violations, distribution-free methods that do 
not require assumptions about the distributions of the population parameters are 
appropriate. The non-parametric methods previously discussed will be utilized.
Summary
Awareness of a bias is the first step necessary for mitigation. Additionally, 
external validity of the findings of prior research is challenged when results are 
experimentally derived. This study will provide an assessment of the laboratory
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research findings on the confirmation bias symptomatic of the anchoring and 
adjustment heuristic in application. Chapter 1 presents three questions worthy of 
investigation. In this chapter, seven hypotheses are developed from those research 
questions. Additionally, the research sample is identified, the sample size is 
determined, and the sampling method employed is explained. Next, the data is 
defined and testing instruments are presented. The dependant and independent 
variables are described, along with an explanation of counting methodologies 
employed. Finally, appropriate statistical tools for assessing each hypothesis are 
delineated. Chapter 4 discusses the results of these statistical analyses.
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EMPIRICAL FINDINGS
The previous chapters contain an introduction to normative decision theory and 
some heuristics that individuals find essential in making judgments and decisions due 
to scarce resources. While these heuristics facilitate good judgment and decision­
making, incentives may act to inhibit optimal JDM processes. Suboptimal processing 
results in biased decisions. Remedial factors, however, can mitigate the influence of 
negative incentives. Chapter 2 presents a review of the extant literature of the tax 
research task, based upon the Roberts’ Economic Psychology Processing Model. 
From the literature, numerous incentives are identified that inhibit the JDM processes. 
Additionally, factors which mitigate the influence of incentives are identified. The 
development of hypotheses and the statistical methodology used to test the impact of 
incentives and remedial measures in the context of tax research and the use of 
confirmatory strategies are explained in Chapter 3. Chapter 4 delineates an analysis of 
the results derived through this testing. A descriptive summary of the data is 
presented first. A discussion of the results related to each hypothesis follows.
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Input Data
Of the 288 Tax Court Memorandum Decisions from the year 2004, 10626 are 
included in this research inquiry. Generally, each decision provides two observations 
for the study: a taxpayer representative defense and an IRS representative defense. In 
most instances, each case is concerned with litigating only one tax issue. Two cases, 
however, provide a distinctive discussion of two separate tax issues to be determined. 
These two decisions, therefore, provide four observations. With 104 cases presenting 
one issue and 2 cases providing two issues each, there are 108 observable tax issues 
presented in the data. Because each party prepares a defense, there are 216 
observations in the sample. The observations are distributed equally between taxpayer 
representatives and Service representatives. Each class contains 108 observations.
The Internal Revenue Service employs attorneys to litigate contentious issues 
with taxpayers. Each of the 108 defenses presented for the Commissioner, therefore, 
are prepared by lawyers. The taxpayer, however, may choose self-representation or 
the services of a professional. Of the cases in this inquiry, taxpayers represent 
themselves (i.e., pro se) in 56 cases and hire professional representatives in 52 
instances. Of the 56 pro se defenses, three are prepared by lawyers representing 
themselves. The other 53 pro se representatives are from diverse backgrounds and 
career paths. Table 4.1 reflects this breakdown of litigants.
26 Using the required sample size equation, finite population correction factor, and the asymptotic 
relative efficiency adjustment described on page 91, the required sample size for this research inquiry is 
86. Briefs for twenty observations in excess o f the random sample requirements were secured in case 
some briefs were not useable for some reason. Because all cases in the sample were usable, the 
additional cases then were included in the study.
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TABLE 4.1 
Profession of Litigants
PRO SE PRO SE 
LAWYER
LAWYER
Taxpayer Representative 53 3 52
Internal Revenue 
Representative
Total
0 0 108
53 3 160
In an adversarial relationship, one party generally prevails. However, in this 
forum, a “split” decision is possible. For example, the IRS may contend in court that 
there are $10M assets omitted from an estate tax return. While the judge may rule that 
there are indeed omitted assets, the value may be established at $2M. With this 
scenario, the IRS prevailed but not to the desired extent. Thus, each party is 
considered a winner. Of the 108 challenges included in this study, eight cases result in 
split decisions. Therefore, there are 116 successful and 100 unsuccessful defenses. 
The taxpayer representative prevailed in 24 decisions and the Internal Revenue won in 
92 cases. Conversely, the petitioner lost in 84 challenges while the Commissioner lost 
in only 16 instances. Demographics by profession and litigant are provided in Table 
4.2.
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TABLE 4.2 
Prevailing Party by Litigant and Profession 
(Percentage by Litigant Class) 
(Percentage by Cases)
TOTAL
BY
CASES
PRO SE PRO SE 
LAWYER
TAXPAYER
REPRESENTA
TIVE
LAWYER
INTERNAL
REVENUE
LAWYER
WON 116
(100.00%)
5
(9.434%) 
(4.311%)*
1
(33.333%) 
( 0.862%)*
18
(34.615%)
(15.517%)*
92
(85.185%)
(79.310%)*
LOST 100
(100.00%)
48
(90.566%) 
(48.00%)*
2
(66.667%) 
(2.00%)*
34
(65.385%)
(34.00%)*
16
(14.815%)
(16.00%)
TOTAL
BY
CLASS
216 53
(100.00%)
3
(100.00%)
52
(100.00%)
108
(100.00%)
* Total by Cases
Instances of Confirmation Bias 
Each of the briefs filed with the Court Clerk for the 108 tax issues are analyzed 
for instances of confirmation bias. As previously discussed, this measurement is 
generated using two schemes. The first measurement is generated by a comparison of 
the cases cited by each litigant. That is, the listing of cases presented by the taxpayer 
is compared to the listing submitted by the IRS. If a case cited by the petitioner is not 
defended by the respondent, an instance of bias is recorded for the Service. 
Conversely, a citation by the respondent not distinguished by the petitioner results in 
an instance of bias for the taxpayer. The variable resulting from this counting is 
labeled CB(L). An example of this methodology is provided in Table 4.3.
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TABLE 4.3 
Measurement of Confirmation Bias 
Dependent Variable CB(L)
Cases Presented 
Taxpayer
Cases Presented Instances of Bias 
Internal Revenue Taxpayer
Instances of Bias 
Internal Revenue
Abeles Abeles 0 0
Rizzo 0 1
Johnson 0 1
Tadros Tadros 0 0
Maranto 1 0
Elgart 1 0
Honts 1 0
Alta Sierra Vista 1 0
Pyo 1 0
Reddock 1 0
Wallin 1 0
Score 7 2
7/11 =6.36 2/11 = 1.82
The alternative measurement methodology compares those cases the judge 
determines as instrumental in the decision process with those cases presented by the 
litigants. A cited case must be included in at least one brief. This stipulation assures 
that both litigants had the opportunity to investigate that case. If one litigant fails to 
discuss a listed case, one instance of bias is counted. If both litigants address a listed 
case, no instances of bias are recorded. The resulting variable is named CB(J). An 
example of this measurement is detailed in Table 4.4. Each of the 108 challenged 
issues is analyzed using the instrument depicted in Appendix C. For comparability, 
instances of bias are recorded as a percentage, with 10 representing 100%.
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TABLE 4.4 
Measurement of Confirmation Bias 
Dependent Variable CB(J)
Cases Cases Cases Cited Instances of Bias Instances of Bias
Presented Presented Judge Taxpayer Internal Revenue
Taxpayer Internal
Revenue
Abeles Abeles Abeles 0 0
Rizzo Rizzo 0 1
Johnson Johnson 0 1
Tadros Tadros Tadros 0 0
Maranto Maranto 1 0
Elgart
Honts
Elgart
Honts
1
1
0
0
Alta Sierra Alta Sierra 1 0
Vista Vista
Pyo
Reddock
Pyo 1 0
Wallin
Monge
Normac
Marks
Ward
Union Texas 
International 
Co.
Bell
Karosen
Score 5
5/9 = 5.56
2
2/9 = 2.22
If a representative failed to file any briefs or mentioned no cases in the filed 
briefs, the defense is deemed fully biased and is scored as a 10. Cases presented under 
a Motion of Summary Judgment by the IRS are counted as zero instances of bias. 
With this Motion, the Service contends that the litigation does not involve an 
interpretation of fact; therefore, no cases are necessary. Having the burden of proof,
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taxpayers must then present cases to overcome this contention through briefs or oral 
testimony. Thus, the taxpayer may demonstrate a confirmatory strategy in the briefs 
offered.
As expected, measurements range from zero to ten (100%). Frequency of 
scores is depicted in Table 4.5.
T A B L E  4 .5  
F r e q u e n c y  o f  In s ta n c e s  o f  C o n fir m a tio n  B ia s
C B (L ) C B (J )
F requency Percent C um ulative Frequency  
Percentage
Percent C um ulative
P ercentage
0.00 53 24.5 24.5 98 45.4 45.4
.28 1 .5 25.0 - - -
.57 1 .5 25.5 - - -
.63 1 .4 25.9 - - -
.64 1 .5 26.4 - - -
.77 1 .5 26.9 - - -
.83 - - 1 .5 45.9
.91 1 .4 27.3 1 .4 46.3
.93 1 .5 27.8 - - -
.94 1 .6 28.2 - - -
1.11 1 .5 29.7 - - -
1.18 1 .5 29.2 1 .5 46.8
1.25 .9 30.1 1 .4 47.2
1.27 1 .5 30.6 - - -
1.33 1 .4 31.0 - - -
1.42 1 .5 31.5 - - -
1.43 1 .4 31.9 - - -
1.54 - - - 1 .5 47.7
1.67 2 1.0 32.9 2 .9 48.6
1.82 2 .9 33.8 2 .9 49.5
1.88 1 .5 34.3 - - -
2.00 .9 35.2 6 2.8 52.3
2.10 1 .4 35.6 - - -
2.22 - - 2 .9 53.2
2.25 1 .5 36.1 - - -
2.45 1 .5 36.6 - - -
2.50 2.3 38.9 6 2.8 56.0
2.56 1 .5 39.4 - - -
2.61 1 .4 39.8 - - -
2.73 1 .5 40.3 1 .5 56.5
2.86 - - 2 .9 57.4
3.00 1 .4 40.7 - - -
3.10 .5 41.2 - ■ - -
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
8 3
TABLE 4.5 (Continued)
3.16 1 .5 41.7 - - -
3.18 1 .4 42.1 - - -
3.33 - - 7 3.2 60.6
3.40 1 .5 42.6 - - -
3.43 1 .5 43.1 - - -
3.45 1 .4 43.5 - - -
3.50 1 .5 44.0 - - -
3.51 1 .4 44.4 - - -
3.53 1 .5 44.9 - - -
3.57 1 .5 45.4 1 .5 61.1
3.58 1 .4 45.8 - - -
3.61 1 .5 46.3 - - -
3.67 1 .5 46.8 - - -
3.70 1 .4 47.2 1 .5 61.6
3.75 1 .5 47.7 - - -
3.79 1 .4 48.1 1 .4 62.0
3.93 2 1.0 49.1 - - -
4.00 2 .9 50.0 1 .5 62.5
4.12 1 .5 50.5 - - -
4.14 1 .4 50.9 - - -
4.18 1 .5 51.4 - - -
4.19 1 .5 51.9 - - -
4.21 1 .4 52.3 - - -
4.38 2 .9 53.2 - - -
4.50 1 .5 53.7 - - -
4.52 1 .5 54.2 - - -
4.53 1 .4 54.6 - - -
4.59 1 .5 55.1 - - -
4.60 1 .5 55.6 - - -
4.71 - - 1 .5 63.0
4.75 1 .4 56.0 - - -
4.76 2 .9 56.9 - - -
5.00 7 3.2 60.1 6 2.7 65.7
5.17 1 .5 60.6 - - -
5.29 1 .5 61.1 - - -
5.33 1 .5 61.6 - - -
5.37 1 .4 62.0 - - -
5.42 1 .5 62.5 - - -
5.46 1 .5 63.0 - - -
5.48 1 .4 63.4 - - -
5.51 1 .5 63.9 - - -
5.56 1 .5 64.4 1 .5 66.2
5.71 1 .4 64.8 - - -
5.79 1 .5 65.3 - - -
5.83 - - 1 .5 66.7
5.91 1 .4 65.7 - - -
6.00 - - 1 .4 67.1
6.15 1 .5 66.2 - - -
6.25 3 1.4 67.6 - - -
6.36 1 .5 68.1 1 .5 67.6
6.40 1 .4 68.5 - - -
6.50 1 .5 69.0 - - -
6.52 1 .5 69.5 - - -
6.67 2 .9 70.4 5 2.3 69.9
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TABLE 4.5 (Continued)
6.74 2 .9 71.3 - - -
6.88 1 5 71.8 - - -
6.92 - - - 1 .5 70.4
7.14 2 .9 72.7 - - -
7.50 - - - 4 1.8 72.2
7.62 1 .4 73.1 - - -
7.71 1 .5 73.6 - - -
7.78 1 .5 74.1 - - -
7.90 1 .4 74.5 - - -
7.92 1 .5 75.0 - - -
8.00 1 .5 75.5 1 .5 72.7
8.13 1 .4 75.9 - - -
8.18 - - - 1 .4 73.1
8.24 1 .5 76.4 - - -
8.30 - - - 2 1.0 74.1
8.33 2 .9 77.3 - - -
8.50 1 .5 77.8 - - -
8.63 1 .4 78.2 - - -
8.67 1 .5 78.7 - - -
8.75 1 .5 79.2 - - -
8.81 1 .4 79.6 - - -
9.64 1 .5 80.1 - - -
10.00 43 19.9 100.00 56 25.9 100.00
Descriptive statistics of Instances of Confirmation Bias (CB) by profession of 
the litigant are presented in Table 4.6. As shown, IRS counsel has the smallest mean, 
with 1.0829 (CB(J)) and 1.8596 (CB(L)), while lawyers who represent themselves in 
tax litigation have the largest mean of 10 (CB(J)) and 9.8147 (CB(L)).
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T A B L E  4 .6  
Instances o f  C onfirm ation B ias  
D escrip tive Statistics b y  P rofession  o f  L itigant 
D escrip tive Statistics by W in /L ose
TOTAL PRO SE P R O S E
LAWYE
R
TAXPAYER
LAWYER
IRS
LAWYER
WIN LOSE
Number 216 53 3 52 108 116 100
Mean - CB(L) 4.4416 8.4899 10.0000 5.3682 1.8596 2.5675 6.6212
Mean - CB(J) 3.7615 8.6701 10.0000 3.9617 1.0829 1.5479 6.3292
Median - CB(L) 4.0590 10 10 5.2725 .7035 1.3345 6.7710
Median - CB(J) 2.0000 10 10 3.3370 0 0 9.1500
Mode - CB(L) 0 10 10 5 0 0 10
Mode - CB(J) 0 10 10 0 0 0 10
Standard Deviation
CB(L) 3.73480 2.71892 .00000 2.53297 2.30255 2.97239 3.34295
CB(J) 4.24275 2.91656 .00000 3.77353 2.22753 2.81101 4.18489
Minimum -  CB(L) 0 0 10 0 0 0 0
Minimum -  CB(J) 0 0 10 0 0 0 0
Maximum -  CB(L) 10 10 10 10 8.63 10 10
Maximum -  CB(J) 10 10 10 10 10 10 10
Testing the Assumptions 
Parametric tests for determining the differences among several population 
means assume three population parameters are satisfied for the use of the procedures 
in testing hypotheses. These assumptions are:
• Independent random sampling from each of the populations (i.e., 
independence assumption),
• Populations under study are normally distributed with means p; that may or 
may not be equal (i.e., normality assumption), and
• Equal variances a  (i.e., constant variances assumption).
ANOVA and ANCOVA procedures are robust against violations of the normality 
assumption (Neter et al. 1996). However, serious violations of one or more of the
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
8 6
assumptions will confound the results of parametric testing. In the face of such 
violations, distribution-free methods that do not require assumptions about the 
distributions of the population parameters are appropriate. Each of these assumptions 
will now be assessed in turn.
Independence Assumption
Independence of the error terms is ensured by randomization. Random 
sampling is used to distribute idiosyncratic characteristics of the population in order to 
diffuse selective bias among the test subjects (Kirk 1982). This study randomly 
samples the population of cases. Consequently, the independence assumption should 
be satisfied.
Normality Assumption
The normality assumption is  tested by plotting error terms for the dependent 
variable in the form of a normal probability plot, or Q-Q plot. This plot shows the 
observed values against the expected values if the sample data are drawn from a 
normal distribution. Clustering around the expected value (i.e., the straight line) 
denotes meeting the normality assumption. Normal Q-Q plots for the dependent 
variables CB(L) and CB(J) are depicted in Figure 4.1
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FIGURE 4.1 
Normal Probability Plots of Dependent Variables
With these plots, there is reason to doubt that the assumption of normality is 
met. Shapiro-Wilk’s and Kolmogorov-Smimov tests are used to derive significance 
levels for the data. If significance levels are small, there is strong evidence that the 
normality assumption is violated. With a small p-value, the null hypothesis that the 
samples are from a normal distribution is rejected. Results of both tests are entered in 
Table 4.7.
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TABLE 4.7 
Normality Tests on Dependent Variables
Kolmogorov-Smimova Shapiro-Wilk
Statistic df Sig. Statistic Df Sig.
CBJ .266 216 .000 .751 216 .000
CBL .128 216 .000 .875 216 .000
a Lilliefors Significance Correction
Both tests of normality for the dependent variables derive a p-value of .000. 
Therefore, the null hypothesis is rejected and there is strong evidence that the 
normality assumption is violated.
Constant Variance Assumption
The constant variance assumption is tested by deriving the p-value for the null 
hypothesis that the error variances are equal in the populations from which the 
samples were taken. The Levene’s Test for Homogeniety of Variance derives this 
value. Table 4.8 reports the results for the test.
Using the Levene’s Test for Homogenity of Variance, each dependent variable 
is tested for constant variances among the factor levels. Although the study has four 
factor levels of litigants, the class of pro se/lawyer is not included because all values 
of bias for the class are constant at 10 instances. The test derives mixed results. 
CB(L), with p-values ranging from .493 to .963, does not reject the null of equal 
variances. CB(J), however, rejects the null, with a p-value of .000.
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
89
TABLE 4.8
Constant Variance Test on Dependent Variables
Test o f Homoeeneitv o f Variance3 -  CB(L)
Levene Statistic dfl df2 Sig.
Based on Mean .122 2 210 .885
Based on Median .709 2 210 .493
Based on Median and with 
adjusted df
.709 2 172.885 .493
Based on trimmed mean .038 2 210 .963
a CBL is constant when LITIGANT = Pro se/Lawyer. It has been omitted.
Test o f  Homoeeneitv o f Varianceb - CBfJ)
Levene Statistic dfl df2 Sig.
Based on Mean 16.636 2 210 .000
Based on Median 15.205 2 210 .000
Based on Median and with 
adjusted df
15.205 2 192.039 .000
Based on trimmed mean 16.585 2 210 .000
b. CBJ is constant when LITIGANT = Pro se/Lawyer. It has been omitted.
With both measurements of Instances of Confirmation Bias violating the 
normality assumption and one measurement violating the constant variance 
assumption, relevant hypotheses for this research inquiry are tested using non- 
parametric statistical methods.
Nonparametric techniques are oftentimes necessary when the data is a count, 
as is the dependent variable, Instances of Confirmation Bias, in this study. As the 
name implies, nonparametric techniques derive no parameters. Without parameters, it
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is difficult to quantify statements about the differences between two populations. 
Additionally, nonparametric methods convert data to ranks. In doing so, the original 
values are discarded; information is lost. As such, nonparametric tests are less 
powerful in detecting differences than are parametric methods, when parametric tests 
can be used.
Asymptotic relative efficiency (ARE) describes the sample size ratio necessary 
for a parametric procedure and nonparametric procedure to have the same ability in 
order to reject a null hypothesis. For the Mann-Whitney U Test, the basic 
nonparametric technique used for analysis in this research study, the ARE is .955. The 
required sample size equation, previously discussed in Chapter 3, generates a sample 
size of 83 cases to be randomly generated from the finite population of Tax Court 
Memorandum Opinions. Using 106 cases far exceeds the required ratio to achieve 
static ability between parametric and nonparametric methods.
Hypotheses Analysis
Hypothesis 1
H0i: Confirmation bias is not present in the substantial authority presented
by litigants in tax issues litigation before the Tax Court.
Hai: Confirmation bias is present in the substantial authority presented by
litigants in tax issues litigation before the Tax Court.
The principal hypothesis in this study is to determine whether litigants exhibit 
confirmatory decision strategies in the defenses presented in litigation. To assess this, 
the Instances of Confirmation Bias variables are tested. A one-tailed t-test, testing that 
the mean is greater than zero, tests Hypothesis 1. Rejecting H0i (t test = 17.471, p 
<.000 for CB(L) and t test = 13.030, p <.000) for CB(J)), Hai is supported.
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Confirmatory decision-making strategies are present in the defenses of litigants using 
both a precise interpretation of confirmation bias and a more conservative definition.
To determine if a specific class of litigants drives this result, each class is 
tested separately. As shown in Table 4.9, no class is responsible for this finding. 
Although the means of each class differ, each mean is significantly greater than 0. 
Thus, this study provides evidence from Tax Court Memorandum Opinions that 
confirmation bias is present in the substantial authority presented by all litigants 
involving tax issues litigations.
TABLE 4.9
T-test of Confirmation Bias Variables by Class of Litigants
t-value df Sig. Mean 95% Confidence
(1-tailed) Difference Interval o f Mean
Difference
Lower Upper
Pro Se -  CB(J) 21.642 52 .000 8.6701 7.8662 9.4740
Pro Se -  CB(L) 22.732 52 .000 8.4899 7.7405 9.2393
Pro Se Lawyer -  CB(J) *
Pro Se Lawyer -  CB(L) *
Taxpayer Lawyer -  CB(J) 7.571 51 .000 3.9617 2.9112 5.0123
Taxpayer Lawyer -  CB(L) 15.283 51 .000 5.3682 4.6630 6.0734
IRS Lawyer -  CB(J) 5.052 107 .000 1.0829 .6580 1.5078
IRS Lawyer -  CB(L) 8.393 107 .000 1.8596 1.4204 2.2988
* t cannot be computed because the standard deviation is 0.
Hypothesis 2
Having rejected H0i that confirmation bias is not present in the substantial
authority presented by litigants in Tax Court Memorandum Decisions, the additional
hypotheses are tested.
H02 : Confirmation bias is not more prevalent in the substantial authority
presented by pro se representatives than professional representatives.
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Ha2 : Confirmation bias is more prevalent in the substantial authority
presented by pro se representatives than professional representatives.
The extant literature provides support that exposure to law school pedagogy 
serves to mitigate the tendency of one to use confirmatory decision strategies while 
engaged in a tax research task (Cloyd and Spilker 2000). Hence, it follows that 
materials presented by pro se litigants should exhibit more confirmation bias than the 
citations provided by lawyers. To test this hypothesis, the four classes of litigants are 
collapsed into two groups. Group One (i.e., non-lawyers) includes only those 
taxpayers who represent themselves and are not a lawyer by profession. Group Two 
(i.e., lawyers) includes the remaining three classes of litigants: pro se/lawyer, taxpayer 
representative lawyers, and IRS lawyers. With only two groups, the Mann-Whitney U 
Test provides the appropriate statistical barometer. Descriptive statistics are provided 
in Table 4.10.
TABLE 4.10
Hypothesis 2: Confirmation Bias -  Pro se v. Professional Representatives
Descriptive Statistics
CB(L) CB(J)
Lawyers Non- Lawyers Non-Lawyers
Lawyers
Number 163 53 163 53
Mean 3.1287 8.4899 2.1654 8.6701
Mean Rank 87.80 172.15 87.98 171.61
Sum of Ranks 14312.00 9124.00 14340.50 9095.50
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The Mann-Whitney U Test derives a statistic of 946.00 (CB(L)) and 974.50 
(CB(J)) and both report asymptotic significance levels (1-tailed) of .000. Thus, H0 2 
that confirmation bias for pro-se litigants is not significantly greater than confirmation 
bias for professional representatives is rejected. As expected, pro se litigants exhibit 
more confirmation bias than professional representatives.
Hypothesis 3
Ho3: Confirmation bias is not more prevalent in the substantial authority
presented by the taxpayers' professional representatives than the IRS 
professional representatives.
Ha3: Confirmation bias is more prevalent in the substantial authority
presented by taxpayers' professional representatives than IRS 
professional representatives.
As with Hypothesis 2, Hypothesis 3 concerns the difference between two 
groups of litigants: taxpayer’s professional representatives and IRS professional 
representative. The focus of this hypothesis is to delineate a difference between two 
groups of lawyers. Assumptions of this hypothesis are that mitigating characteristics 
of task specific experience, task specific knowledge, education, and accountability are 
equal between groups. Differences are related to incentives that are, intuitively, 
dissimilar between government employees (i.e., IRS employees) and private 
practitioners. Descriptive statistics are provided in Table 4.11.
The Mann-Whitney U Test derives a statistic of 882.000 (CB(L)) and 1467.00 
(CB(J)) and both report asymptotic significance levels (1-tailed) of .000. Thus, Ho3 
that confirmation bias for taxpayer hired professional representative is not 
significantly greater than confirmation bias for IRS professional representatives is 
rejected.
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TABLE 4.11
Hypothesis 3: Confirmation Bias -  Taxpayer’s Lawyers v. IRS Lawyers
Descriptive Statistics
CB(L) CB(J)
Taxpayer’s
Lawyers
IRS
Lawyers
Taxpayer’s
Lawyers
IRS
Lawyers
Number 52 108 52 108
Mean 5.3682 1.8596 3.9617 1.0829
Mean Rank 117.54 62.67 106.29 68.08
Sum of Ranks 6112.00 6768.00 5527.00 7353.00
Hypothesis 4
H04 : Confirmation bias is not more prevalent in the substantial authority
presented by Martindale-Hubbell non-rated professionals than
Martindale-Hubbell rated professionals.
Ha4: Confirmation bias is more prevalent in the substantial authority
presented by Martindale-Hubbell non-rated professionals than
Martindale-Hubbell rated professionals.
Martindale Hubbell provides a peer review system for rating the technical 
ability of lawyers. This is a service that is requested. Having no rating is not a
commentary on ability. Of the 163 legal representatives included in the sample, thirty-
three possess a rating and 130 of the lawyers are not peer-reviewed. Table 4.12 
presents descriptive statistics for these groups.
The Mann-Whitney U Test derives a statistic of 966.000 (CB(L)) and 1413.50 
(CB(J)). Asymptotic significance levels (1-tailed) of .000 (CB(L)) and .002 (CB(J)) 
are reported. Thus, Ho4 that confirmation bias for Martindale-Hubbell rated lawyers is
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not significantly greater than confirmation bias for Martindale-Hubbell non-rated 
lawyers is rejected.
TABLE 4.12
Hypothesis 4: Confirmation Bias -  Martindale-Hubbell Non-Rated Lawyers v. 
Martindale-Hubbell Rated Lawyers 
Descriptive Statistics
CB(L) CB(J)
Martindale- Martindale-Hubbell Martindale- Martindale-Hubbell
Hubbell Rated Non-rated Lawyers Hubbell Rated Non-rated Lawyers
Lawyers Lawyers
Number 33 130 33 130
Mean 5.4108 2.5452 3.8461 1.7388
Mean Rank 117.73 72.93 104.17 76.37
Sum of Ranks 3885.00 9481.00 3437.50 9928.50
Hypothesis 5
Ho5: Confirmation bias is not more prevalent in the substantial authority
presented by Martindale-Hubbell “A” rated professionals than
Martindale-Hubbell “B” rated professionals.
Ha5 : Confirmation bias is more prevalent in the substantial authority
presented by Martindale-Hubbell “A” rated professionals than 
Martindale-Hubbell “B” rated professionals.
Martindale-Hubbell provides three levels of rating. Of the thirty-three rated 
lawyers, 25 possess an “A”, 8 receive a “B”, and no lawyers in the group have a “C” 
rating. Descriptive statistics for these two groups are provided in Table 4.13.
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TABLE 4.13
Hypothesis 5: Confirmation Bias -  Martindale-Hubbell “A” Rated Lawyers v. 
Martindale-Hubbell “B” Rated Lawyers 
Descriptive Statistics
CB(L) CB(J)
Martindale- 
Hubbell “A” 
Rated Lawyers
Martindale- 
Hubbell “B ” 
Rated Lawyers
Martindale- 
Hubbell “A ” 
Rated Lawyers
Martindale-Hubbell 
“B ” Rated 
Lawyers
Number 25 8 25 8
Mean 5.4956 5.1456 3.6769 4.370
Mean Rank 17.38 15.81 17.02 16.94
Sum of Ranks 434.50 126.50 425.50 135.50
The Mann-Whitney U Test derives a statistic of 90.50 (CB(L)) and 99.50 
(CB(J)). Exact significance levels (1-tailed) of .696 (CB(L)) and .984 (CB(J)) are 
reported. Thus, H0 5 that confirmation bias for Martindale-Hubbell “A” Rated 
attorneys is not significantly greater than confirmation bias for Martindale-Hubbell 
“B” Rated attorneys is not rejected.
Hypothesis 6
H06: Confirmation bias is not more prevalent in the substantial authority
presented by Martindale- Hubbell non-rated taxpayer professionals than 
Martindale-Hubbell non-rated IRS professionals.
Ha6: Confirmation bias is more prevalent in the substantial authority
presented by Martindale-Hubbell non-rated taxpayer professionals than 
Martindale-Hubbell non-rated IRS professionals.
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Twenty of the taxpayers’ professional representatives are not rated by 
Martindale-Hubbell; none of the IRS representatives possess a rating. Descriptive 
statistics for these two groups are presented in Table 4.14.
TABLE 4.14
Hypothesis 6: Confirmation Bias -  Martindale-Hubbell Non-Rated Taxpayer 
Lawyers v. Martindale Hubbell Non-Rated IRS Lawyers 
Descriptive Statistics
CB(L) CB(J)
Martindale- Martindale-Hubbell Martindale- Martindale-Hubbell
Hubbell Non- Non-rated IRS Hubbell Non- IRS Non-rated
Rated Taxpayer 
Lawyers
Lawyers Rated Taxpayer 
Lawyers
Lawyers
Number 20 108 20 108
Mean 5.5296 1.8596 4.4544 1.0829
Mean Rank 102.38 57.49 94.60 58.93
Sum of Ranks 2047.50 6208.50 1892.00 6364.00
The Mann-Whitney U Test derives a statistic of 322.50 (CB(L)) and 478.00 
(CB(J)). Asymptotic significance levels (1-tailed) of .000 (CB(L)) and .000 (CB(J)) 
are reported. Thus, H06 that confirmation bias for Martindale-Hubbell non-rated 
taxpayer attorneys is not significantly greater than confirmation bias for Martindale- 
Hubbell non-rated IRS attorneys is rejected.
Hypothesis 7
H07 ‘. The amount of the Notice of Deficiency and related penalties does not 
correlate to the presence of confirmatory processing strategies for pro 
se representatives, taxpayer professional representatives, or IRS 
professional representatives.
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Ha7: The amount of the Notice of Deficiency and related penalties does
correlate to the presence of confirmatory processing strategies for pro 
se representatives, taxpayer professional representatives, or IRS 
professional representatives.
The extant literature on the tax research task supports the positive impact of 
monetary incentives on aggressive recommendation for client’s tax issues. Hypothesis 
7 tests the correlation of this monetary incentive (Money) to Instances of Confirmation 
Bias by the classes of litigants. Spearman’s Rank Correlation Coefficient is the most 
frequently used non-parametric statistic for measuring the correlation between two 
variables. This statistic is a derivative of the Pearson’s Correlation Coefficient applied 
to ranked data (Aczel 2002). As a two-tailed test, a positive and a negative 
relationship is tested. The results of the correlation tests are shown in Table 4.15.
TABLE 4.15
Correlation Coefficients -  Monetary Incentive to Litigants
S near man’s Rho Correlation Coefficient with CBfL')
MONEYRNK PRO SE TAXPAYER IRS
LAWYER LAWYER
MONEYRNK Correlation Coefficient 1.000 .068 -.165 -.028
Sig. (2-tailed) .676 .322 .803
N 174 40 38 82
Spearman’s Rho Correlation Coefficient with CB(J)
MONEYRNK PRO SE TAXPAYER IRS
LAWYER LAWYER
MONEYRNK Correlation Coefficient 1.000 .169 -.163 .005
Sig. (2-tailed) .298 .329 .966
N 174 40 38 82
With significance levels as shown, H0 7 is not rejected. Although there is no significant 
correlation for any class of litigant with the monetary assessment incentive, it is of
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note that taxpayer lawyers and IRS lawyers, for the CB(L) variable, show a negative 
relationship. As expected, for knowledgeable litigants, as the monetary stakes rise, an 
unbiased defense is presented.
Summary
With the violations of assumptions exhibited in the data, non-parametric 
methods of analysis are employed to investigate the hypotheses presented in Chapter 
3. The empirical findings in this chapter support Hai. Specifically, statistically 
significant results detect the presence of confirmation bias in the defenses presented 
by all litigants before the Tax Court. Further testing provides an evaluation by 
professional status of the litigants. Additionally, Chapter 5 provides a summary and a 
discussion of the implications of this study. Also, the limitations of the study are 
noted and opportunities for future research are identified.
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
CHAPTER 5
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
Optimal judgment and decision-making mandates searching for and analyzing 
information both confirming and disconfirming a certain perspective. Prior studies, in 
the experimental context, support the impact incentives have on JDM relative to a 
specific tax research task. These incentives prompt the researcher, unconsciously, to 
search and analyze information supporting the desired outcome while ignoring 
information that disconfirms this outcome. Extending this research, subsequent 
studies introduce remedial measures that serve to mitigate this unconscious tendency. 
Incorporating subjects from an applied situation, this study exhibits the premise that 
debiasing techniques are effective. Although these remedial processes are useful in 
reducing instances of bias in the perusal of information, the research also presents 
evidence that the influence of incentives remains. Thus, the degree of effectiveness of 
remediation needs to be improved. Enhanced awareness of this latent influence is the 
initial step.
First, this chapter summarizes the empirical findings of this research inquiry. 
Next, the implications of these results are discussed. Third, contributions and 
limitations of the research are delineated. Finally, suggestions for future research are 
considered.
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Summary of the Empirical Findings
The primary objective of this research is to detect the presence of confirmatory 
decision-making strategies presented by litigants in Tax Court Memorandum 
proceedings. Where the use of these strategies is confirmed, a secondary objective is 
to discern characteristics of those litigants who exhibit usage of this suboptimal JDM 
strategy.
The use of confirmatory JDM strategies is identified in the defenses advanced 
by these litigants to the Court. These professionals, through the educational process, 
have been exposed to methodologies necessary to accomplish unbiased research. 
Additionally, professional standards mandate client recommendations that are without 
prejudice. This finding, at the apex of the contentious legal process, is indicative of 
the strength that incentives exhibit in JDM. Further investigation of litigants’ 
characteristics is warranted.
Three classes of litigants can practice before the Tax Court: pro se, lawyers, 
and other professional representatives that have qualified before the Court through 
extensive testing. Very few professionals attempt to qualify in this manner. This is 
supported by the representative sample randomly chosen from the 2004 proceedings. 
All litigants are either pro se or legal representatives; that is, none of the litigants are 
other qualified professionals.
Because taxes are a highly complex and technical area of expertise, it is 
intuitive that few taxpayers would choose to attempt their own defense. Task specific 
education and experience, along with accountability, are all factors that enhance the 
ability to prevail in a legally adversarial situation. These remedial measures are the
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result of law school pedagogy and in-firm hierarchical research techniques. These 
factors are not characteristics found in the general population. Surprisingly, fifty-three 
non-lawyer taxpayers chose to present their own tax issues. The results for 
Hypothesis 2 support the premise that the delineated remedial measures do reduce 
one’s susceptibility to the use of confirmatory strategies. Pro se petitioners derive a 
mean for Instances of Confirmation Bias of 8.4899 (CB(L)) and 8.6701 (CB(J)). 
These means are significantly greater than lawyers’ derived means of 3.1287 (CB(L)) 
and 2.1654 (CB(J)). Not surprisingly, pro se litigants rarely are successful in their 
challenges. Self-representatives prevailed in only 9.434% of the attempts; conversely, 
they lost in 90.566% of the proceedings. Taxpayers who chose to represent 
themselves in proceeding before the Tax Court are not technically qualified to do so; 
consequently, they are not successful. Thus, findings of prior research on the remedial 
effect of education, experience, and accountability are supported in this real life 
application.
Having provided support for the effect of remedial measures on the propensity 
to use confirmatory decision strategies, testing turns to the effect of incentives on 
these JDM processes. Legal professionals provide a triptych: pro se representative 
that are also lawyers, taxpayer legal representatives, and IRS legal representatives. 
For pro se/legal representatives, the outcome is personal and direct. As such, 
incentives are subjective. However, the factors assessed in the Roberts’ EPP model 
are incentives that impact both taxpayer legal representative and IRS legal 
representatives. The principle dichotomy which exists between these two groups that 
can influence the impact of these factors is the employment perspective. Taxpayers’
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representatives practice in the private sector; therefore, their remunerations are directly 
and indirectly dependent upon the quality of that practice. As government employees, 
IRS legal representatives are not partial to this dependency. Consequently, they are 
not as susceptible to the impact of incentives. This theory is supported by the results 
of testing Hypothesis 3. With means of 5.3683 (CB(L)) and 3.9617 (DB(J)), 
confirmation bias exhibited by taxpayers’ legal representatives is significantly greater 
than that exhibited by IRS legal representatives who reported means of 1.8596 
(CB(L)) and 1.0829 (CB(J)) (asymptotic significance levels of .000). Taxpayer 
representatives are successful in the defenses in only 34.615% of their attempts. IRS 
representative are successful 85.185% of the time. Unbiased defenses enhance the 
ability to prevail.
Martindale-Hubbell provides a peer rating systems for lawyers who request a 
review. This rating generally improves over time. The results of Hypothesis 4 
indicate that rated lawyers exhibit more bias than do non-rated lawyers (asymptotic 
significance levels of .000 for (CB(L)) and .002 for (CB(J))). On the surface, this 
finding may be counter-intuitive. Further investigation of the data indicates that very 
few (20.245%) lawyers are rated. Of these, no IRS lawyers are reviewed. Having 
demonstrated that IRS representatives have the fewest instances of confirmation bias, 
this large group drives the findings of Hypothesis 4.
Only the highest rated two of the three available Martindale-Hubbell ratings 
are incorporated in the data for this study: A ratings and B ratings. There is no 
significant difference in the confirmatory strategies exhibited between these groups 
(exact significance levels of .696 (CB(L)) and .984 (CB(J))).
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The extant literature on the tax research task supports the positive impact of 
monetary incentives on aggressive recommendations for client’s tax issues. This 
study finds a negative correlation between the amount of the monetary assessment and 
confirmatory JDM strategies used by taxpayers’ legal representatives. This 
relationship, however, is not statistically significant. No significant correlations are 
found. It is noted that the mean of monetary assessment is much less for pro se 
litigants (mean = $101,708) than for taxpayers’ professional litigants (mean = 
$2,674,479). Thus, when larger amounts are at risk, taxpayers generally employ 
professional representation.
Implications of the Findings 
Petitioning the Tax Court to review the appropriateness of the Commissioner’s 
tax deficiency determination for contested tax issues is the culmination of a long and 
arduous audit procedure. The process is informative for disconfirming stances. That 
is, there is no paucity of opportunities to reassess one’s position and the probability of 
prevailing. The participants of the process are assumed to be lawyers and accountants 
at the apex of their profession in both education and experience. For these reasons, 
supportable defenses should evolve. On the whole, this assumption is not supported 
as investigation of the data determines that over half (51.85%) of the taxpayers 
represent themselves. The appropriateness of this decision is called into question 
when only 9.434% of these attempts prevail. With very little prospect of success, pro 
se litigants may have inappropriate incentives for proceeding through the audit process 
to the Tax Court level of contention.
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Representing oneself in tax litigation is a right and a personal choice. 
Inappropriate personal choice, however, are a supercilious use of community 
resources. With Section 6674, the Tax Court is capable of monitoring apropos 
contests. Similar to the circuit courts ability to adjudicate a case as “frivolous” and 
assess repayments of excess costs, this section allows the Tax Court to assess up to 
$25,000 for repayment for stipulated conditions. Section 6674, however, is rarely 
invoked. Of the 108 contested issues, three result in assessments under Section 6674. 
In numerous opinions, the judge discusses invoking this assessment but then provides 
the reasoning why he defers from acting on it. This explanation generally involves the 
taxpayer or representative heeding a warning early in the proceedings. This logic, 
however, conveys the notion that frivolity is applicable only to the legal process and 
not the audit process. It also infers that taxpayers are responsible for knowledge of 
only portions of the Tax Code. Section 6674, a procedural statute, has been a part of 
the Code as long as Section 162, a taxing statute. Strengthening this statute by a more 
frequent invocation where appropriate could reduce this supercilious use of resources. 
Additionally, presenting this statute to the taxpayer early in the audit process may 
serve to change the taxpayer’s and tax professional’s assessment of the viability of 
challenging the Commissioner’s determinations.
This study supports the extant literature in the areas of the impact of both 
incentives and remediations in the tax research task. An awareness of the influence of 
incentives on the unconscious heuristic processes constitutes the initial remedial step. 
The significant relationships of the dependent variable and the four classes of litigants 
provide support of the strong influence of incentives. Additionally, the effectiveness
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of debiasing measures is shown. The degree of necessary effectiveness, however, is 
lacking. Professional standards are not being met. While one may argue that unbiased 
research would result in no challenges, the reality is that unbiased research will result 
in fewer challenges. The resulting proceedings should be on point. The dichotomy 
between defenses will then be a result of different weightings of 
confirming/disconfirming information. Within this context, contests are not frivolous 
but necessary. Underweighting disconfirming information is subjective while 
ignoring disconfirming information is objective.
Adherence to professional standards mandating unbiased research is 
questioned by the findings of this research. The study of cognitive biases in the legal 
profession is a relatively young and quite controversial stream of research. 
Additionally, in self-reports from taxpayers, the expected probability for prevailing in 
a challenged tax issue is 70% (Hite et al. 1992). There is a large margin between the 
actual percentage of prevailing (34.615%) and 70%. Elemental to this disparity is the 
definition of client advocacy. These findings imply that the way tax professionals 
define advocacy may differ from their clients’ understanding of advocacy.
Contributions of this Study 
A major criticism of experimental studies is the lack of external validity. To 
date, the studies investigating confirmation bias in the tax research task are in an 
experimental context. Similar to the findings in Rachlinski’s (1994) research inquiry 
into hindsight bias and tort cases, this study, with the applied setting, provides insight 
into real life situations and support for the laboratory findings. Evidence for the 
presence of confirmatory decision strategies in application serves to bring the research
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out of the laboratory. As such, this study reiterates the effect of incentives, the 
mitigation provided by remedial measures, and the need for more extensive debiasing 
in the tax research task.
Limitations of the Study 
One assumption of the present study is that challenges to tax issues are 
engaged in with the intent of prevailing. This is, in fact, a limitation of the study. A 
reading of the briefs and formal opinions leads one to recognize that presenting an 
unbiased defense is oftentimes not the reason behind some challenges. This is seen 
ubiquitously in the pro se litigants. The forum is seen as a place to, among other 
reasons, vent frustration or request leniency. On one hand, a variation of this is the tax 
protester who states that the tax laws are baseless, either constitutionally or because of 
complexity. Another variant is the taxpayer who respects the tax laws but for a 
professed reason, usually sickness, could not comply. The court reminds these 
taxpayers that the judicial jurisdiction is to enforce compliance with laws; Congress 
makes the laws and defines acceptable exceptions. On the other hand, the IRS has 
been known to repeatedly challenge a tax issue deemed inappropriately addressed by 
statute. The logic of this strategy is that attention is being generated for perceived 
loopholes. Hopefully, the attention may result in appropriate statutes. Thus, this 
research is limited by the assumption that tax issue challenges are all statutorily 
founded.
For one measure of Instances of Confirmation Bias, judges provide the expert 
judgments used to measure the bias. Judges are, in fact, humans too. To assess the 
“expert” ability of judges, a study of appealed cases is necessary. This is beyond the
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scope of this work. Thus, assuming that judges are unbiased is a limitation of this 
inquiry. A small number of cases are appealed and an even smaller number are 
overturned and remanded at the appellate level. Thus, the prejudices and biases 
potentially brought to the Court by judges are not considered a serious limitation.
Defenses are often inherited from other professional practitioners (i.e., 
compliance contexts). This study assumes that inappropriate defenses will be changed 
as the process evolves. The impact of this inter-professional relationship is beyond the 
scope of this study and, as such, is a limitation.
Most importantly, this study’s strength is the external validity. The effects of 
incentives and remediations are seen in the diversity of defenses presented. Specific 
incentives or remedial measures cannot be singled out as would be the methodology of 
an experiment with treatment effects. Without this ability, one must look to 
dissimilarities among the classes of litigants for obvious characteristics and rely on 
prior research to interpret these differences.
Opportunities for Future Research 
In the context of testing in an applied situation, the current research could be 
extended to include a testing of the judge’s expert judgment. Appealed cases would 
provide the data for such a study. Additionally, the same technique used in this study 
could be employed to assess the use of confirmatory decision strategies in defenses 
p resen te d  in  th e  o th er  a v a ila b le  v e n u e s  fo r  c h a lle n g in g  th e  C o m m is s io n e r  ( e .g .,  th e  
Unites States Court of Claims). Differing results would provide additional 
opportunities for research.
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Other cognitive bias may lend themselves to operationalization and research 
through the information provided in Tax Court briefs.
Central to this dissertation is the assertion that awareness is the initial step in 
mitigating suboptimal processing. Publication in appropriate periodicals and 
presentations in proper forums aimed at educating tax professionals about this 
proclivity are necessary.
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APPENDIX A 
CASE LISTING 
TAX COURT MEMORANDUM DECISIONS 1106 Cases / 108 Decisions)
T.C. Memo 2004-1 InterTAN, Inc. v. Commissioner
T.C. Memo 2004-4 Csaba L. Magassy and Frances H. Magassey v. Commissioner
T.C. Memo 2004-5 Life Care Communities o f American, Ltd., A Florida Limited Partnership, Robert 
W. McMichal, A Partner other than the Tax Matters Partner
T.C. Memo 2004-10 Robert K. Lowry and Dawn E. Lowry v. Commissioner
T.C. Memo 2004-11 Graceann Berry v. Commissioner
T.C. Memo 2004-14 Alfred J. Martin v. Commissioner
T.C. Memo 2004-20 Scott Roman v. Commissioner
T.C. Memo 2004-24 Vicki S. Pless and Coy E. Pless, Jr. v. Commissioner
T.C. Memo 2004-27 Estate of Emanuel Trompeter, Deceased, Robin Carol Trompeter Gonzales and 
Janet Ilene Trompeter Polachek, Co-Executors v. Commissioner
T.C. Memo 2004-29 Sunoco, Inc. and Subsidiaries v. Commissioner
T.C. Memo 2004-31 Paul R. Peete v. Commissioner
T.C. Memo 2004-33 Tony J. Cavender v. Commissioner
T.C. Memo 2004-34 Dolores Nelson v. Commissioner
T.C. Memo 2004-37 H. Dee Johnson, Jr. and Mary L. Johnson n.k.a. Mary L. Alpine v. Commissioner
T.C. Memo 2004-41 Alec Jeffrey Megibow v. Commissioner
T.C. Memo 2004-43 Charlotte’s Office Boutique v. Commissioner
T.C. Memo 2004-48 Edward P. Heaphy v. Commissioner
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APPENDIX B
SAMPLE BRIEFS AND OPINIONS
U n i t e d  S t a t e s  T a x  C o u r t .
Th o m as  W. H U N TE H , J r .  P e t i t i o n e r ,  
v .
C O M M IS S IO N E R  O F IN T E R N A L  R EVENU E, R e s p o n d e n t .
N o .  S o 5 6 - 0 2 -  
A p r i l  2 1 ,  2 0 0 3 .
B r i e f  f o r  t h e  P e t i t i o n e r  
J am es  D a v id  L e c k r o n e  (L J 0 7 3 5 )  , 3 1 0 0  W e s t  E nd  A v e n u e , A m e r ic a n  C e n t e r ,  S u i t e  1 0 5 0 ,  
N a s h v i l l e ,  TN 3 7 2 3 3 ,  ( 6 1 5 )  2 9 2 - 8 3 0 0 .
*2 TABLE OF CONTENTS
I . C i t a t i o n s  . . .  3
I I .  P r e l i m i n a r y  S t a t e m e n t  . . .  4
I I I .  S t a t e m e n t  o f  t h e  Is s u e  . . .  4
I V .  P r o p o s e d  F i n d i n g s  o f  F a c t  . . .  4
V .  S t a t e m e n t  o f  P o i n t s  R e l i e d  u p o n  b y  t h e  P e t i t i o n e r  . . .  6
V I .  L e g a l  A rg u m e n t  . . .  7
V I I .  C o n c lu s io n  . . .  1 6
* 3  C IT A T IO N S
C A S E S :
A b e le s  v .  C o m m is s io n e r ,  9 1  T . C .  1 0 1 9  ( 1 9 8 8 ) ,  a c q .  1 9 3 9 - 3 1  I . R . B .  4 . . .  8 ,  1 0 ,  1 2 ,  
1 4 ,  15
R i z z o ,  V i r g i l  V .  D a v is ,  ( 1 9 7 9 ,  D .C .P .A . . )  4 3  A . F . T . R .  2 n d  7 9 - 9 8 5 ,  7 9 - 1  U . S . T . C .  
P a r a .  9 3 1 0 ,  A f f d .  ( 1 9 8 0 ,  C A 3) 6 2 4  F 2 r.d  1 0 9 1 ,  C e r t .  D e n . [ 1 9 8 1 ,  S C t)  4 5 0  U . S .  9 1 9  
. . .  10
L e w is  E . J o h n s o n  v .  C o m m is s io n e r , ( 1 9 8 0  C .A .  5 )  6 1 1  F 2 n d  1 0 1 5 ,  45  A FTR  2 n d  7 7 5
. . .  11
CODE S E C T IO N S :
I n t e r n a l  R e v e n u e  C ode  S e c t i o n  6 2 1 2 ( b )  . . .  6 ,  8 ,  1 0 ,  15
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TREASURY R E G U LA TIO N S :
T r e a s u r y  R e g u la t io n s  S e c t i o n  3 0 2 . 6 2 1 2 - 1 ( a !  . . .  9 ,  1 1 ,  12  
IN T E R N A L  REVENUE PRONOUNCEMENTS:
R e v e n u e  P r o c e d u r e  9 0 - 1 8 ,  1 9 9 0 - 1  C .B .  4 9 1  . . .  9 ,  1 2 ,  1 3 ,  14  
R e v e n u e  P r o c e d u r e  2 0 0 0 - 1 3 ,  2 0 0 1 -B  I . R . 3 . ( 2 / 2 0 / 2 0 0 2 )  . . .  9 
C H IE F  COUNSEL A D V IC E :
CCA 2 0 0 2 3 C C 3 3  ( 7 / 2 6 / 2 0 0 2 )  . . .  1 0 ,  1 6  
* 4  I I .
P R E L IM IN A R Y  STATEMENT
T h is  c a s e  i n v o l v e s  d e f i c i e n c i e s  d e t e r m in e d  b y  t h e  R e s p o n d e n t  o n  in c o m e  t a x e s  f o r  
t h e  t a x a b l e  y = c r 3  1 9 9 1 ,  1 9 9 2 ,  1 9 9 3 ,  1 9 9 4 ,  1 9 9 6 ,  a n d  1 9 9 6 .  N o t i c e s  o f  D e f i c i e n c y  
w e r e  d a t e d  J a n u a r y  2 8 ,  1 9 9 9 .  P e t i t i o n e r  f i l e d  h i s  P e t i t i o n  w i t h  t h e  T a x  C o u r t  on  
J u n e  1 0 ,  2 0 0 2 .  R e s p o n d e n t  f i l e d  a  M o t io n  t o  D is m is s  f o r  l a c k  o f  j u r i s d i c t i o n  on  
O c t o b e r  1 ,  2 0 0 2  a n d  t h e  P e t i t i o n e r  f i l e d  a  M o t io n  t o  D is m is s  f o r  l a c k  o f
j u r i s d i c t i o n  o n  O c t o b e r  2 8 ,  2 0 0 2 .  M o t io n s  w e r e  h e a r d  b e f o r e  t h e  H o n o r a b le  S te p h e n
J .  S w i f t  o n  F e b r u a r y  1 C , 2 0 0 3 ,  i n  N a s h v i l l e ,  T e n n e s s e e .  S t i p u l a t i o n s  o f  F a c t  w e r e  
s u b s i r t t e d  a t  t h e  h e a r i n g ,  a s  w e l l  a s  t e s t i m o n y  f r o m  t h e  P e t i t i o n e r .
I I I .
STATEM ENT OF THE IS S U E
T h e  is s u e  t o  b e  d e c id e d  i n  t h i s  c a s e  i s  w h e t h e r  o r  n o t  t h e  N o t ic e s  o f  D e f i c i e n c y  
d a t e d  J a n u a r y  2 8 ,  1 9 9 9  w e r e  s e n t  t c  t h e  P e t i t i o n e r ' s  l a s t  k n o w n  a d d r e s s ,  a s  
r e q u i r e d  S e c t i o n  6 2 1 2 ( b )  o f  t h e  I n t e r n a l  R e v e n u e  C o d e .
I V .
PROPOSED F IN D IN G S  OF FACT 
T h e  P e t i t i o n e r  r e q u e s t s  t h a t  t h e  C o u r t  f i n d  t h e  f o l l o w i n g  f a c t s :
1 .  On N o v e m b e r  1 9 ,  1 9 9 9 ,  t h e  I n t e r n a l  R e v e n u e  S e r v i c e  C e n t e r  i n  M e m p h is , 
T e n n e s s e e  p r o c e s s e d  a  F o rm  2 8 4 3 ,  P o w e r  o f  A t t o r n e y  a n d  D e c l a r a t i o n  o f  
R e p r e s e n t a t i v e  d a t e d  O c t o b e r  2 3 ,  1 9 9 8  f r o m  t h e  P e t i t i o n e r .  ( S t i p .  P a r a g r a p h  S)
2 .  T h e  Form  2 8 4 3  f i l e d  b y  t .b e  P e t i . t . i  o n e r  r e f l e c t s  i n  b o x  1 t h a t ,  t h e  Taxpayer's 
name a n d  a d d r e s s  w as Thomas W. Hunter, 2 2 0 0  New H o p e  R o a d , H e n d e r s o n v i l l e ,  TN * 5  
3 7 0 7 5 .  ( S t i p .  P a r a g r a p h  5 ,  E x h i b i t  1 - J )
3 .  T h e  l i s t i n g  o f  t h e  a d d r e s s  a s  2 20G  New H o p e  R oad w as a t y p o g r a p h i c a l  e r r o r  
a n d  t h e  t a x p a y e r ' 3  a c t u a l  a d d r e s s  i s  2 2 2 0  Hew n c p a  R o a d . P e t i t i o n e r  t e s t i f i e d  th e ?  
t h e r e  i s  no  s u c h  a d d r e s s  a s  2 2 0 0  New H o p e  R o a d  a n d  h e  w o u ld  h a v e  r e c e i v e d  a n y  
c o r r e s p o n d e n c e  a d d r e s s e d  t o  2 2 0 0  New H o p e  R o a d . ( P e t i t i o n e r ’ s t e s t i m o n y )
4 .  B ex  1 o f  t h e  Fo rm  2 8 4 8  w h ic h  w as f i l e d  w i t h  t h e  I n t e r n a l  R e v e n u e  S e r v i c e  
d i r e c t s  t h a t  o r i g i n a l  n o t i c e s  a n d  o t h e r  c o m m u n ic a t io n s  b e  s e n t  t c  t h e  P e t i t i o n e r
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a n d  a  c o p y  t o  t h e  f i r s t  a n d  s e c o n d  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s  l i s t e d  o n  t h e  P o w e r  o f  
Attorney.  ( S t - 'n .  P a r a g r a p h  5, E x h i b i t  1 -  J)
5 .  J a n u a r y  2 8 ,  1 9 9 9 ,  t h e  R e s p o n d e n t  is s u e d  s t a t u t o r y  n o t i c e s  o f  d e f i c i e n c y  f o r  
t h e  t a x a b l e  y e a r s  1 9 9 1 ,  1 9 9 2 ,  1 9 9 3 ,  1 9 9 4 ,  1 9 9 5  a n d  1 9 9 6 ,  a d d r e s s e d  t o  t h e  
P e t i t i o n e r  a t  1 2 2  W ayne D r i v e ,  G a l l a t i n ,  CM 3 7 0 6 6 .  ( S t i p .  P a r a g r a p h s  9 ,  1 0 ,  a r.d  
1 1 )
6 .  P e t i t i o n e r  d i d  n o t  a n d  h a s  n e v e r  r e c e i v e d  c o p ie s  o f  a n y  N o t i c e s  o f  D e f i c i e n c y  
is s u e d  b y  t h e  I n t e r n a l  R e v e n u e  S e r v i c e  f o r  t h e  y e a r s  1 9 9 1 ,  1 9 9 2 ,  1 9 9 3 ,  1 9 9 4 ,  1 9 9 5 ,  
a n a  1 9 9 6 .  ( P e t i t i o n e r ' s  t e s t i m o n y )
U L T IM A T E  F IN D IN G S  OF FACT
7 .  P e t i t i o n e r ’ s f i l i n g  Fo rm  2 8 4 3 ,  P o w e r  o f  A t t o r n e y  a n d  D e c l a r a t i o n  o f  
R e p r e s e n t a t i v e  o n  O c t o b e r  2 3 ,  1 9 9 8 ,  w as c l e a r  a r.d  c o n c is e  n o t i f i c a t i o n  t c  t h e  
I n t e r n a l  R e v e n u e  S e r v i c e  o f  a  d i f f e r e n t  a d d r e s s  t h a n  t h a t  c o n t a in e d  o n  h i s  l a s t  
p r e v i o u s l y  f i l e d  t a x  r e t u r n  o r  a n y  p r e v i o u s  Form  2H4S a n d  c o n s t i t u t e s  the l a s t  
know n a d d r e s s  m ade know n t o  t h e  I n t e r n a l  R e v e n u e  S e r v i c e .
* 6  8 .  T h e  N o t ic e s  o f  D e f i c i e n c y  is s u e d  b y  t h e  I n t e r n a l  R e v e n u e  S e r v i c e  f o r  t h e  
t a x a b l e  y e a r s  1 9 9 1 ,  1 9 9 2 ,  1 9 9 3 ,  1 9 9 4 ,  1 9 9 4 ,  1 9 9 5  a n d  1 9 9 6  or. J a n u a r y  2 B , 1 9 9 9  w e r e
n o t  is s u e d  t o  t h e  P e t i t i o n e r  
6 2 1 2 ( b )  o f  t h e  I n t e r n a l  R e v e n u e  C o d e .
V.
STATEMENT O F P O IN T S  R E L IE D  UPON 3 1  THE P E T IT IO N E R  
T h e  P e t i t i o n e r  i s  e n t i t l e d  t o  a  f i n d i n g  t h a t  t h e  R e s p o n d e n t  f a i l e d  t o  i s s u e  
N o t i c e s  o f  D e f i c i e n c y  f o r  t h e  y e a r s  1 9 9 1 ,  1 9 9 2 ,  1 5 9 3 ,  1 9 3 4 ,  1 3 9 5  a n d  1 3 3 6  t o  t h e  
P e t i t i o n e r ' s  l a s t  k now n  a d d r e s s  a s  r e q u i r e d  b y  S e c t i o n  6 2 1 2 ( b )  o f  t h e  I n t e r n a l  
R e v e n u e  C o d e  b e c a u s e :
1 .  S e c t i o n  6 2 1 2 (b )  o f  t h e  I n t e r n a l  R e v e n u e  C o d e  r e q u i r e s  t h a t  S t a t u t o r y  N o t i c e s  
o f  D e f i c i e n c y  b e  m a i l e d  t o  t h e  t a x p a y e r ' s  " l a s t  k now n  a d d r e s s " .
2 .  C a s e  la w ,  i n t e r n a l  R e v e n u e  P r o c e d u r e s ,  a r .d  T r e a s u r y  R e g u la t io n s  a l l  d e f i n e  a  
t a x p a y e r ' s  l a s t  k n o w n  a d d r e s s  a s  t h e  a d d r e s s  t h a t  a p p e a r s  on  t h e  t a x p a y e r ' s  m o s t  
r e c e n t l y  f i l e d  a n d  p r o p e r l y  p r o c e s s e d  F e d e r a l  T a x  R e t u r n  u n le s s  t h e  I n t e r n a l  
R e v e n u e  s e r v i c e  i s  g i v e n  c l e a r  a n d  c o n c is e  n o t i f i c a t i o n  o f  a d i f f e r e n t  a d d r e s s .
3 .  T h e  P e t i t i o n e r  m o ved  f r o m  h i s  o l d  a d d r e s s ,  a t  1 2 2  W ayr.e D r i v e ,  G a l l a t i n ,  TN 
3 7 0 6 6  t o  h i s  new a d d r e s s  a t  2 2 2 0  New  H o p e  R o a d , H e n d e r s o n v i l l e ,  TN 3 7 0 7 5  i n  
S e p te m b e r  o f  1 9 9 8 .
4 .  P e t i t i o n e r  f i l e d  a F c rm  2 S 4 8  P o w e r  o f  A t t o r n e y  or, O c t o b e r  2 3 ,  1 9 9 8  w i t h  t h e  
I n t e r n a l  R e v e n u e  S e r v i c e  C e n t e r  i n  M e m p h is , T e n n e s s e e  w h ic h  w a s  p r o c e s s e d  o n  
N o v e m b e r  I S ,  19  9 8 .  T h is  P o w e r  o f  A t t o r n e y  n o t i f i e d  t h e  s e r v i c e  c f  h i s  new  a d d r e s s .
* 7  5 .  R e s p o n d e n t  m a i l e d  N o t i c e s  o f  D e f i c i e n c y  f o r  t h e  t a x a b l e  y e a r s  1 9 9 1 ,  1 9 9 2 ,  
1 9 9 3 ,  1 9 9 4 ,  1 9 9 5  and 1 9 9 6  addressed t o  t h e  Petitioner a t  1 2 2  Wayne D r ; v e ,
G a l l a t i n ,  TN  3 7 0 6 6  or. J a n u a r y  2 8 ,  1 9 9 9 .
6 .  P e t i t i o n e r  d i d  r .c t  a n d  h a s  n e v e r  r e c e i v e d  c o p ie s  o f  t h e  a b o v e  N o t i c e s  c f  
D e f i c i e n c y  is s u e d  b y  t h e  I n t e r n a l  R e v e n u e  S e r v i c e .
7 .  T r e a s u r y  R e g u l a t i o n  3 0 1 ,  6 2 1 2  s t a t e s  " a  t a x p a y e r ' 3  l a s t  know n a d d r e s s  i s  t h e  
a d d r e s s  t h a t  a p p e a r s  o n  t h e  t a x p a y e r ' s  m o s t r e c e n t l y  f i l e d  a n d  p r o p e r l y  p r o c e s s e d  
F e d e r a l  T a x  R e t u r n ,  u n le s s  t h e  I n t e r n a l  R e v e n u e  S e r v i c e  ( IR S i  i s  g i v e n  c l e a r  a r.d  
c o n c is e  n o t i f i c a t i o n  o f  a  d i f f e r e n t  a d d r e s s .
V I .
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LEG AL ARGUMENT 
FACTS
T h e  f a c t s  i n  t h i s  c a s e  a r e  f a i r l y  u n d is p u t e d .  T h e  p a r t i e s  s u b m i t t e d  a r.d  a g r e e d  t o  
s t i p u l a t i o n s  o f  t h e  f a c t s  a n d  t h e  P e t i t i o n e r  t e s t i f i e d  a t  t h e  h e a r i n g  f o r  t h e  T a x  
C o u r t  o n  F e b r u a r y  1 0 ,  2 0 0 3 .  R e s p o n d e n t  is s u e d  t h e  S t a t u t o r y  N o t ic e s  f o r  t h e  t a x a b l e  
ys2irs »Ti’/cl.v<2cl ch -Jazv-^ry 28 , 299? s s d  to  P s t i t i c r i 'S t  2 t  222 Ws.*’ns
D r i v e ,  G a l l a t i n ,  TN  3 7 0 6 6 .  A c c o r d in g  t o  t h e  P e t i t i o n e r ' s  t e s t i m o n y ,  w h ic h  w as  
u n d is p u t e d  b y  t h e  R e s p o n d e n t ,  t h e  P e t i t i o n e r  h a d  m o v ed  f r o m  t h i s  a d d r e s s  i n  
S e p te m b e r  o f  1 9 9 8 .  Some t im e  a f t e r  J u l y  2 9 ,  1 9 9 " ,  t h e  b e g i n n i n g  o f  t h e  
R e s p o n d e n t 's  e x a m in a t i o n  o f  t h e  P e t i t i o n e r ' s  in c o m e  t a x  r e t u r n s ,  P e t i t i o n e r  h a d  
s u b m i t t e d  a  Fo rm  2 8 1 8  P o w e r c f  A t t o r n e y  d i r e c t . y  t o  t h e  R e v e n u e  A g e n t .  Or. N o v e m b e r  
1 9 ,  1 9 3 2 ,  t h e  M e m p h is  S e r v i c e  C e n t e r  p r o c e s s e d  a  new  Form  2 3 4 3  P o w e r c -f  A t t o r n e y  
d a t e d  O c t o b e r  2 3 ,  1 9 9 8  w h ic h  w as  f i l e d  b y  t h e  P e t i t i o n e r  c h a n g in g  h i s  a u t h o r i z e d  
r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s  a r .d  h i s  a d d r e s s .  T h a t  * 0  fo r m  p r o v id e d  t h e  s e r v i c e  w i t h  h i s  r.ew  
address o f  27.7.C N ew  H o p e  R o a d , H e n d e r s o n v i l l e .  TN 3 7 0 7 5 .  T h e  P o w e r o f  A t t o r n e y  d i d  
c o n t a i n  a  t y p o g r a p h i c a l  e r r o r  i n  t h a t  t h e  a d d r e s s  w as  s how n  a s  2 2 0 0  New  H o p e  R o a d , 
P e t i t i o n e r  t e s t i f i e d  a t  t h e  t r i a l  t h a t  t h e r e  i s  no  s u c h  a d d r e s s  a s  2 2 0 0  New  H ope  
R o a d  a n d  he  w o u ld  h a v e  r e c e i v e d  a n y  c o r r e s p o n d e n c e  o r  m a i l  a d d r e s s e s  t o  2 2 0 0  N ew  
'dope R o a d .
I t  i s  r .o t  c l e a r  w h e t h e r  o r  n o t  t h e  R e s p o n d e n t  i s  r e l y i n g  o n  t h e  a d d r e s s  c o n t a in e d  
in t h e  n r i g ' n a l  P o w e r  o f  A t t o r n e y  f i l e d  w i t h  t h e  R e v e n u e  Agent o r  t h e  P e t i t i o n e r ' s  
m o s t r e c e n t l y  f i l e d  t a x  r e t u r n  p r i o r  t o  J a n u a r y  2 8 ,  1 9 9 9 .  T h e r e  i s  no  i n d i c a t i o n  
i n  t h e  r e c o r d  o f  t h i s  c a s e  w h a t  a d d r e s s  w as  i n c l u d e d  o n  t h e  P e t i t i o n e r ' s  m o s t  
r e c e n t l y  f i l e d  t a x  r e t u r n  p r i o r  t o  J a n u a r y  2 3 ,  1 9 9 9 .  F o r  p u r p o s e s  c f  t h e  m a jo r  
p o r t i o n  o f  t h i s  a r g u m e n t ,  P e t i t i o n e r  i s  a s s u m in g  t h a t  t h i s  m o s t  r e c e n t l y  f i i a d  t a x  
r e t u r n  w as t h e  1 9 9 7  t a x  r e t u r n  a n d  t h e  a d d r e s s  w o u ld  h a v e  b e e n  1 2 2  W ayn e  D r i v e ,  
G a l l a t i n ,  TN 3 7 0 6 6 .  I f  t h i s  w e r e  n o t  t h e  c a s e ,  t h e  o n l y  is s u e  t o  b e  d e c id e d  i s  
w h e t h e r  o r  n o t  t h e  P o w e r  o f  A t t o r n e y  f i l e d  w i t h  t h e  M e m p h is  S e r v i c e  C e n t e r  i n  t h e  
f a l l  c f  1 9 9 8  s u p e r s e d e d  t h e  P o w e r  o f  A t t o r n e y  p r e v i o u s l y  f i l e d  w i t h  t h e  R e v e n u e  
A g e n t .
H IS TO R Y
S e c t i o n  6 2 1 2 ( b )  o f  t h e  I n t e r n a l  R e v e n u e  C e d e  c l e a r l y  r e q u i r e s  t h e  I n t e r n a l  
R e v e n u e  S e r v i c e  t o  s e n d  a S t a t u t o r y  N o t i c e  o f  D e f i c i e n c y  t o  t h e  t a x p a y e r ’ s  l a s t  
know n a d d r e s s  b y  c e r t i f i e d  o r  r e g i s t e r e d  m a i l .  W h at c o n s t i t u t e s  t h e  " l a s t  know n  
a d d r e s s ” a s  n o t  d e f i n e d  b y  s t a t u t e  a n d  h a s  p r o d u c e d  m uch l i t i g a t i o n .  T h e  T a x  C o u r t  
h a s  d e f i n e d  t h e  t a x p a y e r ' s  l a s t  k now n  a d d r e s s  a s  t h e  a d d r e s s  w h ic h  a p p e a r s  c n  h i s  
m o s t r e c e n t l y  f i l e d  a n d  p r o p e r l y  p r o c e s s e d  F e d e r a l  T a x  R e t u r n  u n le s s  t h e  I n t e r n a l  
R e v e n u e  S e r v i c e  h a s  b e e n  g i v e n  c l e a r  a n d  c o n c is e  n o t i f i c a t i o n  o f  a d i f f e r e n t  
a d d r e s s ,  A b e le s  v .  C o m m is s io n e r ,  9 1  T . C .  1 0 1 9  ( 1 9 8 8 ) ,  a c q .  1 9 8 9 - 3 1  I . R . 3 . 4 .  T h e  
A b e le s  * 9  o p i n i o n  c o n t a in s  a th o r o u g h  d i s c u s s i o n  o f  t h e  t e r m  " l a s t  know n  a d d r e s s " .  
T h e  I n t e r n a l  R e v e n u e  S e r v i c e  a c q u ie s c e d  i n  t h a t  o p i n i o n  a r.d  a l s o  is s u e d  R e v e n u e  
P r o c e d u r e  9 0 - 1 3 ,  e x p l a i n i n g  i t s  p o s i t i o n  o n  how a  t a x p a y e r  i s  t o  in f o r m  t h e  
I n t e r n a l  R e v e n u e  S e r v i c e  o f  a  C h a n g e  o f  a d d r e s s .  R e v .  e r o c .  9 0 - 1 8 ,  1 9 3 0 - 1  C . u .  4 9 1  
. T h e  A b e le s  c a s e  a n d  R e v e n u e  P r o c e d u r e  9 0 - 1 3  c o n t a in e d  t h e  p r i m a r y  g u id a n c e  i n  
e f f e c t  o n  J a n u a r y  2 3 ,  IS 9 9  w h en  t h e  N o t ic e s  o f  D e f i c i e n c y  i n  t h i s  c a s e  w e r e  is s u e d  
b y  t h e  I n f e r n a l  R e v e n u e  S e r v i c e .  R e v e n u e  P r o c e d u r e  9 0 - ; 8  was a m p l i f i e d  and  
s u p e r s e d e d  b y  R e v e n u e  P r o c e d u r e  2 0 0 1 - 1 8 ,  2 0 0 1 - 8  l . R . B .  ( 0 2 - 2 0 -  2 C 0 1 ) , s u b s e q u e n t  
t o  t h e  d a t e  t h e  N o t ic e s  w e r e  is s u e d  h e r e i n .  W h i le  t h e r e  w e re  nc  T r e a s u r y
la im  t o  O r i c .  U .S .
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R e g u la t io n s  a d d r e s s i n g  " l a s t  k n o w n  a d d r e s s "  a t  t h e  t im e  t h e  N o t ic e s  o f  D e f i c i e n c y  
w e/re is s u e d  i n  t h i s  c a s e .  T r e a s u r y  R e g u l a t i o n s  w e r e  s u b s e q u e n t ! y  is s u e d  w h ic h  
r e f e r r e d  t o  R e v e n u e  P r o c e d u r e  9 0 - 1 8 .  T r e a s u r y  R e g u l a t i o n  S e c t i o n  3 0 1 . 6 2 1 2 - 2 .  T h e  
T r e a s u r y  R e g u l a t i o n s  s p e c i f i c a l l y  s t a t e  t h a t  t h e  " l a s t  know n  a d d r e s s "  i s  t h e  
a d d r e s s  t h a t  a p p e a r s  c n  t h e  t a x p a y e r ' s  m o s t  r e c e n t l y  f i l e d  a n d  p r o p e r l y  p r o c e s s e d  
F e d e r a l  T a x  F .e t u r n ,  u n le s s  t h e  I n t e r n a l  R e v e n u e  S e r v i c e  i s  g iv e r ,  c l e a r  a n d  c o n c is e  
n o t i f i c a t i o n  o f  a  d i f f e r e n t  a d d r e s s .
ARGUMENT
T h e  p r i m a r y  f o c u s  o f  t h e  A b e le s  o p i n i o n  i s  d i r e c t e d  t o  w h e t h e r  o r  n o t  t h e  S e r v i c e  
c o u l d  is s u e  N o t i c e s  o f  D e f i c i e n c y  t o  a  t a x p a y e r  a t  t h e  a d d r e s s  o n  h i s  o r  h e r  t a x
r e t u r n s  f i l e d  f o r  t h e  t a x a b l e  y e a r s  w h ic h  w e r e  c o v e r e d  b y  t h e  N o t i c e s  o f
D e f i c i e n c y  o r  w a s  r e q u i r e d  t o  e x e r c i s e  r e a s o n a b le  c a r e  a n d  d i l i g e n c e  i n
a s c e r t a i n i n g  a n d  m a i l i n g  o f  t h e  N o t i c e  o f  D e f i c i e n c y  t o  t h e  l a s t  a d d r e s s  g i v e n  t o
t h e  I n t e r n a l  R e v e n u e  S e r v i c e  b y  t h e  t a x p a y e r .
T h e r e  s eem s t o  b e  n o  c a s e s  d e c id e d  i n  t h e  U n i t e d  s t a t e s  T a x  C o u r t  d i r e c t l y  
a d d r e s s i n g  t h e  e f f e c t  o f  t h e  f i l i n g  o f  a  P o w e r  o f  A t t o r n e y  o n  t h e  " l a s t  know n  
a d d r e s s "  r u l e .  T h e  q u e s t io n  h a s  * 1 0  b e e n  a d d r e s s e d  b y  a  U n i t e d  S t a t e s  D i s t r i c t  
C o u r t  i n  V i r g i l  R .  R i z z o  v .  S t a t u s ,  7 9 - 1  U . S . T . C .  P a r .  9 3 1 0 ;  43  A . F . T . R .  2 n d  9 8 5  
( 1 9 7 9 ) .  I n  t h a t  c a s e ,  t h e  I n t e r n a l  R e v e n u e  S e r v i c e  s e n t  t h e  N o t i c e  o f  D e f i c i e n c y  
t o  t h e  a d d r e s s  c o n t a in e d  o n  a  P o w e r  o f  A t t o r n e y  w h ic h  t h e  t a x p a y e r  h a d  f i l e d  w i t h  
t h e  I n t e r n a l  R e v e n u e  S e r v i c e  o n  A p r i l  4 ,  1 9 7 7 .  T h e  N o t ic e s  w e re  is s u e d  o n  O c t o b e r  
2 0 ,  1 9 7 7 .  T h e  a d d r e s s  c o n t e n d e d  f o r  b y  t h e  P l a i n t i f f  w as  t h e  a d d r e s s  t h a t  a p p e a r e d  
o ii t h e  P l a i n t i f f ’ s r e t u r n s  f r o m  1 3 7 0  t o  1 9 7 9 .  T h e  c o u r t  s t a t e d  t h a t  t h e  I n t e r n a l  
R e v e n u e  S e r v i c e  w as  j u s t i f i e d  i n  r e l y i n g  o n  t h e  a d d r e s s  c o n t a in e d  i n  t h e  P o w e r  o f  
A t t o r n e y  a s  t h e  t a x p a y e r ' s  " l a s t  k n o w n  a d d r e s s ” .
W i t h  r e g a r d  t o  t h e  P o w e r o f  A t t o r n e y  i t s e l f .  P e t i t i o n e r  w o u ld  a d d r e s s  t h e  c o u r t ’ s 
a t t e n t i o n  t o  a n  a d v ic e  is s u e d  b y  t h e  C h i e f  C o u n s e l  o f  t h e  I n t e r n a l  R e v e n u e  S e r v i c e  
on M a y  1 5 ,  2 0 0 2 .  CCA 2 0 0 2 3 0 0 3 3 .  I n  t h i s  a d v i c e ,  C h i e f  C o u n s e l  f o r  t h e  I n t e r n a l  
R e v e n u e  S e r v i c e  a d d r e s s e s  t h e  r o l e  o f  a  P o w e r  o f  A t t o r n e y  i n  t h e  c o n t e n t  c f  
i s s u i n g  N o t i c e s  o f  D e f i c i e n c y  u n d e r  S e c t i o n  6 2 1 2  o f  t h e  I n t e r n a l  R e v e n u e  C o d e .  
W h i le  t h e  a d v ic e  i n v o l v e s  P o w e rs  o f  A t t o r n e y  w h ic h  w e re  f i l e d  w i t h  t h e  t a x  
r e t u r n s ,  t h e  C h i e f  C o u n s e l d o e s  n o t e  i n  P a r a g r a p h  3 o f  h i s  C o n c lu s io n s  t h a t  " w h e r e  
t h e r e  i s  a  v a l i d  P o w e r  o f  A t t o r n e y ,  t h e  d i r e c t i v e  o f  t h e  t a x p a y e r  r e g a r d i n g  
n o t i c e s  a n d  o t h e r  w r i t t e n  c o m m u n ic a t io n s  a s  i n d i c a t e d  o n  L in e  7 o f  F o rm  2 8 4 8  i s  t o  
b e  r e s p e c t e d  o n l y  b y  t h e  y e a r { s j  c o v e r e d  b y  t h e  P o w e r  o f  A t t o r n e y .  L i n e  7 o n  t h e  
P o w e r  o f  A t t o r n e y  f i l e d  b y  t h e  P e t i t i o n e r  s p e c i f i c a l l y  d i r e c t s  t h a t  o r i g i n a l  
n o t i c e s  a n d  o t h e r  w r i t t e n  c o m m u n ic a t io n s  w e r e  t o  b e  s e n t  t o  t h e  P e t i t i o n e r  a n d  i t  
w o u ld  seem  u n r e a s o n a b le  t o  r e q u i r e  t h e  t a x p a y e r  t o  a d d  a d d i t i o n a l  la n g u a g e  o n  t h e  
P o w e r o f  A t t o r n e y  s t a t i n g  t h a t  " t h o s e  n o t i c e s  s h o u ld  b e  s e n t  t o  t h e  a d d r e s s  I  am 
g i v i n g  y o u  w i t h  t h i s  P o w e r  o f  A t t o r n e y ” .
Tn  ’’i l s  r * c . y * s o f  * h s  ■1 sw  CTh'i.0 f  Oowsnssl f o ^  t iiis  R s 'v s jiu s
s t a t e s ,  i r .  r e f e r r i n g  t o  t h e  A b e le s  c a s e ,  t h a t  t h e  p h r a s e  " l a s t  k n o w n  a d d r e s s "  d o e s  
n o t  n e c e s s a r i l y  m ea n  t h e  * 1 1  t a x p a y e r ' s  a c t u a l  a d d r e s s ,  b u t  i n s t e a d  m ea n s  t h e  l a s t  
a d d r e s s  t h a t  t h e  t a x p a y e r  m ak e s  know n  t o  t h e  S e r v i c e  (e m p h a s is  s u p p l i e d ) . I n  
d i s c u s s in g  t h e  P o w e r  o f  A t t o r n e y ,  t h e  C h i e f  C o u n s e l  f u r t h e r  n o t e s  t h a t  a P o w e r  c f  
A t t o r n e y  t h a t  i s  v a l i d  c o n t a in s  a  " c l e a r  a n d  c o n c is e  e x p r e s s io n  o f  t h e  t a x p a y e r ’ s
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i n t e n t i o n  a s  t o  t h e  s c o p e  o f  t h e  a u t h o r i t y  b e in g  g r a n t e d  t o  t h e  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e " .
T f  a p p e a r s  t o  t h e  P e t i t i o n e r  t h a t  t h e  C h i e f  C o u n s e l f o r  t h e  I n t e r n a l  R e v e n u e  
S e r v i c e  c o n s id e r s  a  v a l i d  P o w e r  c f  A t t o r n e y  t o  b e  " c l e a r  a r.d  c o n c i s e " .
T h a t  t h e  I n t e r n a l  R e v e n u e  S e r v i c e  i t s e l f  h a s  r e c o g n iz e d  t h a t  a P o w e r o f  A t t o r n e y  
w o u ld  s e r v e  a s  n o t i c e  f o r  a  c h a n g e  o f  a d d r e s s  i s  a l s o  fo u n d  i n  t h e  I n f e r n a l  
R e v e n u e  S e r v i c e  M a n u a l . W h i le  P e t i t i o n e r  h a s  b e e n  u n a b le  t o  a s c e r t a i n  t h e  e x a c t  
la n g u a g e  t h a t  w as c o n t a in e d  i n  t h e  I n t e r n a l  R e v e n u e  S e r v i c e  M a n u a l i r .  1 9 9 9 ,  t h e r e  
i s  a  1 9 8 0  c a s e  w h ic h  q u o t e s  t h e  la n g u a g e  a t  t h a t  t i m e .  I n  L e w is  E . J o h n s o n  v .  
C o m m is s io n e r ,  6 1 1  5 t h  F 2 n d  1 0 1 5 ;  4 5  A . E . T . R .  2 n d  7 1 5 ,  t h e  C o u r t  q u o t e s  P a r a g r a p h  
4 4 6 2 . 1 ( 3 ) .  o f  t h e  I n t e r n a l  R e v e n u e  S e r v i c e  M a n u a l a s  f o l l o w s ;
" O r d i n a r i l y ,  t h e  s t a t u t o r y  n o t i c e  w i l l  b e  s e n t  t o  t h e  a d d r e s s  s how n  o n  a 
taxpayer's r e t u r n .  H o w e v e r , b e  v e r y  c a r e f u l  i n  d e t e r m in in g  t h e  a d d r e s s  to b e  u s e d  
i f  t h e  taxpayer h a s  s p e c i f i c a l l y  n o t i f i e d  t h e  S e r v i c e  o f  a d i f f e r e n t  a d d r e s s ,  
t h u s ,  a s t a t u t o r y  n o t i c e  s e n t .  t o  t h e  l a s t  know n hom e a d d r e s s  o f  t h e  taxpayer w o u ld  
b e  i n v a l i d  i f  a p o w e r  o f  a t t o r n e y  i s  s u b m i t t e d  w h ic h  s p e c i f i c a l l y  d i r e c t s  t h a t  a l l  
c o r r e s p o n d e n c e ,  d o c u m e n ts , e t c . , r e l a t i n g  t o  t h e  tax m a t t e r  b e  s e n t  t o  t h e  taxpayer 
i n  c a r e  o f  t h e  taxpayer's a t t o r n e y .  T h e r e f o r e ,  i f  t h e r e  i s  a n y  d o u b t  a s  t o  w h a t  
c o n s t i t u t e s  t h e  l a s t  k n o w n  a d d r e s s  o f  t h e  taxpayer, d u p l i c a t e  o r i g i n a l  s t a t u t o r y  
n o t i c e s  s h o u ld  b e  s e n t  b y  c e r t i f i e d  m a i l  t o  e a c h  k now n  a d d r e s s .  I n t e r n a l  R e v e n u e
S e r v i c e  M a n u a l S e c t i o n  4 4 6 2 , 1 ( 3 ) . "  J o h n s o n , a t  1 0 1 8 .
T h e  C o u r t ' s  a t t e n t i o n  i s  a l s o  d i r e c t e d  t o  t h e  c u r r e n t  T r e a s u r y  R e g u l a t i o n  
3 0 1 . 6 2 1 2 - 2 ( a ) . A l t h o u g h  t h i s  T r e a s u r y  r e g u l a t i o n  w as n o t  a d o p t e d  u n t i l  J a n u a r y  2 9 ,  
2 0 0 1 ,  i t  d o e s  r e f e r  t o  R e v e n u e  P r o c e d u r e  3 0 - 1 8  f o r  f u r t h e r  i n f o r m a t i o n .  I t  s ee m s  
c l e a r  t h a t  t h e  T r e a s u r y  D e p a r t m e n t  * 1 2  v ie w s  t h i s  T r e a s u r y  r e g u l a t i o n  a s  b e in g  
b a s e d  o n  t h e  Law a s  e s t a b l i s h e d  i n  t h e  A b e le s  c a s e  a n d  th e  I n t e r n a l  R e v e n u e  
S e r v i c e ' s  p o s i t i o n  a s  e s t a b l i s h e d  i n  R e v e n u e  P r o c e d u r e  9 9 - 1 8 ,  T h a t  r e g u l a t i o n  
c l e a r l y  s t a t e s :
" E x c e p t  a s  p r o v id e d  i n  p a r a g r a p h  (b)(2) o f  t h i s  s e c t i o n ,  a  taxpayer's l a s t  k now n  
a d d r e s s  i s  t h e  a d d r e s s  t h a t  a p p e a r s  o n  t h e  taxpayer's m o s t r e c e n t l y  f i l e d  a n d  
p r o p e r l y  p r o c e s s e d  F e d e r a l  tax r e t u r n ,  u n le s s  t h e  I n t e r n a l  R e v e n u e  S e r v i c e  ( IR S )  
i s  g i v e n  c l e a r  a n d  c o n c is e  n o t i f i c a t i o n  o f  a d i f f e r e n t  a d d r e s s .  F u r t h e r  
i n f o r m a t i o n  on  w h a t  c o n s t i t u t e s  c l e a r  a n d  c o n c is e  n o t i f i c a t i o n  o f  a  d i f f e r e n t  
a d d r e s s  a n d  a  p r o p e r l y  p r o c e s s e d  F e d e r a l  tax r e t u r n  c a n  b e  fo u n d  i n  R e v . P r o c .
9 0 - 1 8  ( 1 9 9 0 - 1  C .B .  4 9 1 )  o r  i n  p r o c e d u r e s  s u b s e q u e n t l y  P r e s c r ib e d  b y  t h e
C o m m is s io n e r .11
I t  i s  t h e  P e t i t i o n e r ’ s  p o s i t i o n  t h a t  t h e  U n i t e d  S t a t e s  T a x  C o u r t  i n  t h e  A b e le s  
c a s e ,  t h e  I n t e r n a l  R e v e n u e  S e r v i c e  a n d  R e v e n u e  P r o c e d u r e  9 0 - 1 3  a n d  t h e  T r e a s u r y  
R e g u la t io n  3 ( 1 1 . 6 ? '? - ?  c l e a r l y  e s t a b l i s h  t h a t ,  f o r  t h e  "’ l a s t  known a d d r e s s "  t o  h e  
d e t e r m in e d  t h e r e  b e ;
1 .  C l e a r  a n d  c o n c is e ;
2 .  N o t i f i c a t i o n ;  
f e r e n i
L e t ' s  r e v i e w  e a c h  o f  t h e s e  r e q u i r e m e n t s  s e p a r a t e l y .  F i r s t  o f  a l l .  P e t i t i o n e r  d o e s  
n o t  u n d e r s t a n d  how a n y o n e  c a n  a r g u e  t h a t  a p r o p e r l y  c o m p le te d  a n d  e x e c u t e d  Form  
2 8 4 S  P o w e r  o f  A t t o r n e y  w h ic h  i s  p r o d u c e d  b y  t h e  I n t e r n a l  R e v e n u e  S e r v i c e  i s  n o t  
c l e a r  a r.d  c o n c is e .  T h e  f a c t  i s  t h a t  t h e  C h i e f  C o u n s e l  f o r  t h e  I n t e r n a l  R e v e n u e
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S e r v i c e  r e c o g n iz e s  t h a t  t h e  la n g u a g e  o f  a  v a l i d  P o w e r o f  A t t o r n e y  i s  a  c l e a r  a n d  
c o n c is e  n o t i f i c a t i o n  b y  t h e  t a x p a y e r  a n d  a c l e a r  a n d  c o n c is e  e x p r e s s io n  o f  t h e  
taxpayer's i n t e n t i o n ,  " h e  p r i n t e d  la n g u a g e  o n  t h e  fo r m  w h ic h  w as  p r o d u c e d  b y  t h e  
I n t e r n a l  R e v e n u e  S e r v i c e ,  c l e a r l y  s t a t e s  t h e  d i r e c t i v e  o f  t h e  taxpayer t o  t h e
I n t e r n a l  R e v e n u e  * 1 3  S e r v i c e  t o  s e n d  a l l  o r i g i n a l  n o t i c e s  a n d  o t h e r  w r i t t e n
c o m m u n ic a t io n s  t o  t h e  t a x p a y e r . I n  d r a f t i n g  t h e  Fo rm  I S I S ,  i t  d o e s n ' t  a p p e a r  t h a t  
t h e  I n t e r n a l  R e v e n u e  S e r v i c e  f e l t  i t  n e c e s s a r y  t o  a d d i t i o n a l l y  s t a t e  o n  L i n e  7 on  
Fo rm  2848 t h a t  t h e s e  n o t i c e s  w o u ld  b e  s e n t  t o  a n y  a d d r e s s  o t h e r  t h a n  t h e  a d d r e s s  
p r o v id e d  b y  t h e  taxpayer o n  L i n e  1 o f  F o rm  2848.
S e c o n d ly ,  F o rm  2 8 4 8  i s  c l e a r l y  a  n o t i f i c a t i o n  a n d  w as f i l e d  w i t h  t h e  I n t e r n a l  
R e v e n u e  S e r v i c e  C e n t e r  a s  s p e c i f i c a l l y  r e q u i r e d  b y  S e c t i o n  4 .G 2  o f  R e v e n u e  
P r o c e d u r e  9 0 - 1 3 .
T h i r d l y ,  t h e r e  a l s o  seem s t o  b e  no  d o u b t  t h a t  t h e  a d d r e s s  c o n t a in e d  i n  t h e  F o rm  
2 8 4 8  f i l e d  b y  t h e  P e t i t i o n e r  w a s  a  d i f f e r e n t  a d d r e s s  t h a n  t h e  a d d r e s s  w h ic h  h a d  
p r e v i o u s l y  b e e n  p r o v id e d  t o  t h e  I n t e r n a l  R e v e n u e  S e r v i c e .
S e c t i o n  4 . 0 2  o f  R e v e n u e  P r o c e d u r e  9 0 - 1 8  c l e a r l y  s t a t e s  t h a t :
" i f  t h e  Taxpayer no l o n g e r  w is h e s  t h e  a d d r e s s  o f  r e c o r d  t o  b e  t h e  o n e  s h o w n  on  
t h e  m o s t  r e c e n t l y  f i l e d  r e t u r n ,  f o r  i n s t a n c e ,  b e c a u s e  t h e  Taxpayer m o v ed  a f t e r  t h e  
r e t u r n  w a s  f i l e d ,  c l e a r  a n d  c o n c is e  w r i t t e n  n o t i f i c a t i o n  o f  a c h a n g e  o f  a d d r e s s  
m u s t b e  s e n t  t o  t h e  I n t e r n a l  R e v e n u e  S e r v i c e  C e n t e r  s e r v i n g  t h e  Taxpayer's o l d  
a d d r e s s  o r  t o  t h e  Taxpayer S e r v i c e  D i v i s i o n  i n  t h e  l o c a l  d i s t r i c t  o f f i c e . ”
I n  t h i s  c a s e ,  t h e r e  i s  r .o  d i s p u t e  t h a t  t h e  P o w e r  o f  A t t o r n e y  w i t h  t h e  
P e t i t i o n e r ' s  n e w  a d d r e s s  w a s  s e n t  t o  t h e  I n t e r n a l  R e v e n u e  S e r v i c e  C e n t e r  s e r v i n g  
t h e  P e t i t i o n e r ' s  o l d  a d d r e s s .  T h e  o n l y  q u e s t i o n  seem s t o  b e  w h e t h e r  o r  n o t  t h e  
c l e a r  a n d  c o n c is e  n o t i f i c a t i o n  t o  t h e  I n t e r n a l  R e v e n u e  S e r v i c e  a c t u a l l y  c o n t a in s  
t h e  w o rd s  " t h i s  i s  a c h a n g e  o f  a d d r e s s " .  T t  s h o u ld  b e  n o te d  t h a t ,  t h e  f i l i n g  o f  a 
tax r e t u r n  w h ic h  i n c l u d e s  a  new  a d d r e s s  d o e s  n o t  c o n t a i n  a n y  s p e c i f i c  d i r e c t i o n  
f r o m  t h e  taxpayer t h a t  t h e  I n t e r n a l  R e v e n u e  S e r v i c e  s h o u ld  c h a n g e  h i s  a d d r e s s .  I n  
a d d i t i o n ,  i t  s h o u ld  n o t e d  t h a t  p r e s e n t l y  t h e  I n t e r n a l  R e v e n u e  S e r v i c e  
a u t o m a t i c a l l y  u p d a t e s  i t s  r e c o r d s  f o r  c h a n g e s  c f  a d d r e s s  f i l e d  w i t h  t h e  U n i t e d  
S t a t e s  P o s t  O f f i c e .  T h is  p r o c e d u r e  i s  d e s c r i b e d  i n  t h e  p r e s e n t  * 1 4  T r e a s u r y  
R e g u l a t i o n  S e c t i o n  3 0 1 . 6 2 1 2 ( b ) 2 a n d  t h e r e  i s  no  r e q u i r e m e n t  b y  t h e  S e r v i c e  i n  t h a t  
p r o c e d u r e  f o r  a  taxpayer t o  h a v e  s p e c i f i c a l l y  t o l d  t h e  I n t e r n a l  R e v e n u e  S e r v i c e  
t h a t  h e  d e s i r e d  r . i s  a d d r e s s  t o  b e  c h a n g e d .
I t  a p p e a r s  t h a t  t h e  o n l y  o t h e r  a r g u m e n t  t h a t  t h e  R e s p o n d e n t  c a n  m a k e  t h a t  Fo rm  
2 8 4 8  w as n o t  a  c l e a r  a n d  c o n c is e  n o t i f i c a t i o n  o f  a  d i f f e r e n t  a d d r e s s  w o u ld  b e  t h a t  
R e v e n u e  P r o c e d u r e  9 0 - 1 8  5 . 0 4 ( 1 )  r e q u i r e s  t h a t  t h e  n o t i f i c a t i o n  a l s o  i n c l u d e s  a  
s t a t e m e n t  b y  t h e  taxpayer t h a t  t h e  taxpayer "wishes t h e  a d d r e s s  cf r e c o r d  c h a n g e d  
t o  a  new  a d d r e s s " .  R e v e n u e  P r o c e d u r e  9 0 - 1 8  p u r p o r t s  t o  s e t  o u t  t h e  la w  a s  i t  w as  
e s t a b l i s h e d  i n  t h e  A b e le s  c a s e .  N o w h e re  i n  t h e  A b e le s  c a s e  i s  t h e r e  a n y  s t a t e m e n t  
w h ic h  r e q u i r e s  t h e  n o t i f i c a t i o n  t o  e x p r e s s  t h e  d e s i r e  o f  t h e  taxpayer- T h e  C o u r t  
s p e c i f i c a l l y  h o ld s  t h a t  " a  taxpayer's l a s t  hr.ow n a d d r e s s  i s  t h a t  a d d r e s s  w h ic h  
a p p e a r s  o n  t h e  taxpayer's m o s t  r e c e n t l y  f i l e d  r e t u r n ,  u n le s s  R e s p o n d e n t  h a s  b e e n  
g iv e r ,  c l e a r  a n d  c o n c is e  n o t i f i c a t i o n  o f  a  d i f f e r e n t  a d d r e s s " .  F u r t h e r  i n d i c a t i o n  
t h a t  t h e r e  i s  n o  r e q u i r e m e n t  o r  n e e d  f o r  a  s t a t e m e n t  c f  t h e  d e s i r e  o r  w is h e s  o f  
t h e  taxpayer i s  fo u n d  w h e n  we lo o k  a t  t h e  o n l y  tw o  o t h e r  m e th o d s  o f  e s t a b l i s h i n g  a
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" l a s t  k n o w n  a d d r e s s " .  U n d e r  t h e  R e v e n u e  P r o c e d u r e s  a n d  t h e  A b e le s  c a s e  t h e  m e th o d s  
o f  e s t a b l i s h m e n t  o f  a  " l a s t  k now n  a d d r e s s " ,  o t h e r  t h a n  c l e a r  a n d  c o n c is e  
n o t i f i c a t i o n ,  i s  t h e  f i l i n g  o f  a  tax r e t u r n  o r  a  n o t i f i c a t i o n  o f  c h a n g e  o f  a d d r e s s  
t c  t h e  U n i t e d  S t a t e s  P o s t  O f f i c e .  N e i t h e r  t h e  f i l i n g  o f  t h e  F e d e r a l  Tax R e t u r n  c r  
t h e  f i l i n g  o f  a c h a n g e  c f  a d d r e s s  w i t h  t h e  U n i t e d  S t a t e s  P o s t  O f f i c e ,  r e p r e s e n t s  
a n y  e x p r e s s io n  o r  s t a t e m e n t  o r. t h e  p a r t  o f  t h e  tax p a y e r  t o  t h e  I n t e r n a l  R e v e n u e  
S e r v i c e  t h a t  h e  d e s i r e s  o r  w is h e s  t o  h a v e  h i s  a d d r e s s  c h a n g e d .
T h e  c o u r t  i n  A b e le s  a d d r e s s e d  t h e  f a i r n e s s  o f  t h e  m e th o d s  i t  s e t  f o r t h  f o r  
taxpayer's t o  u s e  t o  i n f o r m  t h e  I n t e r n a l  R e v e n u e  S e r v i c e  o f  a  new  a d d r e s s .  T h is  
p u r p o s e  w as  t o  e s t a b l i s h  c e r t a i n t y  f o r  t h e  I n t e r n a l  R e v e n u e  S e r v i c e  a r.d  f o r  
taxpayers m  t h e  d e t e r m i n a t i o n  o f  a  taxpayer’s * 1 5  " l a s t  know n a d d r e s s " .  T h e  
A b e le s  o p i n i o n  s t a t e s  t h a t  t h e  C o u r t ' s  p r e v i o u s  d e c is io n s  h a v e  b e e n  p a r t l y  b a s e d  
u p o n  w ho t h e y  w e r e  w i l l i n g  t o  a t t r i b u t e  k n o w le d g e  o f  t h e  i n f o r m a t i o n  c o n t a in e d  i n  
a recently f i l e d  r e t u r n .  They n o t e d  t h a t  "the s t a t e  o f  t h e  Internal R e v e n u e  
S e r v i c e ' s  c o m p u te r  c a p a b i l i t i e s  i s  s u c h  t h a t  a  c o m p u te r  s e a r c h  o f  t h e  i n f o r m a t i o n  
r e t a i n e d  w i t h  r e s p e c t  t o  a  c e r t a i n  taxpayer, i n c l u d i n g  t h e i r  l a s t  k now n  a d d r e s s ,  
m ay b e  p e r f o r m e d  b y  a  R e s p o n d e n t 's  A g e n t  w i t h  u n r e a s o n a b le  e f f o r t  o r  d e l a y ” . 
A b e le s ,  a t  1 0 2 9 .  T h e  C o u r t  f u r t h e r  s t a t e d  " i r .  s o  h o l d i n g ,  we a r e  m e r e ly  
r e i t e r a t i n g  o u r  p o s i t i o n  t h a t  w h a t  i s  o f  s i g n i f i c a n c e  i s  w h a t  R e s p o n d e n t  k n e w  a t  
t h e  t i m e  t h e  S t a t u t o r y  N o t i c e  w as is s u e d  * * *  a n d  a t t r i b u t i n g  t o  R e s p o n d e n t  
i n f o r m a t i o n  w h ic h  R e s p o n d e n t  know s o r  s h o u ld  k now  w i t h  r e s p e c t  t o  a  taxpayer's 
l a s t  know n  a d d r e s s ,  t h r o u g h  t h e  u s e  o f  i t s  c o m p u te r  s y s t e m ."  A b e le s ,  a t  1 0 3 C .
A t  t h e  b e g i n n i n g  o f  t h i s  a r g u m e n t  t h e  P e t i t i o n e r  n o t e d  t h a t  t h i s  a r g u m e n t  i s  
b a s e d  o n  t h e  a s s u m p t io n  t h a t  t h e  R e s p o n d e n t  i s  r e l y i n g  o n  t h e  " l a s t  k now n  a d d r e s s "  
o f  t h e  P e t i t i o n e r  a s  b e in g  t h e  m o s t  r e c e n t l y  f i l e d  tax r e t u r n ,  a l t h o u g h  t h e r e  i s  
n o t h in g  i n  t h e  r e c o r d  t o  i n d i c a t e  t h e  a d d r e s s  t h a t  w as  on  t h a t  r e t u r n .  I n  t h e  
e v e n t  R e s p o n d e n t 's  p o s i t i o n  i s  t h a t  t h e  " l a s t  k n o w n  a d d r e s s "  w as t h e  a d d r e s s  
i n c l u d e d  c n  t h e  P o w e r  o f  A t t o r n e y  f i l e d  w i t h  t h e  R e v e n u e  A g e n t  a t  t h e  b e g i n n i n g  o f  
P e t i t i o n e r ’ s tax e x a m in a t i o n  t h e n  R e s p o n d e n t  i s  a d m i t t i n g  t h a t  i t  i s  p r o p e r  f o r  
t h e  I n t e r n a l  R e v e n u e  S e r v i c e  t o  r e l y  o r. t h e  f i l i n g  o f  a  T o w e r  c f  A t t o r n e y  i n  
e s t a b l i s h i n g  a  taxpayer's " l a s t  know n  a d d r e s s "  f o r  p u r p o s e s  o f  S e c t i o n  6 2 1 2 ( b )  o f  
t h e  I n t e r n a l  R e v e n u e  C o d e . T h e n  t h e  o n l y  q u e s t io n  a t  is s u e  i s  w h e t h e r  o r  n o t  t h e  
S e r v i c e  s h o u ld  b e  r e q u i r e d  t o  c h e c k  t h e  c o m p u te r  f i l e  f o r  a n y  s u b s e q u e n t  P o w e rs  c f  
A t t o r n e y  f i l e d .  T h e  C o u r t  i n  t h e  A b e le s  c a s e  r e c o g n iz e d  t h a t  " t o d a y ,  h o w e v e r ,  t h e  
s t a t e  o f  t h e  IR S ’ s  c o m p u te r  c a p a b i l i t i e s  i s  s u c h  t h a t  a c o m p u te r  s e a r c h  c f  t h e  
i n f o r m a t i o n  o b t a i n e d  w i t h  r e s p e c t  t o  a  c e r t a i n  taxpayer, i n c l u d i n g  t h e r e  l a s t  
know n a d d r e s s ,  m ay  * 1 6  b e  p e r f o r m e d  b y  R e s p o n d e n t 's  a g e n t  w i t h o u t  u n r e a s o n a b le  
e f f o r t  o r  d e l a y . "  A b e le s ,  a t  1 0 2 9 .  I f  t h e  C o u r t  w e r e  t o  h o ld  t h a t  t h e  I n t e r n a l  
R e v e n u e  S e r v i c e  c o u ld  r e l y  u p o n  a p r e v i o u s l y  f i l e d  R o w e r o f  A t t o r n e y  o b t a i n e d  i n  
a n  a g e n t ’ s f i l e  f o r  p u r p o s e s  o f  i s s u i n g  a  S t a t u t o r y  N o t i c e  o f  D e f i c i e n c y  w i t h o u t  
c h e c k in g  f o r  s u b s e q u e n t ly  f i l e d  P o w e rs  o f  A t t o r n e y ,  t h e  S e r v i c e  c o u ld  c o m p l e t e l y  
i g n o r e  a s u b s e q u e n t ly  f i l e d  P o w e r  o f  A t t o r n e y  w h ic h  m ig h t  s p e c i f i c a l l y  d i r e c t  t h e  
S e r v i c e  t o  s e n d  o r i g i n a l  n o t i c e s  t o  a  t a x p a y e r ' s  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e .  T h is  w o u ld  
c o m p l e t e l y  u n d e r m in e  t h e  o p i n i o n  o f  t h e  C h i e f  C o u n s e l  t o  t h e  I n t e r n a l  R e v e n u e  
S e r v i c e  t h a t  t h e  d i r e c t i v e  c f  t h e  taxpayer r e g a r d i n g  n o t i c e s  a n d  o t h e r  
c o m m u n ic a t io n s ,  a s  i n d i c a t e d  o r. L i n e  1  F o rm  2 8 4 8  w as  t c  b e  r e s p e c t e d  b y  t h e  
I n t e r n a l  R e v e n u e  S e r v i c e .  CCA 2 0 0 2 3 0 0 3 3  P a r a ,  3 o f  C o n c lu s io n s .
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Taxpayers s h o u ld  b e  a b l e  t o  k now  t h a t  w h e n  t h e y  f i l e  a  P o w e r o f  A t t o r n e y  w i t h  t h e  
S e r v i c e  i n  a c c o r d a n c e  w i t h  t h e  i n s t r u c t ' : o n s  g i v e n  b y  t h e  S e r v i c e  t h a t  t h e  S e r v i c e  
w i l l  t a k e  n o t e  o f  t h e  i n f o r m a t i o n  c o n t a i n e d  i n  t h a t  P o w e r o f  A t t o r n e y .  I h e  s t a t u t e  
p r o v id e s  a  m ea n s  f o r  t h e  taxpayer t o  b e  p r o v id e d  n o t i c e  o f  a  p r o p o s e d  tax 
d e f i c i e n c y  i n  o r d e r  f o r  t h e  taxpayer t o  a v a i l  h i m s e l f  o r  h e r s e l f  o f  t h e  
o p p o r t u n i t y  t o  l i t i g a t e  t h e  d e t e r m i n a t i o n  c f  a  d e f i c i e n c y  b e f o r e  h e  o r  s h e  h a s  t o  
m ak e  p a y m e n t  o f  t h e  l i a b i l i t y .  T o  t h i s  e n d , t h e  I n t e r n a l  R e v e n u e  S e r v i c e  s h o u ld  b e  
r e q u i r e d  t o  u s e  r e a s o n a b le  c a r e  a n d  d i l i g e n c e  i n  a s c e r t a i n i n g  t h e  taxpayer's 
c o r r e c t  a d d r e s s  a n d  m a i l i n g  t h e  S t a t u t o r y  N o t i c e  t o  t h a t  a d d r e s s .
V I I I .
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W h e r e f o r e ,  p e t i t i o n e r s  p r a y  t h a t  t h i s  C o u r t  d e t e r m in e  t h a t  t h e  P e t i t i o n e r s  a r e  
e n t i t l e d  t o  t h e  r e l i e f  s o u g h t  a n d  s u c h  o t h e r  a n d  f u r t h e r  r e l i e f  a s  t h e  C o u r t  m ay  
deem  f i r .  a n d  p r o p e r .
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* 1  P R E L IM IN A R Y  STATEMENT  
A h e a r i n g  w as  h e l d  b e f o r e  t h e  H o n o r a b le  S t e p h e n  J ,  S w i f t  o n  F e b r u a r y  1 0 ,  2 0 0 3  on. 
t h e  c r o s s - m o t io n s  t o  d is m is s  f o r  l a c k  o f  j u r i s d i c t i o n .  T h e  e v id e n c e  c o n s i s t s  o f  a  
w r i t t e n  S t i p u l a t i o n  o f  F a c t s  c o n t a i n i n g  p a r a g r a p h s  1 t h r o u g h  1 4  a n d  E x h i b i t s  1 - J  
t h r o u g h  n -.T  a n d  7 - R ,  T h e  C o u r t , d e s ig n a t e d  A p r i l  ) i . ,  2 0 0 3 ,  .as  t h e  d a t e  f o r  t h e  
p e t i t i o n e r  t o  f i l e  a n  o p e n in g  b r i e f  a n d  M a y  1 2 ,  20.63, a s  t h e  d a t e  f o r  t h e  
r e s p o n d e n t  t o  f i l e  a n  a n s w e r in g  b r i e f .  A d d i t i o n a l l y ,  t h e  C o u r t  l i m i t e d  t h e  p a r t i e s  
b r i e f s  t o  t w e n t y  { 2 0 }  p a g e s -  A l l  r e f e r e n c e s  t o  f e d e r a l  s t a t u t e s  a r e  t o  t h e  
I n t e r r . i l  R e v e n u e  C ode  c f  1 9 8 6 ,  a s  i h  e f f e c t  d u r i n g  t h e  t a x  y e a r s  i n  i s s u e ,  u n le s s  
o t h e r w i s e  s p e c i f i e d .
* 2  R E S P O N D E N T'S  O B JE C T IO N S  TO P E T IT IO N E R 'S  PROPOSED F IN D IN G S  OF PACT 
T h e  r e s p o n d e n t  a g r e e s  a n d  o b j e c t s  t o  t h e  P e t i t i o n e r ' s  p r o p o s e d  f i n d i n g s  o f  f a c t  
a s  f o l l o w s :
1 .  N o o b j e c t i o n .
1.. No o b j e c t i o n .
3 .  T h e  r e s p o n d e a t  o b j e c t s  t o  t h a t  p o r t i o n  o f  t h i s  p r o p o s e d  f i n d i n g  O f  f a c t ,  w h ic h  
s t a t e s  t h a t  t h e  ’' l i s t i n g  c f  t h e  a d d r e s s  a s  220 .0  New H ope Road, w as a  t y p o g r a p h ic a l  
e r r o r "  o n  t h e  b a s i s  t h a t  t h e  o n ly  p r o o f  i t  t h e  r e c o r d  f o r  t h i s  s t a t e m e n t  i s  t h e  
p e t i t i o n e r  ' s s e  o . f - n e r v i n g  s t a t e m e n t ,
4 .  N o  o b j e c t i o n .
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5 .  Ko o b j e c t i o n .
6 .  T h e  r e s p o n d e n t ,  o b j e c t s  t o  t h i s  p r o p o s e d  f i n d i n g  o f  f a c t  o n  t h e  b a s i s  t h a t  t h e  
o n l y  p r o o f  i n  t h e  r e c o r d  i s  t h e  p e t i t i o n e r ' s  s e l f - s e r v i n g  s t a t e m e n t s .
T h e  r e s p o n d e n t  o b j e c t s  t c  t h e  p e t i t i o n e r ' s  p r o p o s e d  r e q u e s t s  f o r  u l t i m a t e  
f i n d i n g s  o f  f a c t  a s  f o l l o w s :
7 .  T h e  r e s p o n d e n t  o b j e c t s  t o  t h i s  p r o p o s e d  f i n d i n g  o f  f a c t  o n  t h e  b a s is  t h a t  i t  
i s  n e t  a  f a c t  b u t  a  c o n c lu s i o n  n o t  s u p p o r t e d  b y  t h e  e v i d e n c e .
8 .  T h e  r e s p o n d e n t  o b j e c t s  t o  t h i s  p r o p o s e d  f i n d i n g  o f  f a c t  o n  t h e  b a s i s  t h a t  i t  
i s  n o t  a  f a c t  b u t  a  c o n c lu s i o n  n o t  s u p p o r t e d  b y  t h e  e v id e n c e .
* 3  ARGUMENT
B e f o r e  a d d r e s s i n g  t h e  l e g a l  a r g u m e n ts  i n  t h i s  c a s e ,  a  b r i e f  r e v i e w  o f  t h e  f a c t s  
i s  w a r r a n t e d -  S o m e tim e  p r i o r  t o  J u l y  o f  1 9 9 7 ,  t h e  r e s p o n d e n t  i n i t i a t e d  a n  
e x a m in a t i o n  o f  t h e  p e t i t i o n e r ' s  1 9 9 1 ,  1 9 9 2 ,  1 9 9 3 ,  1 9 9 4 ,  1 9 9 5  a n d  1 9 5 6  in c o m e  t a x  
r e t u r n s .  D u r in g  t h e  c o u r s e  o f  t h a t  e x a m in a t i o n  a n d  p r i o r  t o  t h e  p e t i t i o n e r ’ s 
a l l e g e d  m ove  t o  2 2 2 0  Now H ope  R o a d , H e n d e r s o n v i l l e ,  T e n n e s s e e  3 7 0 7 5 ,  t h e  
p e t i t i o n e r ,  o n  J u l y  2 9 ,  1 9 9 7 ,  s u b m i t t e d  a  F o rm  2 8 4 8 ,  P o w e r c f  A t t o r n e y  a n d
D e c l a r a t i o n  o f  R e p r e s e n t a t i v e ,  d i r e c t i y  t o  t h e  I n t e r n a l  R e v e n u e  S e r v i c e  r e v e n u e
a g e n t  w o r k in g  t h e  c a s e .  ( S t i p . ,  5  2 ) .  On A u g u s t  6 ,  1 9 9 8 ,  t h e  r e s p o n d e n t  is s u e d  h i s  
R e v e n u e  A g e n t ’ s  R e p o r t  ( t h e  " 3 0  d a y  l e t t e r " )  w i t h  r e s p e c t  t o  t h e  taxable y e a r s  
1 9 9 1 ,  1 9 9 2 ,  1 9 9 3 ,  1 9 9 4 ,  1 9 9 5  a n d  1 9 9 6 .  T h e  3 C - d a y  l e t t e r  w as  a d d r e s s e d  t o  t h e  
p e t i t i o n e r  a t  1 2 2  B s y n e  D r i v e ,  G a l l a t i n ,  T e n n e s s e e  3 7 0 6 g . ( S t i p . ,  5  3 ) . T h e
p e t i t i o n e r  r e c e i v e d  t h e  3 0 - d a y  l e t t e r  o n  A u g u s t  1 3 ,  1 9 9 8 .  ( S t i p . ,  1  4 ) .  T h e
p e t i t i o n e r  d i d  n o t ,  h o w e v e r ,  r e s p o n d  i n  a n y  w a y  t o  t h e  3 0 - d a y  l e t t e r .  ( S t i p . ,  5  8 j  .
H a v in g  h a d  no  r e s p o n s e  t o  t h e  3 0 - d a y  l e t t e r ,  t h e  r e s p o n d e n t ,  o n  J a n u a r y  2 8 ,  1 9 9 9 ,
is s u e d  s t a t u t o r y  n o t i c e s  c f  d e f i c i e n c y  w i t h  r e s p e c t  t o  t h e  t a x a b l e  y e a r s  1 9 9 1 ,
1 3 9 2 ,  1 9 9 3 ,  1 9 9 4 ,  1 9 9 5  a n d  1 9 9 6 .  T h r e e  (3 )  s e p a r a t e  n o t i c e s  o f  d e f i c i e n c y  w e r e  
i s s u e d  t o  t h e  p e t i t i o n e r .  One w as f o r  t h e  t a x a b l e  y e a r  1 3 3 1 ,  o r.e  w as f o r  t h e  
t a x a b l e  y e a r s  1 9 9 2 ,  1 9 9 3  a n d  1 9 9 4  a n d  o r .e  Was f o r .  t h e  t a x a b l e  * 4  y e a r s  1 9 9 5  a n a  
1 9 9 6 .  ( S t i p . ,  3 1  9 - 1 1 ) .  E a c h  o f  t h e  n o t i c e s  o f  d e f i c i e n c y  w as a d d r e s s e d  t o  t h e
p e t i t i o n e r  a t  1 2 2  W ayne D r i v e ,  G a l l a t i n ,  T e n n e s s e e  3 7 0 8 6 ,  w h ic h  w as t h e  a d d r e s s  o n
t h e  p e t i t i o n e r ' s  m o s t  r e c e n t l y  f i l e d  in c o m e  t a x  r e t u r n .  ( S t i p . ,  1 5  9 - 1 2 ) .  Th e  
n o t i c e  o f  d e f i c i e n c y  f o r  t h e  t a x a b l e  y e a r  1 9 9 1  a n d  t h e  n o t i c e  o f  d e f i c i e n c y  f o r  
t h e  t a x a b l e  y e a r s  1 3 3 3  a n d  1 3 3 6  w e r e  r e t u r n e d  t o  t h e  r e s p o n d e n t  a s  u n c la im e d  b y  
t h e  p e t i t i o n e r  d e s p i t e  t h r e e  (3 )  a t t e m p t s  a t  d e l i v e r y .  ( S t i p . ,  5 5  13  a n d  1 4 ) .
T h e r e  i s  n o t h in g  i n  t h e  r e c o r d  t o  i n d i c a t e  t h a t  t h e  n o t i c e  o f  d e f i c i e n c y  f o r  t h e  
t a x a b l e  y e a r s  1 9 9 2 ,  1 9 9 3  a n d  1 9 3 4  w as  e v e r  r e t u r n e d  t o  t h e  - e s p o n d e n t . .  On J a n u a r y  
2 8 ,  1 9 9 9 ,  t h e  p e t i t i o n e r  a n d  h i s  w i f e  s t i l l  o w ned  t h e  p r o p e r t y  a t  1 2 2  W ayr.e  D r i v e ,
G a l l a t i n ,  T e n n e s s e e .  ( E x .  7 -  R ; T r .  1 6 - 1 7 ) .
Cn N o v e m b e r  1 9 ,  1 9 9 3 ,  a f t e r  is s u a n c e  o f  t h e  3 0 - d c v  l o o t e r  b u t  p r i o r  t o  th e  
i s s u a n c e  o f  t h e  n o t i c e s  o f  d e f i c i e n c y ,  t h e  p e t i t i o n e r  f i l e d  a  Fo rm  2 8 4 8  w i t h  t h e  
r e s p o n d e n t 's  M e m p h is  S e r v i c e  C e n t e r .  ( S t i p . ,  5 5 ) .  U n l i k e  w i t h  t h e  Fo rm  2 8 4 8  f i l e d  
o n  J u l y  2 9 ,  1 9 9 7 ,  t h e  p e t i t i o n e r  d i d  n e t  f i l e  t h i s  Form  2 8 4 8  w i t h  t h e  I n t e r n a l
R e v e n u e  S e r v i c e  r e v e n u e  a g e n t  w o r k in g  h i s  c a s e  n o r  d i d  h e  p r o v id e  a c o p y  o f  t h i s
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Form  2 8 4 8  t o  t h e  I n t e r n a l  R e v e n u e  S e r v i c e  r e v e n u e  a g e n t  w o r k in g  h i s  c a s e .  ( S t i p . ,  2  
f .i . T h e  Form  2 3 4 8  f i l e d  b y  t h e  p e t i t i o n e r  o r  N o v e m b e r  1 9 ,  1 .49R , d o e s  n o t  p r o v ' i i t >  
t h a t  t h e  r e s p o n d e n t  i s  t o  s e n d  o r i g i n a l  n o t i c e s  a n c  w r i t t e n  c o m m u n ic a t io n s  t o  t h e  
p e t i t i o n e r ' s  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e .  * 5  ( E x .  1 - J ) . A d d i t i o n a l l y ,  t h e  Fo rm  2 8 4 8  f i l e d  b y  
t h e  p e t i t i o n e r  o n  N o v e m b e r  1 3 ,  1 3 5 3 ,  c o n t a in e d  a n  a d d r e s s  o f  2 2 0 0  New H ope  R o a d ,
O v e r  t h r e e  ( 3 )  y e a r s  a f t e r  t h e  is s u a n c e  O f  t h e  n o t i c e s  o f  d e f i c i e n c y ,  t h e  
p e t . i t . - i  o r  e r ,  o n  J u n e  1 0 ,  2 0 0 ? ,  f i l e r !  a  n e r . i r h b n  w i t h  t h i s  C o u r t  w i t h  r e s p e c t  t o  t h e  
n o t i c e s  o f  d e f i c i e n c y  f o r  t h e  taxable y e a r s  1 9 9 1 ,  1 3 3 2 ,  1 9 9 3 ,  1 3 9 4 ,  1 9 9 3  a n d  1 9 9 6 .  
On O c to b e r .  1 ,  2 0 0 2 ,  t h e  r e s p o n d e n t ,  p u r s u a n t  t o  I . R . C .  § §  6 2 1 3 ( a )  a n d  7 5 0 2 ,  f i l e d  
a  M o t i o n  t o  D is m is s  f o r  L a c k  o f  J u r i s d i c t i o n  o n  t h e  b a s is  t h a t  t h e  p e t i t i o n  w as
i«v t  l  ♦ j iL 4 • 1* *C uCl t v* *v j,vk.iwiw itC i -  f  V/UwwvCa bv  ^ *_ wo «. j • biCw w ,Jv
t o  D is m is s  f c r  L a c k  o f  J u r i s d i c t i o n  a l l e g i n g  t h a t  t h e  n o t i c e s  o f  d e f i c i e n c y  w e r e  
i n v a l i d  b e c a u s e  t h e y  w e r e  n e t  m a i l e d  t o  t h e  p e t i t i o n e r ’ s " l a s t  know n a d d r e s s . "
T h e  is s u e s  i n  t h i s  c a s e  a r e  s t r a i g h t  f o r w a r d .  F i r s t ,  W ere  v a l i d  n o t i c e s  o f  
d e f i c i e n c y  is s u e d  t o  t h e  p e t i t i o n e r ?  I n  p a r t i c u l a r ,  w e r e  t h e  n o t i c e s  o f  d e f i c i e n c y  
is s u e d  t o  t h e  p e t i t i o n e r ' s  " l a s t  k n o w n  a d d r e s s "  w i t h i n  t h e  m e a n in g  o f  I . R . C .  §  6 2 1 2  
? A n d , i f  t h e  n o t i c e s  o f  d e f i c i e n c y  is s u e d  t o  t h e  p e t i t i o n e r  a r e  v a l i d ,  w as t h e  
p e t i t i o n  t i m e l y  f i l e d  w i t h i n  t h e  m e a n in g  o f  I . R . C .  § §  6 2 1 3  (a )  a n d  7 5 0 2 ?  As s e t  
f o r t h  in .  m h re  d e t a i l  b e lo w ,  t h e  n o t i c e s  o f  d e f i c i e n c y  is s u e d  t o  t h e  p e n i t ’ o n e r  on  
J a n u a r y  2 8 ,  1 9 9 9  w e r e  is s u e d  t o  t h e  p e t i t i o n e r  a t  h i s  " l a s t  k now n  a d d r e s s "  a n d  
a r e ,  t h e r e f o r e ,  v a l i d .  A s s u c h , w h e n  t h e  * 6  p e t i t i o n e r  d i d  n o t  f i l e  h i s  p e t i t i o n
w i t h  t h i s  C o u r t  u n t i l  J u n e  1 0 ,  2 0 0 2 ,  s a i d  p e t i t i o n  w as n o t  t i m e l y  a r.d  t h i s  C o u r t
d o e s  n o t  h a v e  .
S e c t i o n  6 2 1 2 ( b )  o f  t h e  I n t e r n a l  R e v e n u e  C o d e  o f  1 9 8 6  r e q u i r e s  t h e  I n t e r n a l  
R e v e n u e  S e r v i c e  t o  s e n d  t h e  n o t i c e  o f  d e f i c i e n c y  t o  t h e  taxpayer's " l a s t  known 
a d d r e s s . ’’ I n  d e t e r m in in g  w h e t h e r  a  n o t i c e  o f  d e f i c i e n c y  h a s  b e e n  m a i l e d  t o  a 
taxpayer's " l a s t  k now n  a d d r e s s , "  t h i s  C o u r t  h e l d  i n  A b e le s  v .  C o m m is s io n e r ,  9 1
T . C .  1 0 1 9  ( 1 3 8 8 ) . ,  t h a t  a  taxpayer's l a s t  k n o w n  a d d r e s s  ’’ i s  t h a t  a d d r e s s  w h ic h
a p p e a r s  o r. t h e  taxpayer's m o s t r e c e n t l y  f i l e d  r e t u r n ,  u n le s s  r e s p o n d e n t  h a s  b e e n  
g i v e n  c l e a r  a n d  c o n c is e  n o t i f i c a t i o n  o f  a d i f f e r e n t  a d d r e s s . "  91  T . C .  a t  1 0 3 5 .  T h e  
p a r t i e s  s t i p u l a t e d  t h a t  t h e  a d d r e s s  o n  t h e  p e t i t i o n e r ' s  " m o s t r e c e n t l y  f i l e d  
r e t u r n "  on  t h e  d a t e  t h e  n o t i c e s  o f  d e f i c i e n c y  w e r e  is s u e d  w as t h e  1 22  W ayne D r iv e . ,  
G a l l a t i n ,  T e n n e s s e e  a d d r e s s .  ( S t i p . ,  1  1 2 ) .  T h u s , t h e  is s u e  i r .  t h i s  c a s e  h in g e s  o n  
w h e t h e r  t h e  r e s p o n d e n t  r e c e i v e d  " c l e a r  a n d  c o n c is e  n o t i f i c a t i o n  o f  a  d i f f e r e n t  
a d d r e s s "  p r i o r  t o  t h e  . i s s u a n c e  o f  t h e  n o t i c e s  o f  d e f i c i e n c y .
T h e  Tax C o u r t  h a s  e s t a b l i s h e d  t h e  f o l l o w i n g  f r e q u e n t l y  c i t e d  r u l e :  
w h i l e  t h e  C o m m is s io n e r  i s  b o u n d  t o  e x e r c i s e  r e a s o n a b le  d i l i g e n c e  i n  a s c e - t a i n i n g  
t h e  taxpayer's c o r r e c t  a d d r e s s ,  h e  i s  e n t i t l e d  to t r e a t  t h e  a d d r e s s  a p p e a r in g  o n  a 
taxpayer's r e t u r n  a s  t h e  l a s t  k n o w n  i n  t h e  a b s e n c e  o f  c l e a r  a n d  c o n c is e  
n o t i f i c a t i o n  f r o m  t h e  *7 taxpayer d i r e c t i n g  t h e  C o m m is s io n e r  t o  u s e  a  d i f f e r e n t
uj, I
A l t a  S i e r r a  V i s t a ,  I n c .  v .  C o m m is s io n e r ,  62  T . C .  3 6 ? ,  3 7 4  ( 1 9 7 4 !  ( c i t a t i o n s  
o m i t t e d ) ; S e e  W a l l i n  v .  C o m m is s io n e r ,  7 4 4  P .Z d  6 7 4 ,  6 7 6  ( 9 t h  C i r .  1 9 8 4 ;  . 
Establishing a p r e s u m p t io n  t h a t  t h e  taxpayer's " l a s t  know n a d d r e s s "  i s  t h e  a d d r e s s  
on h i s  most r e c e n t  r e t u r n  a l s o  e s t a b l i s h e s  a  c l e a r  s t a r t i n g  p o i n t  f o r  t h e  I n t e r n a l
C  2 6 0 5  T h o m s o n /W e s t . N o C l a m  t o  O n  g . U .S .  G o v t .  W o rk s .
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R e v e n u e  S e r v i c e ' s  d e t e r m i n a t i o n .  ?. n o t i c e  o f  d e f i c i e n c y  m a i le d  t o  t h a t  a d d r e s s  
w i l  * h e  s u f f i c i e n t ,  u n le s s  t h e  f s n p a y r  s t’h s e q n e n f l  y  r.nmjnuni c a t e s  " c l e a r  a nd  
c o n c is e ” n o t i f i c a t i o n  c f  a  c h a n g e  o f  a d d r e s s .
C o r r e s p o n d e n c e  b e a r i n g  a n  a d d r e s s  d i f f e r e n t  f r o m  t h a t  o n  t h e  m o s t r e c e n t  r e t u r n  
d e e s  n e t ,  b y  i t s e l f ,  c o n s t i t u t e  c le a r ,  a r .d  c o n c is e  n o t i c e .  S e e ,  e g . ,  T a d r s s  v .  
C o m m is s i o n e r ,  7 6 3  F ,2 d  8 9 ,  9.2 (2 n d  C i r .  1 5 3 5 )  ; letter f r o m  taxpayer d i d  r.ot
i n d i c a t e  t h a t  taxpayer h a d  p e r .iT ia n e n .t ly  m o v e d  o r  t h a t  a d d r e s s  c n  l e t t e r h e a d  w as  h i s  
r .ew  p l a c e  o f  r e s i d e n c e ;  n o r  d i d  i t  m e n t io n  t h e  o l d  a d d r e s s  o r  i n d i c a t e  t h a t  i t  w as  
r.o lo n g e r  t o  b e  u s e d ) ;  A l t a  S i e r r a  V i s t a ,  62 T . C .  a t  3 7 5  (r.ew  a d d r e s s  o n  
l e t t e r h e a d  i n s u f f i c i e n t  t o  n o t i f y  I n t e r n a l  R e v e n u e  S e r v i c e  " t h a t  s u c h  a d d r e s s  h a d  
r e p l a c e d  ; taxpayerT sj f  o r m e r  a d d r e s s  a n d  t h a t  t r ie  f o r m e r  a d d r e s s  w as liO l u n g e r  t o  
be  u s e d ) ;  C f .  p y o  v .  C o m m is s io n e r ,  S3 T . C .  6 2 6 ,  6 3 7 - 3 8  ( 1 9 8 4 )  { f i l i n g  o f  Form  8 7 2  
b e a r i n g  o l d  a d d r e s s  d i d  n o t  s u p p la n t  a d d r e s s  o n  m o s t  r e c e n t  r e t u r n ) . I n  o r d e r  t o  
awnp'i a n t  t h e  a d d r e s s  on  h i s  m o s t r e c e n t  r e t u r n ,  t h e  t a x p a y e r  m u s t c l e a i - l y  i n d i c a t e  
*8 t h a t  t h e  f o r m e r  a d d r e s s  i s  r.o l o n g e r  r b  b e  u s e d .  C a d r e s ,  7 6 3  F .2 d  a t  9 2 .
A t  t h e  t i m e  t h e  n o t i c e s  of d e f i c i e n c y  w e r e  i s s u e d  i r .  t h e  c a s e  a t  b a r .  R e v e n u e  
P r o c e d u r e  9 0 - 1 2 ,  1 9 3 C - 1  C .D .  4 9 1 ,  p r e s c r i b e d  t h e  p r o c e d u r e  f c r  p r o v i d i n g  " c l e a r  
a n d  c o n c is e  n o t i f i c a t i o n "  to t h e  I n t e r n a l  R e v e n u e  S e r v i c e .  F o r  s i t u a t i o n s  r e l e v a n t  
h e r e i n .  R e v e n u e  P r o c e d u r e  9 0 - 1 8  p r o v id e s  t h a t  a  taxpayer c a n  e i t h e r  s e n d  " c l e a r  
ar.d  c o n c is e  w r i t t e n  n o t i f i c a t i o n  o f  a  c h a n g e  o f  a d d r e s s "  t o  t h e  S e r v i c e  C e n t e r  
s e r v i n g  t h e  taxpayer's o l d  a d d r e s s ,  t o  t h e  C h i e f ,  Taxpayer S e r v i c e  D i v i s i o n  i r .  t h e  
l o c a l  d i s t r i c t  o f f i c e  o r ,  i f  a  taxpayer i s  u n d e r  a u d i t ,  t c  t h e  I n t e r n a l  R e v e n u e  
S e r v i c e  e m p lo y e e  who i s  w o r k in g  t h e  taxpayer's c a s e .  R e v . F f o c .  9 .0 - 1 8 ,  1 5 8 0 - 1  C . 5 .  
4 9 1 ,  4 9 2 .  R e v e n u e  P r o c e d u r e  9 0 - 1 8  s p e c i f i c a l l y  d e f i n e s  " c l e a r  a n d  c o n c is e ,  w r i t t e n  
n o t i f i c a t i o n "  a s
a s t a t e m e n t  s ig n e d  b y  t h e  taxpayer i n f o r m i n g  t h e  S e r v i c e  t h a t  a  taxpayer w is h e s  
t h e  a d d r e s s  o f  r e c o r d  c h a n g e d  t o  a  new  a d d r e s s .  I n  a d d i t i o n  t o  t h e  new a d d r e s s ,  
t h i s  n o t i f i c a t i o n  ro u s t c o n t a i n  t h e  taxpayer's f u l l  n a m e, s i g n a t u r e ,  o l d  a d d r e s s ,  
ar.d  s o c i a l  s e c u r i t y  n u m b e r a n d / o r  e m p lo y e r  i d e n t i f i c a t i o n  n u m b e r .. . . .  i n  a l l  
b a s e s ,  clear a n d  c o n c is e  w r i t t e n  n o t i f i c a t i o n  m u s t  b e  s p e c i f i c  a s  to a c h a n g e  c f  
a d d r e s s .
1 9 9 0 - 1  C .B .  4 9 1 ,  4 9 4 .  R e v e n u e  P r o c e d u r e  9 0 - 1 8  f u r t h e r  S t a t e s  t h a t  ” [ t ] h e  S e r v i c e  
i s  c u r r e n t l y  d e v e lo p i n g  a new  fo r m  (F o rm  8822! t h a t  taxpayers w i l l  b e  a b l e  t o  u s e  
t o  s e n d  c l e a r  a n d  c o n c is e  w r i t t e n  n o t i f i c a t i o n  o f  a  c h a n g e  o f  a d d r e s s  t o  t h e  
S e r v i c e "  - 19.90-1 C . 3 .  a t  4 9 2 .  T h e  Fo rm  8 8 2 2 ,  C h a n g e  o f  A d d r e s s ,  +9 w as a v a i l a b l e  
a n d  i n  U se  d u r i n g  1 3 5 3  a n d  1 3 3 S . . { A lth o u g h  R e v e n u e  P r o c e d u r e  SC— IS  h a s  b e e n  
a m p l i f i e d  a r.d  s u p e r s e d e d  b y  R e v e n u e  P r o c e d u r e  2 0 0 1 -  1 8 ,  200.1-1 C .B .  7 0 8 ,  t h e  
p o r t i o n s  c i t e d  h e r e i n  h a v e  n o t  c h a n g e d  o t h e r  t h a n  t o  s p e c i f i c a l l y  p r o v i d e  t h a t  a  
Form  8 9 7 7  m ay b e  u s e d  a s  a c l e a r  a n d  c o n c is e  w r i t t e n  n o r.i f  i  n a t . i  o n  o f  a c h a n g e  fr"  
a d d r e s s ! .
T h e  p e t i t i o n e r  d i d  n o t  f i l e  a  Fo rm  8 8 2 2 .  ( S t i p . ,  1  7 ) .  I n s t e a d ,  t h e  p e t i t i o n e r  
h s ' l i c c  u p o n  a  f c r m  2 8 4 2  f i l e d  v i t h  t h e  r e s p o n d e n t ’ s M e m p h is , T e n n e s s e e  S e r v i c e  
C e n t e r  or. N o v e m b e r  1 9 ,  1 3 9 8 ,  t o  a r g u e  t h a t  h e  p r o v id e d  - 'c l e a r  a n d  c o n c is e  w r i t t e n  
n o t i f i c a t i o n ' '  t o  t h e  I n t e r n a l  R e v e n u e  S e r v i c e  o f  h i s  c h a n g e  o f  a d d r e s s .  T h e  
p e t i t i o n e r ' s  r e l i a n c e  o n  t h e  F o rm  2 8 4 8  f i l e d  o n  N o v e m b e r I S ,  1 9 9 8  i s  m is p la c e d .  
F i r s t ,  t h e  a d d r e s s  o r. t h e  Fo rm  2 9 4 8  i s  n o t  e v e n  t h e  p e t i t i o n e r ' s  c o r r e c t  a d d r e s s .  
(E x .  1 - J ;  I s .  1 8 - 1 3 ) .  S e c o n d ly ,  a n d  m o re  i m p o r t a n t l y ,  t h e  p u r p o s e  c f  a  F o rm  2 8 4 8
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i s  n o t  t o  n o t i f y  t h e  I n t e r n a l  R e v e n u e  S e r v i c e  c f  a  c h a n g e  o f  a d d r e s s  b u t  t o  
e s h a b ' i s h  a p e r s o n  o r  p e r s o n s  who s r p  a u t h o r ; r e d  b y  a t a x p a y e r  t o  r e p r e s e n t  
h i m / h e r / i t  b e f o r e  t h e  I n t e r n a l  R e v e n u e  S e r v i c e .  T h e  Form  2 8 4 8  f i l e d  b y  t h e  
p e t i t i o n e r  d o e s  r .c t  c o n t a i n  a " s t a t e m e n t  s ig n e d  b y  t h e  taxpayer i n f o r m i n g  t h e  
S e r v i c e  t h a t  a  taxpayer w is h e s  t h e  a d d r e s s  o f  r e c o r d  c h a n g e d  t o  a new  a d d r e s s "  n c r  
d o e s  i t  c o n t a i n  t h e  t a x p a y e r ' s  o l d  a d d r e s s .  1 9 3 C -  1 C . 2 .  a t  4 .5 4 . M o r e o v e r ,  t h e  
Form  2 8 4 S  i s ,  i n  n o  w a y , " s p e c i f i c  a s  t o  a  c h a n g e  o f  a d d r e s s . "  I d .
* 1 0  T h e  o n e  e x c e p t i o n  t c  a  F o ra i 2 8 4 3  n o t  c o n s t i t u t i n g  a  c h a n g e  o f  a d d r e s s  i s  w h en  
t h e  fo r m  2 8 4 8  s p e c i f i c a l l y  p r o v id e s  t h a t  t h e  r e s p o n d e n t  i s  t o  s e n d  o r i g i n a l  
n o t i c e s  a n d  w r i t t e n  c o m m u n ic a t io n s  t o  t h e  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e  ( r a t h e r  t h a n  t h e  taxpayer 
.■ . IT : t h a t  c a s e  (a n d  t h a t  c a s e  u r . l y ) ,  C he  r e s p o n d e n t  h a s  s t a t e d  t h a t  h e  w i l l  t r e a t  
t h e  a d d r e s s  o f  t h e  taxpayer's r e p r e s e n t a t i v e  a s  t h e  taxpayer's " l a s t  know n  
a d d r e s s . "  S e e  R e v e n u e  P r o c e d u r e  6 1 - 1 3 ,  1 9 6 1 - 2  C . B .  5 5 0 .  T h is  C o u r t  r e c o g n iz e s  t h i s  
e x c e p t i o n .  S e e  R e d b r ic k  v .  C o T M i ' i s s i o n e r ,  72 T , C .  21 ( 1 9 7 9 ; ;  M a -a n r .o  v .
C o m m is s io n e r ,  T . C .  M em o. 1 9 9 9 - 2 6 6 ;  E l g a f t  v .  c o m m is s io n e r ,  T . C .  M em o. 1 9 9 6 - 3 7 9 ;  
H o n ts  v .  C o m m is s io n e r , T . C .  M em o. 1 9 9 5 -  5 3 2 .  T h i s  e x c e p t i o n  i s  n o t ,  h o w e v e r ,  
p r e s e n t  i n  t h e  c a s e  a t  b a r .  T h e  Fo rm  2 3 4 8  f i l e d  b y  t h e  p e t i t i o n e r  o n  N o v e m b e r  1 9 ,  
1 9 3 8 ,  p r o v id e d  t h a t  t h e  o r i g i n a l s  w e r e  t o  b e  s e n t  t o  t h e  p e t i t i o n e r ,  w i t h  c o p ie s  t o  
h i s  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s .
T h e  p e t i t i o n e r  a c k n o w le d g e s  t h a t  t h i s  C o u r t ' s  d e c i s i o n  i n  A b e le s  a n d  R e v e n u e  
P r o c e d u r e  9 0 - 1 8  " c o n t a in e d  t h e  p r i m a r y  g u id a n c e  i n  e f f e c t  c n  J a n u a r y  2 8 ,  1 9 3 9  w hen  
t h e  N o t i c e s  o f  D e f i c i e n c y  i n  t h i s  c a s e  w e r e  is s u e d  b y  t h e  I n t e r n a l  R ev e n u e . 
S e r v i c e . "  P a g e  3 ,  B r i e f  f o r  t h e  P e t i t i o n e r .  I n t e r e s t i n g l y ,  h o w e v e r ,  t h e  p e t i t i o n e r  
o f f e r s  n o  e x p l a n a t i o n  f o r  w h y h e  ig n o r e d  t h e  s p e c i f i c  g u id a n c e  p r o v id e d  b y  R e v e n u e  
P r o c e d u r e  9 0 - 1 8 .  C l e a r l y ,  t h e  p e t i t i o n e r  c o u l d  h a v e  f i l e d  a  Fo rm  8 8 2 2  a n d  a v o id e d  
t h i s  p r o b le m .  M o r e o v e r ,  i n  f a i l i n g  t o  f o l l o w  t h e  r e q u i r e m e n t  s e t  * 1 1  f o r t h  i n  
R e v e n u e  P r o c e d u r e  9 0 - 1 3 ,  1 9 9 2 - 1  C . 3 .  4 9 1 ,  4 9 4 ,  t h a t  t h e  r . c t i f i c a t i o r .  c o n t a i n  " a  
s t a t e n * lit s ig n e d  b y  t h e  taxpayer i n f o r m i n g  t h e  s e r v i c e  t h a t  a  taxpayer w is h e s  t h e  
a d d r e s s  o f  r e c o r d  c h a n g e d  t o  a  new  a d d r e s s , "  t h e  p e t i t i o n e r  a r g u e s  t h a t  n e i t h e r  
t h e  f i l i n g  o f  a  tax r e t u r n  n c r  t h e  f i l i n g  c f  a  c h a n g e  o f  a d d r e s s  w i t h  t h e  U n i t e d  
S t a t e s  P o s t  O f f i c e  r e p r e s e n t s  a  s t a t e m e n t  b y  t h e  taxpayer " t h a t  h e  d e s i r e s  o r  
w is h e s  t c  h a v e  h i s  a d d r e s s  c h a n c e d ."  P a g e  1 4 ,  B r i e f  f o r  t h e  P e t i t i o n e r .  W i t h  
r e s p e c t  t o  t h e  f i l i n g  o f  a tax r e t u r n ,  w h a t  t h e  p e t i t i o n e r  f a i l s  t o  r e c o g n iz e  i s  
t h a t  t h e r e  i s  n o  n e e d  f o r  t h e  taxpayer t o  p r o v i d e  s u c h  a  s t a t e m e n t  w i t h  t h i s  
d o c u m e n t a s  t h e  la w  s p e c i f i c a l l y  p r o v id e s  t h a t  t h e  f i l i n g  o f  a r e t u r n  w i l l  
c o n s t i t u t e  a  c h a n g e  i n  t h e  p e t i t i o n e r ' s  " l a s t  know n a d d r e s s . "  A b e le s  v .  
C o m m is s io n e r ,  9 1  T . C .  1 0 1 9  ( 1 3 S 8 ) . As r e g a r d s  t h e  f i l i n g  o f  a c h a n g e  o f  a d d r e s s  
w i t h  t h e  U n i t e d  S t a t e s  P o s t  O f f i c e ,  w h i l e  t h e  la w  h a s  r e c e n t l y  c h a n g e d , t h e  la w  i n  
e f f e c t  on J a n u a r y  2 8 ,  ^ 9 8 9 ,  t h e  d a t e  t h e  n o t i c e s  o f  d e f i c i e n c y  w e r e  Is s u e d  i n  t h e  
c a s e  a t  b a r ,  s p e c i f i c a l l y  p r o v id e d  t h a t  " n o t i f i c a t i o n  t o  t h e  U .S .  P o s t a l  S e r v i c e  
d o e s  n o t  c o n s t i t u t e  t h e  c l e a r  a n d  c o n c is e  w r i t t e n  n o t i f i c a t i o n  t h a t  i s  r e q u i r e d  t o  
c h a n g e  a taxpayer's a d d r e s s  o f  r e c o r d  w i t h  t h e  S e r v i c e , "  R e v . P r c c ,  9 0 - 1 8 ,  1 9 9 0 - 1
Ve»LW» «> U. y *3 _r i_ . y 1 £ CS CL bi • * Cr *> W .».«**«* .*. 4- *‘l l  w* | . X v a. Ci VJ/VU J  I-.IU i/vt4vlvilC>.
f o r  t h e  p r o p o s i t i o n  t h a t  t h e  f i l i n g  o f  a c h a n g e  o f  a d d r e s s  w i t h  t h e  U n i t e d  S t a t e s  
P o s t  O f f i c e  c o n s t i t u t e s  n o t i c e  t o  * 1 2  t h e  I n t e r n a l  R e v e n u e  S e r v i c e  o f  a  c h a n g e  o f  
a d d r e s s  w as n o t  a d o p te d  u n t i l  J a n u a r y  1 1 ,  2 0 0 1  a n d  t h u s ,  was n o t  i n  e f f e c t  on  
J a n u a r y  2 8 ,  1 9 9 9 ; .
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T h e  p e t i t i o n e r  w o u ld  L i k e  t h i s  C o u r t  t o  b e l i e v e  t h a t  a n y  d o c u m e n t w h ic h  c o n t a i n s  
a new  a d d r e s s  c o n s t i t u t e s  " c l e a r  a rc j c o n c is e  n o t i f i c a t i o n ” o f  a c h a n g e  o f  a r i r i - e s s .  
T h is  i s  s im p ly  n o t  t h e  L a w . As r e c o g n iz e d  b y  R e v e n u e  P r o c e d u r e  9 0 - 1 3 ,  r .c t  e v e r y  
d o c u m e n t w h ic h  c o n t a i n s  a n  a d d r e s s  c o n s t i t u t e s  " c l e a r  a n d  c o n c is e  n o t i f i c a t i o n "  o f  
a c h a n g e  o f  a d d r e s s .  F o r  i n s t a n c e ,  a  new  a d d r e s s  o n  a Fo rm  4 8 6 8 ,  A p p l i c a t i o n  f o r  
A u t o m a t ic  E x t e n s io n  o f  T im e  t o  F i l e  U .S .  I n d i v i d u a l  In c o m e  T a x  R e t u r n ,  " w i l l  n o t  
b e  u s e d  b y  t h e  S e r v i c e  t o  u p d a t e  t h e  t a x p a y e r ' s  a d d r e s s  c f  r e c o r d . "  R e v . P r o c .  
9 0 - 1 8 ,  1 9 9 0 - 1  C .B .  4 9 1 ,  4 9 4 .  C l e a r l y ,  i f  a  F o rm  486.8 w h ic h  i s  so  c l o s e l y  r e l a t e d  
t o  a  Fo rm  1 0 4 0  d o e s  n o t  c o n s t i t u t e  “ c l e a r  a n d  c o n c is e  n o t i f i c a t i o n "  o f  a c h a n g e  o f  
a d d r e s s ,  a  Fo rm  2 8 4 3  w h ic h  m e r e ly  p r o v id e s  f o r  a n o t h e r  i n d i v i d u a l ( s )  t o  r e p r e s e n t  
a  t a x p a y e r  c a n . n o t  b e  s a i d  t o  c o n s t i t u t e  " c l e a r  a r.o  c o n c is e  n o t i f i c a t i o n "  o f  a 
c h a n g e  o f  a d d r e s s .
I n  c o n c l u s i o n ,  t h e  F o rm  2 8 4 8  s u b m i t t e d  b y  t h e  p e t i t i o n e r  a n d  r e c e i v e d  a t  t h e  
M e m p h is  S e r v i c e  or. N o v e m b e r  1 9 ,  199R  d o e s  r o t  c o n s t i t u t e  " c l e a r  a nd  c o n c is e  
n o t i f i c a t i o n "  o f  a  c h a n g e  o f  t h e  p e t i t i o n e r ' s  a d d r e s s .  A b e le s  v .  C o m m is s io n e r ,  91  
T . C .  1 0 1 9 ,  1 C 3 5  ( 1 9 8 8 ) ;  R e v .  P r o c .  9 0 - 1 3 ,  1 9 9 0 - 1  C . B .  4 9 1 .  T h e  a d d r e s s  o n  t h e  
p e t i t i o n e r ' s  m o s t r e c e n t l y  f i l e d  t a x  r e t u r n  w as 1 2 2  W ayne D r i v e ,  * 1 3  G a l l a t i n ,  
T e n n e s s e e  3 7 0 6 6 .  T h e  n o t i c e s  o f  d e f i c i e n c y  a t  is s u e  i n  t h i s  c a s e  w e re  a d d r e s s e d  t c  
t h e  p e t i t i o n e r  a t  1 2 2  W ayne D r i v e ,  G a l l a t i n ,  T e n n e s s e e  3 7 0 6 6 .  AS s u c h ,  t h e  n o t i c e s  
o f  d e f i c i e n c y  w e r e  is s u e d  t o  t h e  p e t i t i o n e r ’ s  " l a s t  know n a d d r e s s "  a n d  a r e  v a l i d .  
T h e  p e t i t i o n e r  d i d  n o t  f i l e  h i s  p e t i t i o n  w i t h  t h i s  C o u r t  u n t i l  J u n e  1 0 ,  2 0 0 2 ,  
w h ic h  d a t e  i s  1 2 2 9  d a y s  a f t e r  t h e  m a i l i n g  o f  t h e  n o t i c e s  o f  d e f i c i e n c y .  T h e  
p e t i t i o n  w as n o t  f i l e d  w i t h  t h e  C o u r t  w i t h i n  t h e  t im e  p r e s c r i b e d  b y  I . R . C .  § §  
6 2 1 3 1 a )  o r  7 5 0 2 .  T h e  r e s p o n d e n t 's  H u t t o n  t o  D is m is s  f u r  L a c k  o f  J u r i s d i c t i o n  
s h o u ld ,  t h e r e f o r e ,  b e  g r a n t e d .
* 1 4  C O N CLUSIO N
I t  f o l l o w s  t h a t  t h e  R e s p o n d e n t 's  M o t i o n  t o  D is m is s  f o r  L a c k  o f  J u r i s d i c t i o n  
s h o u ld  b e  g r a n t e d .
Th om as W. H UN TER , J r . ;  P e t i t i o n e r ,  v .  C O M M IS S IO N E R  OF IN T E R N A L  REVENUE, 
R e s p o n d e n t .
2 0 0 3  WL 2 3 5 1 8 4 1 1  
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R e s p o n d e n t  id .  t h i s  c a s e ,
1 .  p a g e  4 o f  t h e  R e s p o n d e n t ’ s B r i e f * ,  'R e s p o n d e n t  r e c o g n iz e s  t h a t  t h e  P e t i t i o n e r  
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R e s p o n d e n t: e m p h a s iz e  t h a t  t h e  P e t i t i o n e r  d i d  n e t  f i l e  t h i s  Fo rm  2-848 w i t h  t h e  
I n t e r n a . ’  R e v e n u e  A g e n t  w o r l t in t j  h i s  ^ s e  n r  p r o v i d e  t h e  a g e n t  w i t h  s  c o p y  o f  t h e  
Form  2 3 4 3 .  R e v e n u e  P r o c e d u r e  9 C - 1 8 ,  1 9 9 0 - r l  C . B . 4 9 1  s p e c i f i c a l l y  p r o v id e s  f o r  c l e a r  
a n d  c o r .c is e  w r i t t e n  n o t i f i c a t i o n  t c  b e  s e n t  t o  t h e  I n t e r n a l  R e v e n u e  S e r v i c e  C e n t e r  
s e r v i n g  t h e  t a x p a y e r ’ s  o l d  a d d r e s s .
Z .  R e s p o n d e n t  n o t e s  i n  t h e  f i r s t  f u l l  p a r a g r a p h  or. p a g e  5 c f  t h e  A n s w e r :n g  B r i e f  
t h a t  p e t i t i o n e r  f i l e d  a  p e t i t i o n  w i t h  t h i s  C o u r t  e v e r  t h r e e  S3) y e a r s  a f t e r  t h e  
i s s u a n c e  c f  t h e  o r i g i n a l  i s s u a n c e  o f .  t h e  N o t i c e s  o f  A p p e a r a n c e .  R e s p o n d e n t 's  
r e c o r d s  w o u ld  show  t h a t  d u r i n g  t h i s  t h r e e  C31 y e a r ,  p e r i o d ,  P e t i t i o n e r  w as p u r s u i n g  
a l l  a v e n u e s  f o r  a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  r e l i e f  t h a t  w e r e  a v a i l a b l e  t o  h in t .
3 .  P a g e  7 o f  R e s p o n d e n t ’ s B r i e f .  R e s p o n d e n t  c i t e s  t h e  T a d rO S  c a s e  a t  7 6 3  f . 2 n d  
1 3 5 2 ,  s t a t i n g  C h a t  t h e  T a x p a y e r  m u s t  c l e a r l y  i n d i c a t e  t h a t  t h e  f o r m e r  a d d r e s s  was  
t b  no  lo n g e r  b e  u s e d ,  t h e  T a d r c s  c a s e  m e r e ly  n o t e s  t h i s  a s  o r.e  i t e m  w h ic h  w as  
m is s in g  i n  t h e  t a x p a y e r ' s  n o t i f i c a t i o n .
4 .  On p a g e  ' Z  o f  R e s p o n d e n t 's  S r : e f ,  R e s p o n d e n t  c i t e s  R e v e n u e  P r o c e d u r e  6 1 - 1 8 ,  
1 9 6 1 - 2  C .B .  5 5 0 ,  f o r  t h e  p r o p o s i t i o n  t h a t  F o rm  284-8 i s  o n l y  t o  c o n s t i t u t e  a  c h a n g e  
* 5  c f  a d d r e s s  w h en  t h e  Fo rm  2 8 4 3  s p e c i f i c a l l y  p r o v id e s  t h a t  t h e  R e s p o n d e n t  i s  t o  
s e n d  o r i g i n a l ,  n o t i c e s  and . w r i t t e n  c o m m u n ic a t io n s  t o  t h e  T a x p a y e r ’ s  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e .  
T h a t  R e v e n u e  P r o c e d u r e  s im p ly  s t a t e s  t h a t  t h e  I n t e r n a l  R e v e n u e  S e r v i c e  w i l l  
r e c o g n i z e  t h e  a d d r e s s  o f  t h e  T a x p a y e r 's  d u l y  a u t h o r i z e d  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e  a s  
C o n s t i t u t i n g  t h e  l a s t  know n  a d d r e s s  o f  t h e  T a x p a y e r  w h en  a  f i l e d  P o w e r o f  A t t o r n e y  
r e q u e s t s  t h a t ,  a l l  c o m m u n ic a t io n s  b e  m a i l e d  t o  t h e  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e ' s  a d d r e s s .  I t  
f u r t h e r  s p e c i f i c a l l y  s t a t e s  " a  d e t e r m l n a t i  o n  sis -G  w hsit 3 5  T ju c p iy s ir * s  l s s t  
k n o w n  a d d r e s s  w i l l  s t i l l  b e  m ade o n  t h e  b a s i s  o f  t h e  p a r t i c u l a r  f a c t s  i n v o l v e d ,  
t h e  r e q u i r e m e n t s  o f  section. 6 2 1 2 ( b )  o f  t h e  C o d e  a n d  t h e  a p p l i c a b l e  c a s e  l a w ' ' .  I D ,
B . R e s p o n d e n t  r e l i e s  h e a v i l y  o n  R e v e n u e  P r o c e d u r e  9 0 - 1 8 .  P a g e  1 1  o f  R e s p o n d e n t ’ s 
B r i e f  r e f e r s  t o  R e v e n u e  P r o c e d u r e  9 0 - 1 8  a s  b e i n g  t h e  la w  i n  e f f e c t  o n  J a n u a r y  2 8 ,
1 9 3 9 ,  R e v e n u e  P r o c e d u r e  9 0 - 1 8  p r o v id e s  g u id a n c e  r e g a r d i n g  a  c h a n g e  o f  a d d r e s s ,  b u t
i t  i s  m e r e ly  t h e  p o s i t i o n  o f  t h e  I n t e r n a l  R e v e n u e  S e r v i c e  a s  t o  i t s  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  
o f  t h e  la w  a s  e x p r e s s e d  i n  A b e le s  v .  c o m m is s io n e r ,  a n d  o t h e r  c i t e d  c a s e s  
i n t e r p r e t i n g  t h e  la n g u a g e  o f  S e c t i o n  6 2 1 2  o f  t h e  I n t e r n a l  R e v e n u e  C o d e . I n  o r d e r  
t b  d e t e r m in e  w h a t  t h e  la w  r e q u i r e s ,  t h e  f o c u s  m u s t b e  bn  t h e  c o u r t ' s  o p in i o n  i n  
t h e  A b e le s  w h ic h  s t a t e s ,
" t h e  t a x p a y e r ' s  l a s t  know n a d d r e s s  i s  t h a t  a d d r e s s  w h ic h  a p p e a r s  o n  t h e  
t a x p a y e r ' s  m ost, r e c e n t l y  f i l e d  r e t u r n  u n le s s  R e s p o n d e n t  h a s  b e e n  g iv e n  c l e a r  a n d  
c o n c is e  n o t i f i c a t i o n  o f  a  d i f f e r e n t  a d d r e s s . * '  ( e m p h a s is  a d d e d )  I d .  a t  1 0 3 5 .
C l e a r l y ,  t h e  Fo rm  2 8 4 3  c a v e  c l e a r  a n d . c o n c is e  n o t i f i c a t i o n  o f  a  d i f f e r e n t
a d d r e s s .  T h e  c o u r t  * 6  f u r t h e r  s t a t e s  t h a t  “ w h a t  is . s i g n i f i c a n t  i s  w h a t  r e s p o n d e n t  
kn e w  a t  t h e  t im e  t h e  s t a t u t o r y  n o t i c e  w as  i s s u e d . "  i d .  R e s p o n d e n t  r e c o g n iz e s  t h a t  
w -.e r  t h e  Form. 7 3 4 8 ,  P o w e r  o f  A t t o r n e y ,  d e s ig n a t e s  t h e  t a x p a y e r ' s  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e  t o  
r e c e i v e  o r i g i n a l  n o t i c e s  a n d  w r i t t e n  c o m m u n ic a t io n s  i t  i s  t o  b e  r e c o g n iz e d  a s  a 
r.ew a d d r e s s .  I n  t h a t  in s t a n c e  t h e  R e s p o n d e n t  r e c o g n iz e s  t h a t  i t  h a s  k n o w le d g e  o f  
t h e  c o n t e n t s  c -f t h e  P o w e r  o f  A t t o r n e y .  H o w e v e r ,  i f  t h e  b l o c k  o n  t h e  fo r m  i s  n o t  
c h e c k e d  t o  s e n d  t h e  c c . r x - u r . ic a t ic r .s  t c  t h e  t a x p a y e r ' s  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e ,  t h e  
R e s p o n d e n t  d e n ie s  t h a t  i t  h a s  k n o w le d g e  o f  t h e  i n f o r m a t i o n  i n  t h e  P o w er o f  
A t t o r n e y .
R e s p o n d e n t ’ s a rg u m e n t  a n d  t h e  g e n e r a l  g u id a n c e  i r .  R e v e n u e  P r o p .  9 0 - 1 8  i s  d i r e c t e d  
p r i m a r i l y  t o  t h e  f a c t  t h a t  t h e  " c l e a t  a n d  c o r .c is e  n o t i c e "  m u s t n o t  o n l y  n o t i f y  t h e
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f o r  e d u c a t i o n a l  u s e  o k l f
R e s p o n d e n t  o f  a  t a x p a y e r ' s  new  a d d r e s s  b u r  a l s o  s p e c i f i c a l l y  s t a t e  t o  t h e  S e r v i c e  
t h a t  t h e  t a x p a y e r ’ s  fernrds h e  c h a n g e d  t o  r e * ’  s e t .  t h i s  new  a d d r e s s . N o w h e re  i s  
t h i s  r e q u i r e m e n t  f o u n d  i n  t h e  A b e le s  c a s e .  R a t h e r  t h e  c o u r t  i r .  A b e le s  c l e a r l y  
s t a t e s
" s o  h o l d i n g ,  we a r e  m e r e ly  r e i t e r a t i n g  o u r  p o s i t i o n  t h a t  w h a t  i s  o f  s i g n i f i c a n c e  
i t  w h a t  R e s p o n d e n t  k n e w  a t  t h e  t i n e  t h e  s t a t u t o r y  n o t i c e  w as is s u e d  . . .  a n d  
a t t r i b u t i n g  t o  R e s p o n d e n t  i n f o r m a t i o n  w h ic h . R e s p o n d e n t  knows, o r  s h o u ld  k n o w , w i t h  
r e s p e c t  t o  a taxpayer's l a s t  know n  a d d r e s s ,  t h r o u g h  t h e  u s e  o f  i t ' s  c o m p u te r  
s y s te m "  I c .
3ox I  o f  Fo rm  2 8 4 8  c l e a r l y  s t a t e s  t h a t  t h e  i n f o r m a t i o n  c o n t a in e d  i n  t h a t  b o x  i s  
t h e  taxpayer’s "nam e a n d  a d d r e s s " ,  R e s p o n d e n t  s p e c i f i c a l l y  r e c o g n iz e s  t h a t  t h e  
i n f o r m a t i o n  o n  t h e  F o o l  2848 i s  i n f o r m a t i o n  w h ic h  i s  "k n o w n ” t o  Che R e s p o n d e n t  i f  
t h e  b o x  i s  c h e c k e d  w h ic h  d e s ig n a t e s  t h e  Taxpayer's r e p r e s e n t a t i v e  t o  r e c e i v e  
o r i g i n a l  n o t i c e s  a n d  communications b u t  i s  n o t  " k n o w n "  i f  t h i s  b o x  i s  n o t  c h e c k e d .  
T h is  l o g i c  I s  l u d i c r o u s .  T h e  c o u r t  i  -i. t h e  Abeles case c o r r e c t '  V fo c u s e d  *7 on t h e  
k n o w le d g e  o f  t h e  C o m m is s io n e r .  T h e  c a s e s  r e c o g n i z i n g  t h a t  t h e  Fo rm  28  48  m ay  
d e s ig n a t e  t h e  taxpayer's r e p r e s e n t a t i v e  t o  r e c e i v e  n o t i c e s  s im p ly  c o n c lu d e  t h a t  
t h e  r e s p o n d e n t  m ay r e l y  o n  t h a t  d e s i g n a t i o n  i n  i s s u i n g  a s t a t u t o r y  n o t i c e  c f  
d e f i c i e n c y .  I f  t h e  r e s p o n d e n t  i s  t o  r e c c g .n i . ie  t h e  Ecrtr. 2C 48  a s  c l e a r  a n d  c o r .c is e  
n o t i c e  o f  a  d i f f e r e n t  a d d r e s s  i f  a  b l o c k  i s  c h e c k e d ,  i t  s h o u ld  r e c o g n iz e  t h e  From  
2 8 4 8  a s  c l e a r  a n d  c o n c is e  n o t i c e  o f  a  d i f f e r e n t  a d d r e s s  w hen  t h e  b l o c k  i s  n o t  
c h e c k e d  b u t  t h e  Fo rm  23.48 h a s  a  d i f f e r e n t  a d d r e s s  f o r  t h e  tax p a y e r .
V I I I .
CO N CLUSIO N
T h is  c o u r t  s h o u ld  h o l d  t h a t  t h e  p r o p e r l y  s u b m i t t e d  Form  2 3 4 8 ,  P o w e r o f  A t t o r n e y ,  
c o n t a i n i n g  a  d i f f e r e n t  a d d r e s s  f o r  t h e  P e t i t i o n e r  t h a n  on. h i s  p r e v i o u s l y  s u b m i t t e d  
in c o m e  tax r e t u r n  w as  c l e a r  a n d  c o n c is e  n o t i f i c a t i o n  o f  a d i f f e r e n t  a d d r e s s  a s  t h e  
la w  i s  i n t e r p r e t e d  i n  A b e le s  v ,  C o m m is s io n e r ,  I d .  P e t i t i o n e r ’ s  M o t io n  f o r  
D is m i s s a l  s h o u ld  b e  g r a n t e d .
Th om as S .  H U N TE R , J r . ,  P e t i t i o n e r ,  v .  C fcM M IS S I0K S R  OF IB T E K J A li REVENUE, 
R e s p o n d e n t .
2 0 0 3  WL 2 3 5 1 8 4 1 2  
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T.C. Memo. 2004-81 
UNITED STATES TAX COURT
THOMAS W. HUNTER, JR., Petitioner V.
COMMISSTONER o f  INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent
Docket No. 9855-02. Filed March 23, 2004.
James David LeckrOne, for petitioner.
Rebecca Dance Harris, for respondent.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
HOLMES, Judge-: In September 1998, petitioner Thomas Hunter
moved from Gallatin to Hendersonville, Tennessee, He knew when 
tie moved that the IRS was auditing his tax returns. In, October 
1998, he hired new accountants to represent him, and filed a 
power-of-attorney form that both directed the IRS to send copies 
of all correspondence to their office in Nashville and listed his
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own new address in Hendersonville. In January 1999, respondent 
sent notices of deficiency for the tax years under audit to 
petitioner at his old address in Gallatin. He never received 
them. Respondent did not mail duplicates to him at his new 
address, nor did he mail duplicates to petitioner's accountants 
in Nashville.
The case comes to us on the parties' cross-motions to 
dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. The question presented is 
whether petitioner, by filing this power-of-attorney form, gave 
respondent a clear and concise notification of his change of 
address.
Background
This case turns on the timing of a few key events:
August 14, 1997 Petitioner files 1991-1995 returns.
July 30, 1998
August 13, 1998
September 1998
Petitioner files 1996 return. The 
parties assume that this return listed 
petitioner's Gallatin address.
The revenue agent issues her findings on 
petitioner's 1991-1996 tax liability in 
a revenue agent's report that she sends 
to petitioner at his Gallatin address.
He receives it, but doesn't respond.
Petitioner moves to Hendersonville, 
Tennessee.
October 23, 1998 Petitioner signs Form 2848 ("Power of
Attorney and Declaration of 
Representative") listing his 
Hendersonville address and naming three 
accountants as his designated 
representatives for the 6 tax years 
under audit. The form directs
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respondent to send copies of all 
correspondence to both the first and 
second accountants named on the form.
November 19, 1998 The IRS service center in Memphis
receives and processes the Form 2848.
January 28, 1999 Respondent issues three notices of
deficiency covering all 6 tax years. 
Respondent sends these notices to the 
Gallatin address. All are sent by 
certified mail; two are returned to the 
IRS as unclaimed, and there is no record 
of what happened to the third.
Petitioner receives statements of 
account for each of the years in 
question from the IRS, sent to him at 
his Hendersonville address.
Petitioner begins suggesting compromise 
to resolve all years in question.
Petitioner continues settlement talks, 
first with a revenue agent and then with 
the IRS Appeals office.
Petitioner files petition. (In lieu of 
the notices of deficiency, which he 
still hasn't received, he attaches the 
revenue agent's reports from August 
1998} .
Petitioner continues to be a resident of Tennessee, as he 
was when he filed his petition. When the case neared trial in 
Nashville, both parties moved to dismiss the petition for lack of 
jurisdiction--petitioner on the ground that respondent never sent 
a notice of deficiency to his last known address, and respondent 
on the ground that petitioner filed his petition well outside our 
SO-day jurisdictional limit. The parties have stipulated or not
July 1999
September 1999
July 2000- 
April 2002
June 10, 2002
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contested the key facts and documents.1
Discussion
Our jurisdiction to redetermine deficiencies exists only 
when the Commissioner issues a notice of deficiency and a 
taxpayer files a timely petition to redetermine that deficiency. 
Rule 13(a), (c); Monge v. Commissioner. 93 T.C. 22, 27 (19S9); 
Normac. Inc. v. Commissioner. 90 T.C. 142, 147 (1988) . The 
Internal Revenue Code says that a notice of deficiency shall be 
"sufficient" if "mailed to the taxpayer at his last known 
address." Sec. 6212(b)(1) . 2 There is no statutory definition of 
“last known address," and the resulting gap has been filled with 
a "plethora of caselaw decided by this and other courts." Marks 
v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1989-575, affd. 947 F.2d 983 (D.C. 
Cir. 1991).3
In Abeles v. Commissioner. 91 T.C. 1019, 1035 (1988), we
1 The most important fact that the parties did not stipulate 
is whether petitioner ever received a notice of deficiency. 
Petitioner testified at the short hearing held before the case 
was submitted that he never had. Respondent objected to the 
proposed finding of fact citing that testimony, but only by 
characterizing the testimony as "self-serving." On this crucial 
point, we agree with petitioner-noting especially that 
respondent, in his own motion to dismiss, asserted only that he 
sent three notices of deficiency to petitioner— the three 
ccncededly sent to petitioner's old address in Jan. 1999.
2 Subsequent section references are all to the Internal 
Revenue Code.
3 Respondent has issued a regulation, sec. 301.6212-2,
Proced. & Admin. Regs., defining "last known address." The 
regulation's effective date, however, is Jan. 29, 2001, after the 
events giving birth to these motions.
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held that
a taxpayer's last known address is that address which 
appears on the taxpayer's most recently filed return, 
unless respondent has been given clear and concise 
notification of a different address.
We also held in Abeles that once a taxpayer notifies the IRS 
that his address has changed, the Commissioner "must exercise 
reasonable care and diligence in ascertaining, and mailing the 
notice of deficiency to, the correct address." Id. at 1031. And 
we focus in deciding whether he's exercised reasonable care on 
"the information that would be available to the IRS at the time 
that it issued the deficiency if it had used reasonable 
diligence."4 Ward v. Comntissloner. 907 F.2d 517, 521 (5th Cir. 
1990), revg. and remanding 92 T.C. 949 (19B9). So the specific 
question to be answered is whether petitioner, by listing his new 
address on his power-of-attorney form, gave respondent "clear and 
concise notification" of his new address.
Two courts have already answered the question. In Rizzo v. 
Davis. 43 APTR 2d 985, 79-1 USTC par. 9310 (W.D. Pa. 1979), the
4 Most circuits consider the "last known address" issue to 
be a purely factual question, e.g., McPartlin v. Commissioner,
6S3 F . 2d 1185, 1189 (7th Cir. 1981), or a "mixed question" which 
is "essentially factual", Kino v. Commissioner. 857 F.2d 676, 578 
(9th Cir. 1988), affg. 88 T.C. 1042 (1987); cf. Armstrong v. 
Commissioner, 15 r.3d 970, 973 (10th Cir. 1994), affg. T.C. Memo.
1992-328. In a case involving "the extraordinary circumstances 
of taxpayers whose address had changed twice * * * even though 
they have never moved," the Second Circuit reviewed de novo the 
"legal conclusion as to the [Commissioner's] satisfaction of the 
reasonable diligence requirement". Sicari v. Commissioner. 136 
F .3d 925, 928 (2d Cir. 1998), revg. T.C. Memo. 1997-104. The 
Sixth Circuit has not decided what standard of review applies.
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court found--at the Government's insistence--that the taxpayer's 
Form 2848 established a "last known address'' different from the 
one appearing on the taxpayer's most recently filed return. And 
in Johnson v. Commissioner. 611 F.2d 1015, 1020 (Sth Cir. 1980), 
revg. and remanding T.C. Memo. 1977-382, the Fifth Circuit 
similarly held that a Form 2848 is sufficient to change a last 
known address, even if the IRS later loses the form. We 
ourselves have repeatedly held that a power-of-attorney form 
directing the IRS to send all original documents to a 
representative is an adequate notification of a change of 
address: Maranto v. Commissioner. T.C. Memo. 1999-266; Eloart v.
Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1996-379; Honts v. Commissioner, T.C. 
Memo. 19 95-532 .
This case would seem only a bit different--here petitioner 
directed that conies be sent to his accountants, and it is he 
rather than respondent who is claiming that a Form 2848 
effectively makes a change of address. Petitioner suggests 
neither of these distinctions makes a difference. In his view, 
for a filing to change a "last known address" it must only be 
(1) clear and concise, (2) a notification, (3) and show a 
different address from the last one sent to the IRS. Ke then 
insists that his October 1998 power-of-attorney form meets all 
three requirements. It was "clear and concise" because the Form 
2848 was the IRS's own form,- it was a notification because it was
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sent to the appropriate IRS service center, as the IRS required, 
see Rev. Proc. 90-18, sec. 4.02, 1990-1 C.B. 491, 492, and it 
definitely showed a different address.5
Respondent chose not to file a reply brief and so missed his 
chance to grapple with Rizzo and Johnson. Instead, he argues 
that petitioner's proposed test leaves out a critical fourth 
element: An express statement of intent by a taxpayer that his
address of record be changed to his new address. See Rev. Proc.
90-18, sec. 5.04(1), 1990-1 C.B. at 494.6 This failure, which 
respondent strongly suggests could easily have been cured by 
using Form 8852--the IRS's official change-of-address form--in 
his view vitiates petitioner's attempt to use a Form 2848 to 
effect a change of address.
Respondent finds this fourth element not in any case 
involving powers of attorney, but in other cases stating 
seemingly broad principles of "last known address" law. He 
begins with Alta Sierra Vista v. Commissioner, 62 T.C. 367, 374 
(1974) , a case where we noted that "Administrative realities
5 Respondent suggests that petitioner could have given the 
form to the revenue agent working on the audit. This is true, 
but hardly decisive--respondent's own procedure allows a taxpayer 
to mail the form to the Service Center that received his last 
return.
5 Note that we have held that revenue procedures generally,
and Rev. Proc. 90-18, supra, in particular, do not bind this 
Court. Westahal v. Commissioner. T.C. Memo. 1992-599.
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demand that the burden fall upon the taxpayer to keep the
Commissioner informed as to his proper address." Id. at 374
(citations omitted). Alta Sierra Vista spoke of respondent's
"entitlement" to treat the address on a taxpayer's most recent
tax return as his last known address. Respondent insists that
this "entitlement" creates a presumption which simply listing a
new address on a power-of-attorney form does not rebut.
Respondent then cites cases in which various documents other
than power-of-attorney forms were found insufficient to rebut
this presumption. His leading case is Tadros v. Commissioner.
763 F.2d 89 (2d Cir. 1985). Tadros featured a taxpayer who lived
in New York when he filed his 1981 tax return, but who moved to
New Jersey in January 1983. In March 1983, the Commissioner sent
a notice of deficiency to his old New York address, but the
Postal Service returned it as "undeliverable".
Tadros argued that he had told the Commissioner of his move
to New Jersey in a letter he had written to the IRS in January
1983 on stationery printed with his New Jersey address. His
letter asked for copies of correspondence and said that he needed
the copies to replace originals that he had "'lost or misplaced
in the process of moving.'" Id. at 92.
The Second Circuit held that the letter was a mere "routine
inquiry," not amounting to an official change of address:
Tadros's letter * * * indicated neither that Tadros had 
permanently moved, nor whether the Jersey City address
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on the letterhead was his new place of residence. Nor 
did it mention the old address or indicate that it was 
no longer to be used.
The steps taken by the IRS when the March 8 notice was 
returned as undeliverable show that it exercised 
reasonable care to ascertain Tadros's new address.
Id. (emphasis added).
The letter Tadros had sent the IRS was not an IRS form, and
not in a format drafted by the IRS itself. Respondent would
nevertheless have us find that petitioner's power of attorney is
like Tadros's stationery--it too made no mention of his old
address and did not expressly indicate that the old address was
no longer to be used. We do not, however, read Tadros as listing
requirements needed to make an effective change of address in all
cases. Instead, we read it as suggesting ways in which the
letter in that case could have sufficed--for example, by
identifying the old address and noting that it had been replaced
by the new one.
Respondent next points to Pvo v. Commissioner. 83 T.C. 626
(1984), which does at least feature an IRS-designed form--Form
872, the form the IRS customarily uses to extend the statute of
limitations. The IRS had itself incorrectly filled out the
taxpayer-address portion of the form with the Pyos' old address
before sending it to their accountant. The Pyos did not catch
the mistake before returning the form to the IRS. A year later,
the IRS sent a notice of deficiency to the old address, despite
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having traded letters with the Pyos at their new address in the 
meantime.
When the notice was returned as undeliverable, the IRS 
relied on the erroneously completed Form 872 as evidence that the 
Pyos' old address was their "last known address." The Court 
rejected this argument, holding that an "inadvertent" failure by 
a taxpayer to correct an IRS mistake on a form would be 
insufficient to establish a last known address, especially when 
so much time had passed since the Pyos sent back the Form 072 and 
the IRS had begun writing to them at their new address. Pvo does 
not support the proposition that a form filed for a purpose other 
than changing an address will not create a new "last known 
address"; rather, it teaches that taxpayers will not be penalized 
for inadvertently failing to correct IRS mistakes.
Petitioner's Form 2848, in contrast, calls upon taxpayers to 
fill it out themselves and include their address. “ [I]t seems 
anomalous to permit * * * [respondent] to prescribe the medicine 
and then punish the patient for taking it." Johnson. 611 F.2d at 
1019. And our caselaw--beginning at least with Honts--holds that 
a power-of-attorney form works as a change of address.
Respondent tries to limit those cases' force by arguing that the 
Form 2848 is sufficient notice of an address change only when it 
directs originals of all notices and communications be sent to 
the taxpayer's representative instead of the taxpayer. He argues
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that petitioner's case is different: His form directed only 
conies go to his representatives, and merely informed respondent 
of his address, without saying that he wished the new address to 
supplant the old.
But we reject the assertion that a valid change-of-address 
notification must use language equivalent to "please note that 
this is a change of address." As petitioner points out, no such 
glaring notification exists on a tax return, or on the power-of- 
attorney forms given effect in Rizzo and Johnson.
We also think that respondent's position overlooks a more 
general theme in the case law; namely, that the IRS is chargeable 
with knowing the information that it has readily available when 
it sends notices to taxpayers. As courts have repeatedly 
observed, the steady advance of technology continues to lighten 
the IRS's burden in searching its own records for current address 
information. Union Tex. Intl. Co. v. Commissioner. 110 T-C. 321, 
334 (1998) .
Petitioner is thus right in noting that address information 
on the Form 2848 is not mere surplusage. The IRS asks for that 
information and solicits taxpayer's directions on what address 
should be used for original and duplicate notices. This strongly 
implies that respondent will actually incorporate the information 
on the form into its databases and use the information when 
sending notices to a taxpayer's "last known address."
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Respondent's position is essentially that it is up to
taxpayers to flag change-of-address information in a way so
obvious as to be immune from occasional bureaucratic
irregularities. But the minimal burden to the IRS must be
balanced against the potentially serious consequences for
taxpayers who rely on the IRS to process in a businesslike way
the information that it receives. The Tadros decision itself
recognized that the IRS has an "obligation" to "exercise
reasonable care in determining an address." Tadros. 763 F .2d at
91-92. And as we announced in Abeles:
the IRS' computer system was available to respondent's 
agent responsible for mailing the notice of deficiency, 
and * * * the system would have reflected the [correct 
address] had such agent caused a computer search of 
petitioner's TIN.
Abeles at 1034.7 In short, the IRS should not "ignore that which
it obviously knows." United States v. Bell. 183 Bankr. 650, 653
(S.D. Fla. 1995} .
Respondent's failure to act on what he knew continued even
after the notices were returned as "unclaimed". Respondent's own
manual suggests that he should have kept trying to find the right
7 The record in this case contains scant information on the 
procedures and database capabilities of respondent. We are 
guided, however, by the stipulation of the parties that the Form 
2848 was processed on Nov. 19, 1998; and by Rev. Proc. 90-18, 
which indicates that the IRS requires 45 days to process address 
information. The 45-day period, ever, counting from the time the 
Form 2848 was filed, would have ended well before Jan. 28, 1998-- 
the date that the IRS sent out the notices of deficiency.
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
1 4 7
address. 1 Audit, Internal Revenue Manual (CCH), sec.
4243.2(6)(b) {as in effect January 1999) (if mail undeliverable, 
IRS should "check all possible sources in the case files").8 
Instead, the stipulated facts show no effort to redeliver the 
notices even after respondent began using petitioner's 
Hendersonville address in correspondence, and while he continued 
to meet with petitioner's accountants in settlement talks for 
several years. The caselaw calls this evidence of lack of 
reasonable care and due diligence. See Pvo, 83 T.C. at 538 
(corresponding with taxpayers at new address suggests knowledge 
of new address); Honts. T.C. Memo. 1995-532 (Commissioner should 
verify address if in regular contact with taxpayer's 
representative!. And we ourselves have stressed that the 
Commissioner can protect himself from last-known-address problems 
by sending copies to each possible address. Elgart v. 
Commissioner. T.C. Memo. 1995-379; Karosen v Commissioner. T.C. 
Memo. 1983-540. No such steps are on record here, even though 
petitioner had asked on his Form 2848 for copies of all 
correspondence to go to two of his accountants.
1 Respondent points out that there is no record of the third 
notice's being returned. Because we find that respondent failed 
to issue any of these notices to petitioner's last known address, 
the ambiguity surrounding the ultimate fate of this one notice is 
irrelevant. Respondent also argues that the house number on the 
Form 2848 was incorrectly listed as 2200, rather than 2220. This 
would only be relevant if respondent had used it to address the 
notices of deficiency at issue.
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Nothing compels the Commissioner to ask taxpayers to list 
their address on a Form 2848. By doing so, and by using that 
requested information to identify taxpayers within IRS records, 
respondent bears the burden of conforming his actions to the 
knowledge at his disposal. See Alta Sierra Vista. 62 T.C. at 
374. This is important not only because of the statutory 
requirements of section 6213, but also because, as petitioner 
points out, taxpayers are put in the position of quite reasonably 
assuming that the address information they provide to the IRS 
will be noted and acted upon.
We agree with petitioner that listing his Hendersonville 
address on the Form 2848 provided respondent with "clear and 
concise" notification of his change of address. His 
Hendersonville address thus became his "last known address" under 
section 6213 . We shall therefore grant his motion to dismiss 
this case for lack of jurisdiction, and deny respondent’s.
To reflect the foregoing,
An order will be entered 
granting petitioner's, and denying 
respondent's, motion to dismiss 
for lack of jurisdiction.
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